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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
October 1 ~ , 1980 Conference
List 1, Sheet /Zj
No. 80-148 CSY
Cert to Cal Ct App (Christian;
Rattigan, dissenting")_ _ __

ROBBINS

v.
CALIFORNIA

State/Criminal

SUMMARY:

Timely

Petr argues that marijuana contained in a package

wrapped in opaque plastic that was seized from the trunk of his
car should have been suppressed.
FAC'J'S AND DECISIONS

DELO\'v:

Petr 's car was stopped by

police officers who had observed him driving erratically.
officer detected the smell of burnt m

An

ijuana in t he car and

~1M~ ~ fu ~t w;11
uJt•v¥co.{e(~ ~
~e_ ~bvtle.. -, ne.v; to.Ide.

'I+

- 2 -

arrested petr for driving under the influence of marijuana.
The officer then searched the car, discovering a cookie tin
containing marijuana seeds.

Petr told the officers: "What

you're looking for is in the back".

They opened the trunk and

found a tote bag and two large packages wrapped in plastic.
They searched the tote
marijuana.

ba~

and found about three pounds of

They opene d each package and . found fifteen poiunds

of marijuana.
Before his trial petr moved to suppress the items seized
from his car.

The motion was denied, and petr was eventually

found guilty of possession of marijuana, possession for sale,
and transportation of marijuana.

The Ct App affirmed, holding

that the search was valid under the automobile exception to the

(

4th Amendment's warrant requirement.

This Court GVR'd for

reconsideration in light of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
(1979).

On remand, the state conceded that Sanders required the
suppression of the items seized from the luggage and the cookie
tin, but argued that the seizure of the packages was
justified.

The Ct App agreed.

It admitted that there was no

evidence that the plastic wrapping was sufficiently transparent
to reveal the packages' contents.

However, it examined a

photograph of one of the packages and concluded t hat the
package did not "present an appearance of contai1ing anything
other than contraband.

Any experienced observer could

have inferred from the appearance of the packages that they
contained bricks of marijuana."

The court also cited the

testimony of one of the officers who stated that he had been

- 3 -

told. that marijuana was commonly packaged in this manner.

The

Court relied upon the statement in Sanders that police do not
need a warrant to inspect containers that "by their very nature
cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because
their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance".
442

u.s.

at 764-65 n.l3.

Since the simple possession charge was based upon the
evidence seized from the luggage and the cookie tin, petr's
conviction on that charge was reversed.

,.

The transportation and

possession for sale convictions were affirmed.
The dissent argued that the package "presents • • • the
visual impression of a package that had been tightly wrapped
for shipment by mail, or to protect its contents," and that its
appearance indicated nothing about its contents.

"For all that

I see, it could contain books, stationery, canned goods, or any
number of other wholly innocuous items which might be heavy in
weight.

In fact, it bears a remarkable resemblance to an

unlabelled carton of highway flares that I bought from a store
shelf and have carried in the trunk of my own automobile."
dissent regarded the officer's hearsay testimony that

The

m~rijuana

was normally wrapped in this manner as insufficient to
establish probable cause to search the package.
The Cal. Sup. Ct. denied review, Bird, C.J., and Tobriner,
J. dissenting.
CONTENTIONS:

Petr argues that the Ct. App. did not comply

with this Court's mandate because it upheld the seizure under
the ''plain view" doctrine.

He believes that the only question

open on remand was whether the seizure complied with Sanders.

- 4 Petr also argues that this case exemplifies Justice
Blackmun's statement in Sanders that "[s]till hanging in limbo,
and probably soon to be litigated, are the briefcase, the
wallet, the package, the paper bag, and every oth e r kind of
container." 442

u.s. at 768 (dissenting opinion).

He argues

that applying a "reasonable expectation of privacy" standar d to
containers found in automobil es on a c a se by cas e basis will
allow the police and the courts to oper a te under inherently
subjective standards.

He contends that a better ruie is that

no container found in an automobile may be searche d without a
warrant unless its contents are in plain view.
DISCUSSION:

Petr's complaint that the Ct App disregarded

this Court's mandate is puzzling.

The court simply found that

the seizure was consistent with Sanders.

Contrary to petr's

argument, it did not hold that the contents of th e packag es
were in plain view.
Unless the Court wishes to adopt petr's

propo s ed~~~

rule concerning containers, I do not believe that this case
warrants review.

While it is by no means clear that the court

below applied Sanders correctly, the question pre s ented is
fact-bound.

If the Court took this case, it would be a useful

precedent for cases involving packages wrapped in opaque
plastic, but not otherwise helpful.
I recommend denial.
There is no response.

(

10/6/80
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~~'-1.-~~~~
BENCH MEMORANDUM . ~4.._~

~~~"'t ~P·!"'·U.ht!l't'~ ·
Byrne ?.?~~. T~ - ~~~~~
~·

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Peter

DATE:

April 21, 1981

RE:

No. 80-148,

I(

--

~ ~ ~

Rob~o~ ~ ~

~

·~~ ·

~ ~: ~~~,,~,--~~
~~~ · J3~:S~~~~~~
I
. l l /~-~~_,.~/~- __./ __--:/'.~.t-.-~.- .. JJ~C-ru..~
~ ~- -;r Que~Cl'sent~ f[,:,~~, .... _(}
_.!
~i4A/~~~~

,~,~d,·k~~

~~ ~e ~ upon probab l e cause search a sealed,

1

wr~p~dp~c-~ge"-~ithout

a

~J;;di:;:,...IJI.f ~ ~ ~
J

~~~1~~·vt- ~~J,.vtJ-:S~ .

Jju:;l-~/~

~/h.- ~~.J!,t,~ /2~ ~~ 2-u-~
ff Th~~s both an ~ssue requiring the

ap~tiotfcf

known, but

broa~ ~\~~-;cif~r~~~

~~ ~.At~ ~ ./.l,eaRe-L ~ ~ .,l.<)

//"2!1.-41 .

law- fo 7 a particuiai ' iact ·- ;itu~ t ~ and a difficult question of

1~
. ~
d. .
~~
1 required
' ....- d (~f.-h~
~
k
1 1nle
.drawing.
Pr1rnarilf
1st e app l'1cat1on
o f Aransas

J.

v.

Sanders,

less

442

u.s.

753

(1979)

to the search of a container

"inevitably associ a ted with

the expectation of privacy"

than a piece of personal luggage. See id., at 762.
The
rectangular

container

package,

at

covered

issue
with

here
green

is
opaque

a

15

.

pound,

plastic

and

2.

sealed.

The

majority

photograph,
The

and

characterize

majority

stated

dissent

its

that

below,

who

viewed

only

a

appearance somewhat differently.

"the

very

appearance

of

a

bulky,

fifteen pound, brick-shaped, plastic-wrapped package suggested
that

it contained a

specific

marijuana) •.•. [L] egally
packaged

in

this

wrapped

in

tinfoil.

inferred

from

contained

bricks

possessible

manner,

the

type of

as

Any

are

objects
food

of

marijuana."

(a brick of
not

commonly

tobacco

commonly

observer

the

The

are

and

experienced

appearance

of

contraband

could

have

that

they

packages

dissent

rather

sees,

"a

package that had been tightly wrapped for shipment by mail, or
to protect its contents, or for
remarkable

resemblence

to

an

both purposes ..•• [I]t bears a

unlabelled

carton

of

emergency

highway flares that I bought from a store and have carried in
the trunk of my own automobile."
The

principles

for

determining

whether

the

police

needed to obtain a warrant befor opening the package to search
for contraband are set forth

in Sanders. First, subject to a

few "jealously and carefully drawn" exceptions, a warrant must
be

obtained

reasonable

before

is

the

any

search

search.

The

no

matter

exceptions

how

pertain

otherwise
to

those

circumstances "where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant,
such

as

danger

destruction

of

to

law

evidence,

officers

or

outweight

the
the

risk
reasons

of

loss
for

or

prior

recourse to a neutral magistrate." Id., at 759. The burden is
on those seeking the exception to show the need for it. Id. at
760. In determining whether a warrant is needed before a search

3.

of

personal

luggage

removed

a

expectation of

privacy

repository

one 1 s

argues

for

that

police

person
in

particular

has

luggage,

a

full

because

personal effects.
have

any

greater

need

Court

because the luggage can be secured while a warrant
2)

no

the

exception,

and

is

automobile,

that

procured,

there

an

concluded

is

1)

from

and
it

need

an

warrant

common
no one

immediate

Thus, except ~

search of the wrapped package than of a suitcase.
for the fact

a

case,

for

the

reasonable

"is

In this

for

the ~

that it would embrace more containers within

requirement,

there

is

no

asserted

~~
apparent 1 ~ -~

or

~

en~

for exluding this package from the warrant ~

requirement.
Thus,

the determinative

issue here

is whether petr uJ~

had such a lessened expectation of privacy in this package that
the usual reasons for

the

inferred

search on

from

its

applicab~e ~
·~~Ju;.
remand the~{ -~

requiring a warrant are not

This case has already been GVR 1 d on Sanders; on
upheld

the

ground

outward

that

its

appearance.

As

contents
noted

~

could

above,

the

majority below believed that a trained observor would know from
looking

at

the

plastic

brick of marijuana.
conclusion

as

the

wrapped

There

officer

~

is

a

package
factual

who conducted

that

it

contained

difficulty with

a

this

the search had only

heard that marijuana was packaged this way, but had never seen
it before despite being in the Highway Patrol for 8 years. The
~

ct 1 s

analysis

stated:

stems

~

from

fn.

13

in Sanders,

where the Court

4.

Not all containers and packages found by the
police during the course of a search will deserve
the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus,
some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools
or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support
any reasonable expectation of privacy because their
contents
can
be
inferred
from
their
outward
Cl.EP.ear anc.e. Similarly, in some cases the co1ntents
of a package will be open to "plain view," thereby
obviai tng
the
need
for
a
warrant.
[ citation
omitted]. There will be difficulties in determining
which parcels taken from an automobile require a
warrant for their search and which do not."
I

read

the

"outward

refinement of

the plain view

conceal

is

what

within,

appearance"

rule:

because

if

rule

the

of

a

to

package

peculiar

be

a

does

not

shape

or

labelling, then the contents are constructively in plain view.
I

think that the Cal Ct read this

footnote

far

too

broadly in holding that from its outward appearance one could
tell

that

it

contained

marijuana.

had

Thepackage

a

simple

geometric shape rather than a shape revealing the profile of
the

-

content,

blank,

n one

and

can

like

a

the owner

see

ins ide,

gun case.
has
it

If

the

outward

appearance

is

sealed the opaque wrapping so that
cannot

plausibly

be

said

that

the

contents can be "infered" from the outward appearance. The size
and

plastic wrapping

suspicion"

that

the

could

give

package

no more

contained

than

a

contrabamd.

"reasonable
A holding

that it could would do no more than encourage criminal to wrap
packages

in

paper

rather

than

plastic,

or

make

up

smaller

packages.
The state broadens the focus of the court's holding.
Its

position

contents

is

could

not
be

that

inferred

no warrant was
from

its

needed

outward

because

the

appearance,

but

5.

rather offers as a rule:

"If a reasonable person, in light of

all the circumstances, has cause to believe that the container
in

question

warrantless

is

a

repository

search

circumstances,

the

is

of

personal

prohibited ..•. In

effects,

then

evaluating

all

the

searching police officer may consider

intended purpose of the container, its present use,

a

the

how it is

secured or sealed, how it is stored, its outside markings, its
weight and consistency, and any odor

it may omit."

In short,

the state would have the officer determine on the spot from the
appearance of the package and the context within which it is
discovered,

whether

the

individual

is

likly

to

have

a

subjective expectation of privacy in such a package and whether
a

judge

that

later will decide

expectation.

This

markedly

from

the

because,

the

state

that society

test

test

in

practice

suggested in

suggests,

is willing to uphold

the

might

footnote
officer

not

differ

13 of Sanders,

would

reach

his

judgment by estimating from the available evidence whether "the
container

houses

personal

effects."

It

is

still

based

on

a

guess by the officer about the contents based on the appearance
of the package.
The SG's argument
His

argument

depends

character isi tcs

of

the

is similar

"only

to that of

incidentally

parcels

at

issue

upon
here

the state.

those
that

special
indicated
I

their general charcter." Brief at 7. Rather he would require a
warrant for the search of only those "container §_ that

__,

function

as

repositories

------~~---------~

that

the

for

personal

~

effects

or

normally ~-

~h..t;;u

papers,

~-----------------------~~---

functional

equi v lent of

luggage,

S' GS'

or

such as

6.

suitcases,
bags."
and

briefcases,

purses,

duffle bags,

knapsacks and gym

In drawing the line between these private repositories

lesser

containers,

such

as

"paper

and

plastic

bags

and

packages", the SG suggests that courts look to "the precautions
taken to preserve privacy,

the manner in which the interested

individual has emp f loyed the object or location to be searched,
and applicable property rights insofar as they reflect widelyshared

u.s.

privacy

expectations."

Citing

Rakas

128, 152 (Powell, J., concurring).

v.

Illinois,

439

By illustration the SG

quotes with approval the analysis of why a paper bag does not
sufficiently implicate privacy interests to require a warrant
in

the

(D.C.

panel

opinion

Cir.

(1980),

in United States
rev'd

en

bane,

v.

Ross,

(1981).

No.

This

79-1624
analysis

emphasizes that a paper bag may fall or break open easily. The
SG

concedes

mail,

Ex

that certain' packages,

parte

Jackson,

96

u.s.

such as
727

a

parcel

(1878),

do

in

the

require

a

warrant because the markings on the package indicate a special
desire for privacy. See Brief at 15, n.9.
II
Thus, two
main rationales are offereJi for permitting
....___.._.....a

warrantless

~

it

sea<fr h of

contents

appearance.

This

plain

and

view

the

could

is what
stems

I

package

at

issue

in

this

case.

be

inferred

from

the

have

referred

to

constructive

directly

from

footnote

as
13

outward

in Sanders.

~ the outward appearance of the container indicated that
it

was

not

reasonable

the

kind

of

expectation

container
of

privacy.

in

which
This

a

person

view

is

has

a

clearly

7.
articulated by the SG and the state too relies on it to some
degree.
search

In my view,
in

this

neither

case.

Both

theory
theories

justifies
do have

the warrantless
some validity as

narrow exceptions to the general rule I wou~d~opt:

the seasfh of any container that conceals

is required for
contents

from

a warrant~17L~~

visual

inspection.

I

will

explain my

its)~

problems

with each suggested theory.
The Cal cts stretching of the constructive plain view

~

.

exception to cover a rectangle warapped in plain green plastic~~·
would

allow

the

Sanders

shape could

not

suggest

exception

to

the contents.

swallow

the

rule.

The ( ~

The ct must have been

.J..o

1.- ~~ ..•-.

~

~)··~ .

persuaded by the use of plastic as a wrapping, but plastic is a

~~

most common wrapping. Drawing lines like these could not result

~

in

principled

distinctions:

what

if

the

package

had

been

wrapped in paper? Surely, the Sanders exception must be limited
to packages whose peculiar outward appearance suggests a very
high

probability

therein.

If not,

that

a

type

of

contraband

will

be

found

the officer observing the outward appearance

will be able to draw the inferences and weigh the probabilites
that

the Fourth Amendment wants

magistrate.

The

exception should

to be

examined by a

be limited

to

neutral

circumstances

where the certainty of the inference that the package contains
a

particular

superfluous.
circumstances
interest

It

renders

will

where

provides

requirement.

·',t•.

item

be
no

a

consideration

recalled
exigency

reason

to

that
or

by

a

magistrate

we

are

considering

other

law

enforcement

dispense

with

the

warrant

8.
1

The

SG's

repositories

and

distinction
less

between

substantial

luggage-like

containers

doubtful premise and would be unworkable

personal

rests

in practice.

on

a

No-1'-

~
jD~~

The SG ~

seeks to isolate those containers where a person is unlikly to

- -------

have a reasonable expectation of privacy, but the main test of
.
distinction he adopts
is the material from which the container

is made. But there are many instances in which people put items
J'

they wish to keep private, letters and books are only the most
obvious such items, in paper, plastic or cardboard containers.
c_hea_p -~bstantial containers may be the only
~---~--------~--------------------kinds available. The en bane opinion in Ross, supra, seems to

For

th~__...t?oor,

----------------..

me the pref erable analysis:

---

there

--

is

no "worthier container

doctrine."
A more

likly point of

distinction

is

whether

the

contents can be seen through the package or if the package is
sealed.

If

items are contained in an opaque, sealed wrapping,

it is probable that the owner expects the contents to remain
private. I would contend that such an expectation of privacy is
reasonable

in

a

civilized

society

that

repects

property and

privacy. As the Court said 100 years ago in Ex parte Jackson,
supra:
Letters and sealed packages of this kind are as
fully guarded from examination and
inspection,
except as to their outward form and weight, as if
they were retaind by the parties forwarding them in
their own domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of
the right of the poeple to be secure in the papers
against
unreasonable
searches extends
to their
papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever
they may be. Whilst in the mail they can only be
opened on like warrant, issued upon similiar oath
affirmation, paricularly describing the thing to

?

9.

seized, as is required when the papers are subjected
to search in their own household.
Sealed packages would seem to require the same protction when
found in the trunk of a car. The only possible law enforcement
interest

in

holding

otherwise

is

to

limit

the

aggregate

inconvenience to officers in procuring warrants.
The SG's approach wqould create devilish line drawing
problems.

How

personal

does

effects"

touchstone is

one
from

identify
other

"common

containers,

repositiories

for

especially

the

the material from which the container

if

is made.

One may be able to (and probably should) distinguish a leather
'--

case from an empty, styrofoam coffee cup with a plastic lid,
but how does one distinguish among different plastic containers
or among different paper packages. The question to be answered
is simply too attenuted from the concerns that should provide
the answer. A more practical vice in this uncertainty is that
the

judgment must

moment.

Requiring

be made
the

by

the officer

officer

the

make

in

the

field

this

in a

complicated

judgment will inevitably lead to reversed warrantless searches,
incursions

on

privacy,

and

the

suppression

of

probative

evidence. A more certain rule is required. I would hold in this
case

that

sealed

opaque

packages

require

a

warrant

to

be

opened, subject to the narrow exception in fn 13 of Sanders.
III.
Finally, I would not reach the question in this case
of

whether

Chadwick

and

Sanders

should

be

applied

retroactively. If this question is answered in the negative, no

10.

other issue can be reached, and hearing the case will have been
something of a waste. The retroactivity of a 4 year old Fourth
Amendment case cannot be a pressing problem given the effect of
Stone v.

Powell. Also,

this would be an awkward holding since

this case has already been GVR'd on Sanders; the applicibility
of that precedent would seem to be_ _l _a _w_ o_f _ t_h_e_ 9 as •
this issue was not raised in the Cal ct after remand
opposition to the petn for cert.

Lastly,

or in the

(~

80-148 ROBBINS v. CALIFORNIA

Argued 4/27/81

1(~(?4.) {.d--~k<;;/~
~ ~

tV2-

Jlo ~ ~ .~l:u

~-

p~~~~~~~~~ JuJ~
~

~ <?{eU.--~~~4;

~~

~,

~cp~~~

~~

F;i:C

·-~_,d

r-~~~~-~
~ /2-~ r1
.
, c;;:_~~
(hoe~ Y- P1..u._ ~ ~~ ~~/

.hd-- d:-z-dose

)>

~~ ~- U-e.- 11ili's~

ft;:l~~~ -~~

/~~~~4~~

~~ Mble.-{ ~4, ~

~~t..o~~-~

?-<:-tv-.~~~ ''~4.~\I
~~~.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .t..~-£·,4tt./_ ..
7U.-~~!~~
~~1-t!J~~b-~
~~~~~~

~~~~ ~~~,.~~
~ ~Py-~~.e::v~~~
I

(1...,_ h

/o4~-~~~
'-

/l..<_~ ~ 4_ b-1(

J(-~-f~)
4

s~&-~:.4-~~~r~

~/.2-~-h~r~~ ~~.

W~(~hr)~~~
,Lo ~~~ {~~-~~J~s~
?f..t, ~ ~ ~f~ ~~
~~,.

?~~~~~~4~

~~~~~~

f!1s

.

~~u~-~~~

~~

U;>

~4-~,

~ ~ .Pt}:if% ~ ~~ ..

~

~~~~ Mj'~

~.

h..-

7£o

~(~f-.t46--~)
~~ ?<.-11

~ :s~«

~~ ~~~of'A.uLC
-

~~ ~~Cj~~~:i~

~

_,t_,__ ~~&...u.lo ;,...,.., ~
~~~ - ~

( S..u-~ ~- .;.,.. 'R~v ~-e.t. ·
~~Pj~

\

4-~~~~w.-~l.uk
- ~ ~k=:_I-R-tf-z.KIA-~·5tf.J,~l)

5..u__~ ~ i-c-v ~) ll'l-3 tt.~
.a. d Chw ; •.. v
~ )2-

'Uo~r~~

~k~~~~~~-

7k ~ rf
~~~

~

.tA-

;f4-r.

/k{_

~~
~

rp~ ~ l.o ~f:;:zt

ILj ~I
?~ ~~--;_,_~~~~~
k; ~ ~r ~ ~~, ;tu..__

/,<'.;:b:jy¥:CV

~

~~~~tf~.

,

.

.$

~- ~ LP,d.ff-

80-148 Robbins v. California

Mr. Justice Stewart

p~
Con£. 4/29/81

~

s~~ - ~~3~:u::t~ .
~ ~~:--~ ~ ~ ~ ~/zu:i..o ~ ,
~~

-

-------- - -

,J

~• seb)P......- .

~

)

-

.

Mr. Justice White

~

...

Mr.

Mr. Justice Blackmun

~

W~~~--4U.~~~ ~
~- ~ ~

-

,(

~ -~.)~

)L

.s'.a~.t6k...<._

~~~~~~:#~~
~

~~~.,~.

------

---·

-··-----------~---

--

------ - -

f.

Mr. Justice Powell J~~~
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Justioe Brennan
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r. Justice White
r. Justice Marshall
r. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Mr. Justice Stevens
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From: Mr. Justice Blaokmun
Circulated: ______________
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-148

Jeffrey Richard Robbins,)
Petitioner
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court
'
of Appeal of California, First
v.
Appellate District.
S tate of California.
[June -, 1981]
J Uc'rlCJ<]

BLACKM UN,

dissenting.

I !Uust dissent for the reasons stated in my respective writings in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 17 (1977),
ami Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 768 (HJ79). I also
agree with much of what JusTICE REHNQUH:>T says, post, at
5-10, in his dissenting opinion in the 11resent case. The anticipated confusion tJ2.at ~ChQdwick an cJ_Sanders si'awnei for
tfie' ftat H)n'S £ri8J" andapPeftate COUrtSfs" well illustrated by
the Court's listing, ante, at 5, of cases c.lecideu Ly federal
courts of ap
Is since Chadwick was announced i n 1 ~ 77.
The Court's ecision m t e present case at least has the
merit of a "bright line" rule that should serve to eliminate
the opaqueness and to dissipate some of the confusioll. See
442 U. S., at 771-772. NoHetheless, under today's holding,
an arresting officer will still be forced. despite a concededly
lawful search of the automobile, to go to the magistrate,
whether near or far. for the search wa.r rant inevitably to be
issued when the facts are like those presented here. And
only time will tell whether the Court's "test," ante, at o- 7, for
determining whether a package's exterior "announce lsJ its
contents" will lead to a new stream of litigation.
I continue to think the Court is in error and that it would
have been better, see 442 U. S., at 772. "to adopt a clear-cut
rule to the effect that a warrant should not be required to
seize aud search any personal property found in au automo-
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bile that may in turn be seized and searched without a war~.
rant pursuant to Carroll [v. United States, 267 U. S. 132'
(1925) ,] and Chambers [v. Marone.y, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)] .."
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 10, 1981

RE:

80-148 - Robbins v. California

Dear Potter:
I contemplate joining but with a few
"observations."

Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

j

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 11, 1981

Re:

80-148 - Robbins v. California

Dear Potter ,
Please join me .
Sincerely yours ,

-Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference
cpm

>

I'
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'J!Ifrurltittgton. ~. QJ.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 12, 1981
RE: Robbins v California (i80-148)
Dear Potter:
I join your opinion in this case.

I will add the followin g

concurring statement.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, concurring :
I join Justice Stewart 's
opinion for the Court.
I write separately simply to underscore
the fact that our earlier decisions in Unit ed States v Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, and Arkansas v Sanders, 442 u.s. 753, were not
decided under the "automob ile exception".
Justice Stewart accuratel y notes, ante at 3-4, that in both
Chadwick and Sanders, it uas argued by the prosecution that the
"automobile exception" somehow justified a warrantless search
of the containers involve d in those two cases. And he also
notes that in both cases this Court rejected the suggestion.
In doing so, the Court emphasized that the mere happenstance
that an automobile was mentioned in the fact pattern of the
cases was irrelevant.
Chadwick turned on the legitimate expectation of privacy in
the contents of a footlocker shipped on an interstate common
carrier and signalled by two padlocks securing the container.
The Court explicitly noted that the case was not an "automobile
exception" case: the presence 0f the taxi was purely a
coincidence and had no bearing on the holding.
433 U.S. at
11-12. The taxi entered the picture only because the agents
deferred making the arrest until Chadwick exercised dominion
over the footlocker by helping to lift it into the trunk of the
cab. The situation would have been no different for probable
cause analysis if Chadwick had undertaken to carry the
J footlocker to some distant point without a vehicle.
In Sanders too, it was the luggage being transported by
Sanders at the time of his arrest, not the automobile in which
it was carried, that was the focus of the Court's inquiry and
holding. Once again, the Court's opinion stressed that "the
extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and
other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are seized
from an automobile." 442 U:s-=-at 765 n.l3.
(emphasis added).

!
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S tate of Ca 1 orma.

dissenting.
wusly stated why I believe the so-called "exclusionary rule" created by this Court imposes a burden out
of all proportion to the Fourth Amendment values which it
seeks to advance by seriously impeding the efforts of the
national, state, and local governments to apprehend and convict those who have violated their laws. See California v.
Minjares, 443 U. S. 916 (1979) (REHNQUIST , J. , joined by
BuRGER, C. J. , dissenting from the denial of a stay). I have
in no way abandoned those views, but believe that the Court's
opinion in the present case compounds the evils of the "exclusionary rule" by engrafting subtleties into the jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment itself that are neither required
nor desirable under our previous decisions. As Justice Harlan
stated in his concurring opinion in Coolidge v. N ew Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 490-491 (1971):
"State and federal law enforcement officers and prosecutorial authorities must find quite intolerable the
present state of uncertainty, which extends even to such
an every day question as the circumstances under which
police may enter a man's property to arrest him and seize
a vehicle believed to have been used during the commission of s crime.
"I would begin rthe l process of re-evaluation bv overruling Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), and K er v.
California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963) .. . •
T,
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uuntil we face up to the basic constitutional mistake~
of Mapp and Ker, no solid progress in setting things
straight in search and eeizure law will, in my opinion,
occur."
The 10 years which have intervened since Justice Harlan
made this statement have only tended to confirm its correct-:_
ness.
The harm caused by the exclusionary rule is compounded
by the judicially-created preference for a warrant as indicating
satisfaction of the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. It is often forgotten that nothing in the Fourth
Amendment itself requires that searches be conducted pmsuant to warrants. The terms of the amendment simply
mandate that the people be secure from unreasonable searches
and seizures, and that any warrants which may issue shall
only issue upon probable cause: 11 The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses. papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and
no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the plac,
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Not only has historical study 11 suggested that in emphasizing the warrant requirement over the reasonableness of
the search the Court has 'stood the fourth amendment on its
hea.d' from a hiEtorical standpoint." Coolidge. supra, at 492
(Harlan. J., concurring) ( quotinp; T. Taylor. Two Studies in
Constitutional Interpretation, 23-24 (1969)), but the Court
has failed to appreciate the impact of its decisions. not mandated by the Fourth Amendment. on law enforcement.
Courts. including this Court, often make the rather casual assumption that police are not substantially frustrated in their
efforts to apprehend those whom they have probable cause
to arrest or to gather evidence of crime when they have
probable cause to search by the judicially-created preference
for a warrant, apparently assuming that the typical case it:!
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ene in which an officer can make a quick half mile ride to the
nearest precinct station in an urban area to obtain such a
warrant. See, e. g., Steagald v. United States, No. 79-6777
(April 21, 1981), slip op., at 17. But this casual assumption
simply does not fit the realities of sparsely populated "cow
counties" located in some of the southern and western states,
where at least apocryphally the number of cows exceed the
number of people, and the number of square miles in the
eounty may exceed 10,000 and the nearest magistrate may be
25 or even 50 miles away. The great virtue of the opinion in
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), was that it made allowance for these vast diversities between States; unfortunately
such an approach to the Fourth Amendment in the true spirit
of federalism was, as Justice Harlan observed, rejected in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
Recent developments have cast further doubt on the em-.
phasis on a warrant as opposed to the reasonableness of the
search. In Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972),
the Court ruled that clerks of the municipal court of the city
of Tampa, Fla., not trained in the law, are "neutral and
detached magistrates" who may issue warrants which satisfy
the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. And in
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Court held that
a defendant can go behind a warrant and attack its validity
on a motion to suppress. In emphasizing the warrant requirement the Court has therefore not only erected an edifice
without solid foundation but also one with little substance.
Even aside from these general observations on the warrant
requirement, the case we decide today falls within what has
been and should continue to be an exception to that requirement-the automobile exception. In Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U. S. 433, 439 (1973), we explained that one class of
cases which constitutes "at least a partial exception to this
general rule [of requiring a warrant] is automobile searches.
Although vehicles are 'effects' within the meaning of the-
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Fourth Amendment, 'for the purposes of the Fourth Amend ..
ment there is a constitutional difference between houses and
cars.' Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 52 (1970). See
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-154 (1925)." We
also stated in Cady:
"[T]he application of Fourth Amendment standards,
originally intended to restrict only the Federal Government, to the States presents some difficulty when searches
of automobiles are involved. The contact with vehicles
by federal law enforcement officers usually, if not always,
involves the detection or investigation of crimes unrelated
to the operation of a vehicle. Cases such as Carroll v.
United States, supra, and Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949) , illustrate the typical situations in which
federal officials come into contact with and search vehicles. In both caees, members of a special federal unit
charged with enforcing a particular federal criminal statute stopped and searched a vehicle when they had probable cause to believe that the operator was violating that
statute.
"As a result of our federal system of government, how..
ever, state and local police officers, unlike federal officers,
have much more contact with vehicles for reasons related to the operation of vehicles themselves. All States
require vehicles to be registered and operators to be
licenPed. States and localities have enacted extensive
and detailed codes regulating the condition and manner
in which motor vehicles may be operated on public
streets and highways." Id., at 440-441.
I would not draw from the language of either Cady or of
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976), the conclusion which the Court draws today that "'inherent mobility'
cannot alone justify the automobile exception , since the Court
has sometimes approved warrantless searches in which the
automobile's mobility was irrelevant." Ante, pp. 3-4. Logi ..
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~ally,

it seems to me that the conclusion to be drawn from
Cady and Opperman is that one need not demonstrate that
a particular automobile was capable of being moved, but that
automobiles as a class are inherently mobile, and a defendant
seeking to suppress evidence obtained from an automobile
should not be heard to say that this particular automobile
had broken down, was in a parking lot under the supervision
of the police, or the like. Thus, I continue to adhere to the
:view expressed by JusTICE BLACKMUN that:
"If 'contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched
for without a warrant,' Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S.
132, 153 (1925) , then, in my view, luggage and similar
containers found in an automobile may be searched for
contraband without a warrant. The luggage, like the
automobile transporting it, is mobile. And the expectation of privacy in a suitcase found in the car is probably
not significantly greater than the expectation of privacy
in a locked glove compartment.
"In my view, it would be better to adopt a clear-cut
rule to the effect that a warrant should not be required
to seize and search any personal property found in an
automobile that may in turn be seized and searched
without a warrant pursuant to Carroll and Chambers."
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 769, 772 (1979)
(BLACKMUN , J. , dissenting).
The proper application of the automobile exception would
uphold the search conducted by the California Highway
Patrol officers in this case inasmuch as the Court acknowledges
that the officers could constitutionally open the tailgate of the
stationwagon and then open the car's luggage compartment.
Ante, p. 8.
The Court, however, concludes that the opening of the twoplastic garbage bags. which the officers found in the luggage
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compartment is unconstitutional. In so doing, the Court
relies on its earlier decision in Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, and
rejects the argument that the search of the garbage bags
should, at a minimum, fall within the exception noted in f.Q9tnote 13 of the Sanders opinion. · There, the Court had
exPlained:
"Not all containers and packages found by police during
the course of a search will deserve the full protection of
the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very
nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of
privacy because their contents can be inferred from their
outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open to 'plain view,' thereby
obviating the need for a warrant. See Harris v. United
States, 390 U. S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam)." 442
U. S., at 764-765, n. 13.
It seems to me that the search conducted by the Highway
Patrol Officers falls squarely within the above exception.
This is revealed by an examination of the events which
prompted the search of the luggage compartment in the first
place-events which are conspiciously absent from the recitation of the facts in the Court's opinion. Prior to opening
the tailgate of the car, the Highway Patrol Officers had
already discovered marihuana in the passenger compartment
of the car. While the officers were rett'ieving this marihuana
and other drug paraphernalia from the front of the car, petitioner stated: "What you are looking for is in the back. 11
Only then did an officer open the luggage compartment of the
station wagon and discover the two plastic garbage bags being
used to wrap the blocks of marihuana. One of the officers
then testified that he was aware that contraband was often
wrapped in this fashion-a fact of which all those who watch
the evening news are surely well aware. Given these factors,
particuiariy the petitioner's statement, it seems to me that

I
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t<>etitioner could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of the garbage bags. Surely, given all the cir~
cumstances, the contents of the garbage bags "could be inferred from their outward appearance."
The present case aptly illustrates the problems inherent in
the Fourth Amendment analysis adopted by the Court in the
past two decades. Rather than apply the automobile exception to a situation such as the present one, the Court in
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977) and Sanders,
supra, attempted to limit that exception so as not to include
certain, but not all, containers found within an automobile.
Apparently, the Court today decides that distinguishing between containers found in a car is to difficult a task and
accordingly denudes the language found in footnote 13 of
Sanders of most of its meaning. It does so evidently in search
of a workable rule to govern automobile searches. I seek
such a workable rule as well, but unlike the Court I feel
that such a rule cannot be found as long as the Court continues in the direction which it is headed. Instead, I would
return to the rationale of Carroll and Chambers and hold
that a warrant should not be required to seize and search any
personal property found in an automobile that may in turn be
constitutionally seized and searched without a warraut. I
would not abandon this reasonably "bright line" in search of
another.
But I think that probably any search for "bright lines,
short of overruling Mapp v. Ohio is apt to be illusory. Our
entire profession is trained to attack "bright lines" the way
hounds attack foxes. Acceptance by the courts of arJ;?:uments
that one thing is the "functional equivalent" of the other, for
example, soon breaks down what might have been a bright
line into a blurry impressionistic pattern.
If city clerks who are not trained in the law satisfy the
warrant requirement of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and if a defendant may attack the validity of a warrant on a motion to suppress, it seems to me that little is lost
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in the way of the "core values'' of the Fourth Amendment as
made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth if M app v.
Ohio is overruled. This will not establish a bright line except
to the extent that it makes clear that the t>xclusionary rule is
not applicable to the states. And it will leave to the federal
government, with its generally more highly trained law enforcement personnel, the problems of wrestling with this
Court's twisting and turning as it makes decisional law applying the Fourth Amendment, rather than forcing the 50 States,
with their widely varying conditions and greater traditional
responsibility for prevention of serious crime, to engage in the
burdensome and frequently futile efforts which are necessary
· to predict the "correct" result in a particular case.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL
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June 17, 1981

Re:

/

No. 80-148 - Robbins v. California

Dear Potter:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.
';

Justice Stewart
cc:

The Conference

J

J

To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Peter Byrne
Re: No. 80-148, Robbins v. California
Date: 06/18/81
I have attempted to incorporate the substance of your
riders, but often by expanding a section of text rather than by
adding a new footnote. I
Please see footnote

~

at

-

page ~ • You had suggested

that this be eliminated but, I think you misunderstood the
thrust of the note. I have recast it to try to make it more
clear. If someone lacks an expectation of privacy under Rakas,
the Fourth Amendment is simply inapplicable. The footnote seems
necessary to me to distinguish our inquiry so the same result
would not follow automatically.
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OF"

TnE. CHIEF JUSTICE

.I

June 22, 1981

RE:

No. 81-48 Robbins v. California

Dear Potter:
I am having some "second thoughts" on my
concurring opinion in this case, but I will resolve
them before Thursday's Conference.

Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

,ju.prnnt Ofourl of t4t ~ttb- ,jtldts

Jl'asltittghtn. ~. <q.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

PERSONAL
June 23,
Re:

No. 80-148 - Robbins v. California

Dear Lewis:
I hope you will be agreeable to an insert t long
the following lines, somewhere in the revised concu
opinion.
The evolution of 4th
Amendment jurisprudence has been a
long and tortuous road on which courts
have tended to give too little weight
to the key term "unreasonable" in that
amendment. That term has made "bright
lines" in this field difficult to
achieve; such a yardstick cannot be
applied with the precision of the
literal linear yardstick of 36 inches.
Hence what has seemed unreasonable to
some judges was perceived differently
by others.
It tends to anticipate the standard criticism that
we "zig and zag" on 4th Amendment search law.
Regards,

Justice Powell

•

--------

My further pondering on this case relates to whethe r I can join with a

(

concurring opinion or, join the judgment in this case recognizing that the
blurred signals from the Court on 4th Amendment cases are by no mean s
of New York v.
Belton .

A third course could be to

" second an d

third" thoughts.
We have been many years in
seizure

law~

search an d

We cannot extr

adhere to the Exclusionary

A

1

~·

" rules relatin~ ~ h

The urge for

at

best illusory for the very language of t~ clau
"unreasonable."

The 4th Amendment guarantees "against unreasonable

searches and seizures" and this has resulted in case by case adjudication.
The confusion in judicial utterances flows from the reality that a
literally infinite variety of situations confront police and ultimately the
courts .

What seems " unreasonable " to some is perceived as reasonable to

others.

The increasing complexity and mobility of society, the enormous

expansion of certain criminal activity - drug traffic in particular - brings
a flood tide of cases into the courts.
Of course we place high value on our privacy but some privacy must
yield, as today's holding in Belton suggests, if we are not to become
impotent in control of crime .
The Court sought a "bright line" rule as to trunks and containers by
relying on the double locking of the footlocker in Chadwick but some think
we diluted that somewhat in Sanders.

It is now suggested that the quality

of the container or the nature of the sealing should control.

Thus a

supermarke t shopping bag - not sealed in any way - would not require a
search warran t

if the

I

person carrying it was subject t o a lawful arrest .

This leaves

open the status of a comparable ba g closed wit h Scotc h tape o r
staple s - whic h is not uncommon.

But these are artificia l

criteria and if we here cannot agree , how can the policeman o n
the beat function ?
Returning to the present case , the record is cloudy on th e
nature of the "sealing."

There was no lock as in Chadwick but

only some form of wrapping with an opaque material .

The Officer

said he had "heard " that marijuana was sometimes transported th at
wa y - but he had neve r see n su ch p a ck a g i ng.
I am abou t prepa r e d t o s upport an " a u tomo bile except ion"
that leave s l i ttl e r o om for c on f u s ion, i.e., th a t wh e n an

(

automo bile i s sto ppe d on pr o b able c a use and th er e is s ome
obj ec ti v e e v ide nce o f an offe nse - o t h e r than a min9r traffic
violatio n - an d if t h e of fice r smel ls dru gs, see s t h e m, or s e e s
~
/"j:7; /
dr ug parapherna lia or we apons, t~ ar ~ an be se arched without a
wa r r a nt f rom the
the vehicle.

~/

insrae~ ot

the tires to every place and part of

Obviously a total "French Connection" search could

not be conducted on the street.

But under Opperman I think I

would allow an inventory search at the police garage - assuming
those in the car are taken in arrest status.
practical matter raised by Chadwick:

Here we come to the

if the "container" and the

ostensible owner are securely in custody, getting a warrant is no
real bur d en- ex c e pt perhaps in Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, et al.
where it might well be many hours and many miles travel to secure
a wa r ra nt.

As a " trade off" or balancing to make our complex system
work, I think I am now ready to say that if I am stopped either
on the street or in my car, even with my briefcase full of
circulating opinions , and there is probable cause for my arrest,
the police can open and run their hands through the briefcase to
make sure there is no weapon - or contraband.

If - like som e -

the briefcase has a combination lock, should that invok e
Chadwick?
Probably yes , in which case the officer should take custody
of the person (havin g first carrie d out a "Terry" patdown) and
control of the locked briefcase and all proceed to the police
cellblock.

At that point, the Chadwick lock barrier becomes

somewhat academic.

Most people will consent to opening the

(
\

container - especially if they are not carrying illegal material.
I am now less concerned about an officer peering and feeling into
the briefcase than I was previously.

If no weapon or

"suspicious" package is found the officer will close it.

Even if

he glanced at one of our circulating opinions, the risk of
breaking our security is minimal.

I don't like anyone reading my

papers, but we must give up some things to protect higher values.
All the problems in this area flow, of course, from an
across-the-board enforcement of the Exclusionary Rule.
of'

Without

a...t \e~ -t ~~ mAAt41b.-tl \q.

•

that "monster," our problems would evaporate,.._ That is another,
albeit related, subject.

As I stated in my Bivens dissent, that

Rule should be modified along the British lines but with a "tort
claims" suit allowed against the government for damages.

As Alan

Barth wrote for the Post when I advanced this thesis 17-18 years

ago, judge and jurfes would be unlikely to give awards to hoodlums found
with a packet of heroin as a result of an "illegal" search.
He grieved over that more than I can bring myself to grieve.

But an

innocent citizen might well recover and soon officers would be compelled to
mend their ways to protect the public fisc -

if for no better reason.

What I am pondering on is whether to use this occasion to raise, once
again , the utter fallacy of the Exclusionar y Rule and the distortion it has
produced on the whole jurisprudence.

l,'
\ )

'
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I
On the early morning of January 5, 1975, Califomia High~
way Patrol officers stopped the petitioner's car-a 1966 C'hcv~
rolet station wagon-because he had been driving erratically.
He got out of his vehicle and walked towards the patrol car.
When one of the officers asked him for his driver's licPIIS(' alld
the station wa.gon's registration, he fumbled with his wall<'t.l
When the petitioner opened the car door to get out the regis~
tration, the officers smelled marihuana smoke. OnP of the
officers patted the petitioner down, and discovered a vial of
liquid. ·The officer then searched the passenger compartment
of the car, and found marihuana as well as equipment for
using it.
After putting the petitioner in the patrol car, the officers
opened the tailgate of the station wagon, located a handle
set flush in the deck, and lifted it up to uncover a recessed
luggage compartment. In the compartment were a tote bag
and two packages wrapped in green opaque plastic.1 · The
1 A photograph was made of one of the packages, and it wa:, later
described as follows:
"The package viSible in the photograph is apparently wrapped or boxed
in an opaque material covered by an outer wrapping of transparent, cello-

80-148-0PINION
ROBBINS v. CALIFORNIA

police unwrapped the packages; each one contained 15 pounds
of marihuana.
The petitioner was charged with various drug offenses, his
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence found when the
packages were unwrapped was denied, and a jury convicted
him. In an unpublished opinion, the California Court of
Appeal affirmed the judgment in all relevant respects. · This
Court granted a writ of certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeal's judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753. 443
U. S. 903. On remand, the Court of Appeal again found the
warrantless opening of the packages constitutionally perrnissible, since the trial court "could reasonably [have] concluderdJ that the contents of the packages could have been
inferred from their outward appearance, so that appellant
could not have held a reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to the contents." 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40. Because
of continuing uncertainty as to whether closed containers
found during a lawful warrantless search of an automobile
may themselves be searched without a warrant, thi Court
U. S. - .
granted certiorari. II
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which is made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
establishes " [ t] he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects. against unreasonable
searches and seizures." · This Court has held that a search
i per se unreasonable, and thus violates the Fourth Amendplume-type plastic. (The photograph i not in color, and lhl' 'green'
plastic cannot be seen ut all.) Both wrappings are sealed on the outs1de
with at least one strip of opaque tape. As thus wrapped and ~:<Pn lrd, the
package roughly resembles an oversized, extra-long cigar box with slightly
rounded corners and edges. It bears no legend or other wri1 ten indicia
supporting any inference concerning its contents." 103 Cal. App. 3d 34r
44 (Rattigan, J ., dissenting).
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ment, if the police making the search have not first secured
from a neutral magistrate a warrant that satisfies the terms
of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g. ,
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357; Agnello v. United
States, 269, U. S. 20, 33. Although the Court has identified
some exceptions to this warrant requirement, the Court has
emphasized that these exceptions are "few," "specifically es~
tablished ," and "well-delineated." Katz v. United States,
s'upra, at 357.
Among these exceptions is the so-called "automobile excepU. S. - . In Carroll
tion." See Colorado v. Bannister, v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, the Court held that a search
warrant is unnecessary "where there is probable cause to
search an automobile stopped on the high way; the car is
movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents
may never be found a.gain if a warrant must be obtained."
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 51. In recent years,
we have twice been confronted with the suggestion that this
"automobile exception" somehow justifies the warranties,
search of a closed container found inside an automobile.
Each time, the Court has refused to accept the suggestion.
In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, the Government argued in part that luggage is analogous to motor vehicles for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that the "automobile exception" should thus be extended to encompass closed
pieces of luggage. The Court rejected the analogy and insisted that the exception is confined to the special and possibly unique circumstances which were the occasion of its
genesis. First, the Court said that " [ol ur treatment of automobiles has been based in part on their inherent mobility,
which often makes obtaining a judicial warrant impracticable." !d., at 12. While both cars and luggage may be
"mobile," luggage itself may be brought and kept under the
control of the police.
Second, the Court acknowledged that "inherent mobility'~
cannot alone justify the automobile exception, since the Court
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has sometimes approved warrantless searches in which the
automobile's mobility was irrelevant. See Cady v. Dom~
browski, 413 U. S. 433, 441-442; South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U. S. 364, 367. The automobile exception , the Court
said, is thus also supported by "the diminished exp~tation
of privacy which surrounds the automobile" and which arises
from the facts that a car is used for transportation and not
as a residence or a repository of personal effects, that a car's
occupants and contents travel in plain view, and that automobiles are necessarily highly regulated by government.
United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 12-13. No such diminished expectation of privacy characterizes luggage; on the
contrary, luggage typically is a repository of personal effects,
the contents of closed pieces of luggage are hidden from view,
and luggage is not generally subject to state regulation.
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, the State of Arkansas
argued that the "automobile exception" should be extrndrd
to allow the warrantless search of everything found in an
automobile during a lawful warrantless search of the vehicle
itself. The Court rejected this argument for much the same
reason it had rejected the Government's argument in Chadwick. Pointing out, first, tha.t, "[o]nce police have seized
a suitcase, as they did here, the extent of its mobility is in
no way affected by the place from which it was taken,'' the
eourt said, that there generally "is no greater need for warrantless searches of luggage taken from automobiles than of
luggage taken from other places." Id., at 763-764. Second,
the Court saw no reason to believe that the privacy expectation in a closed piece of luggage taken from a car is necessarily less than the privacy expectation in closed pieces of
luggage found elsewhere.
In the present case, the Court once again encounters the
argument-made in the Government's brief amicus curiaethat the contents of a closed container carried in a vehicle
are somehow not fully protected by the Fourth Amendment.
But this argument is inconsistent with the Court's decisions:
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in Chadwick and Sanders. Those cases made clear, if it wai3
not clear before, that a closed piece of luggage found in a
lawfully searched car is constitutionally protected to the same
extent as are closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else.
The respondent, however, proposes that the nature of a
container may diminish the constitutional protection to which
it otherwise would be entitled-that the Fourth Amendment
protects only containers commonly used to transport "personal effects." By personal effects the respondent means
property worn on or carried about the person or having some
intimate relation to the person. In taking this position, the
respolldent relies on numerous opinions that have drawn a
distinction between pieces of sturdy luggage, like suitcases,
and flimsier containers, like ;t cardboard boxes. Compare,
e. g., United States v. Be~, 631 F. 2d 1336 (CA8 1980)
(leather tote bag); United States v. Miller, 608 F. 2d 1089
(CAS 1979) (plastic portfolio); United States v. Presler, 610
F. 2d 1206 (CA4 1979) (briefcase); United States v. Meier,
602 F. 2d 2S3 (CAlO 1979) (backpack); United States v.
Johnson, S88 F. 2d 147 (CAS 1979) (duffie bag); United
States v. Stevie, S82 F. 2d 117S (CA8 1978); with United
States v. Mannino, 63S F. 2d 110 (CA2 1980) (plastic bag
inside paper bag); United States v. Goshorn, 628 F. 2d 697
(CAl 1980) ("[t]wo plastic bags, further in three brown
paper bags, further in two clear plastic bags"); United States
v. Gooch, 603 F. 2d 122 (plastic bag); United States v. Mackey, 626 :F. 2d 684 (CA9 1980) (paper bag); United States v.
Neurnann, S8S F. 2d 3SS (CA8 1978) (cardboard box) .
The respondellt's argument cannot prevail for at least two
reasons. First, it has no basis in the lallguage or meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. That Amendment protects people and their effects, and it protects those effects whether
they are "personal" or "impersonal." The contents of Chadwick's footlocker and Sanders' suitcase were immune from a
warrantless search because they had been placed within a
closed, opaque container and because Chadwick and Sanders
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had thereby reasonably "manifested an expectation that the
contents would remain free from public examination."
United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 11. Once placed within
such a container, a diary and a dishpan are equally proLectcd
by the Fourth Amendment.
Second, even if one wished to import such a distinction i11to
the Fourth Amendment, it is difficult if not impossible to
perceive any objective criteria by which that task might be
accomplished. What one person may put into a suitcase,
another may put into a paper bag. United States v. Ross,
- F . 2d (en bane). And as the disparate results in t,he
decided caEes indicate, 110 court, no collstable. uo citize11. can
sensibly be asked to distinguish the relative "privacy inh·rests" in a closed suitcase, briefcase. portfolio. duffie bag. or box.
The respondent protests that footnote 13 of the Sanders
opinion says that "[n lot ali containers and packages found
by police during the course of a search will deserve the full
protection of the Fourth Amendment." 442 U. S. 753 , at
764- 765. But the exceptions listed in the succeeding sentences of the footnote are the very model of exceptions which
prove the rule: "Thus, some coutainers (for example a kit of
burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because tlwir <'Ontents can be inferred from their outward appearanc<'. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open
to 'plain view,' thereby obviating the need for a warnwt:"
The second of these exceptions obviously refers to items in a
container that is not closed. The first exception is lihwisP
little more than another variation of the "plain virw' ' exception, since, if the distinctive configuration of a contain<'r proclaims its contents, the contents cannot fairly be said to hav<'
been removed from a searching officer's view. · The same
would be true, of course , if the container were transparent, or
otherwise clearly revealed its contents. In short, th e negative implicatiort of footnote 13 of the Sanders opinion is that ~

I
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unless the container is such that its contents may be said to
be in plain view, those contents are fully protected by tte
Fourth Amendment.
The California Court of Appeal believed that the packag;es
in the present case fell directly within the second except~·n
described in this footnote, since "[a]uy experienced obser er
could have inferred from the appearance of th~ packa es
that they contained bricks of marijuana." 103 Cal. App. d
34, 40. The only evidence the Court cited to support this
proposition was the testimony of one of the officers who ~r
rested the petitioner. When asked whether there was anything about "these two plastic wrapped green blocks which
attracted your attention," the officer replied, somewhat
't>bscurely,
"A. I had previous knowledge of transportation of
such blocks. Normally contraband is wrapped this way,
merely hearsay. I had never seen them before.
"Q. You had heard contraband was packaged this
way?
"A.. Yes." ld., n. 2.
This vague testimony certainly did not establish that marihuana is ordinarily "packaged this way." Expectations of
privacy are established by general social norms, and to fali
within the second exception of the footnote in question a
container must so clearly announce its contents, whether by
its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise,
that its contents are obvious to an observer. If indeed a
green plastic wrapping reliably indicates that a package could
only contain marihuana, that fact was not shown by the evidence of record in this case. 2
2 As Judge Rattigan wrote in hi;; dis;;enting opinion in the California
Court of Appeal: "For all that I ;;ee, it could contain books, stationery,
canned goods, or any number of other wholly innocuous item;; which
might be heavy in weight. In fact, it bears a remarkable resemblance to
{ln unlabelled cartQn of emergency highway flare;; that I brought ftom a·
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Although the two bricks of marihuana were discovered
during a lawful search of the petitioner's car, they were inside
a closed, opaque container. We reaffirm today that such
a container may not be opened without a warrant, even if it
is found during the course of the lawful search of an automobile. Since the respondent does not allege the presence
of any circumstances that would constitute a valid exception
to this general rule, 3 it is clear that the opening of the closed
containers without a search warrant violated the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the judgment of
the California Court of Appeal is reversed.
It is so ordered.

store shelf and have carried in the trunk of my own automobile." 103
Cal. App. 3d 34, 44.
3 In particular, it is not argued that the opening of the packages was
incident to a lawful custodial arrest. Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U. S.
752 Src Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, at 764, 11. 11. Furthrr, thr rr~pond
rnt do(·~ not argue that the prtitionrr corJ::;PrJted to the opening of the
package~.
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June 26, 1981
80-148 Robbins v. California
Dear Chief and Potter:
John's dissent puts into painful focus what will
be perceived - correctly I fear - as the disarray of the
Court in automobile search cases if the opinions presently
circulated all come down. I ackno ledge at the outset my
own contribution.
There is much to be said for the view that both
cases hould be decided the same way. Potter has a Court in
Belton for a full earch of the interior of
car and
everytning in it, incident to a lawful arrest of an
occupant. The opinion is written on tfie autfiority of our
"arr st" cases. As John suggests, it do
exten these
cases omewhat to justify searching a suitcase on the back
seat of an automobile. But we thought this was justified
for two reasons: (i) occupants of an automobile do have
control over the interior of the car, with time - in most
cases - to conceal contraband or weapons before an arresting
officer can bring a car to a haltJ a d (ii) a right line
obviously is desirable.
John says that we could, and should, treat Belton
as an automobile search case. But the courts below in
Belton did not find probable cause to search, although there
may well have been a basis for so finding. I prefer to
decide it here as Potter does on the "incident to arrest"
basis.
In ~elton, WJB, BRW and nt are dissenting both
from the opinion and the judgment. But this leaves us with
five votes for the opinion, plus JPS for the judgment. John
would not •extend" the arrest analysis so far.
The status of Robbins is what concerns m • The
Chief is not yet at rest, 5ut'ne has indicated serious
second thoughts with respect to both Potter's and my
opinions. My concurring opinion records my vie nS to the
applicable principle. I have thought that in a Fourth
Amendment search case the underlying question is whether
reasonable expectation of privacy exists.
But as Potter points out so forcefully, the need
for a bright line in Robbins is as great as in Belton. I

2.
agree with Potter to this extent, but I cannot accept a
bright line that so severely restricts law enforcement. Nor
am I entirely happy with my circulated opinion that leaves
to law enforcement and the courts below a qreat deal of
subjective latitude in making judgments as " to which
containers fall within my analysis.
In sum, I am now not entirely at rest in Robbins.
If necessary to obtain a Court opinion, I would consider
accepting a bright line application of the automobile
exception substantially as stated by John.
I recognize, of course, that I have a problem with
some of the language in my Sanders opinion. Yet, both
Chadwick and Sanders can be ~Istlnguished fairly on the
grounC1 that nelE'fier was an •automobile search case".
Probable cause had attached to the luggage itself in each of
those cases before they were placed in the trunk of an
automobile. Although I talked about the automobile
exception (?erhaps too much!}, I distinguished between
Chadwick and the Chambers/Carroll line of automobile search
caseS:--But some of my Sanders lanquage wouln have to be
clarifien or rejected, altfiough I do not read famous
footnote 13 as broadly as Potter does.
If the Chief shoul~ go with John, and I remain
with my concurring opinion, Potter would have a judgment but
there would be no Court opinion to afford guidance either to
law enforcement or to the courts. If, however, the Chief
and I both accepted the broader automobile search exception,
there apparently would be a Court. Although neither t~HR nor
HAB has - as of yet - joined John, each of them - writing
separately - would apply the automobile exception as broadly
as John. See pages 5,6 of WHR's dissent and pp. 1 and 2 of
Harry's little opinion.
If the Court went four with Potter and four with
John (in separate opinions), and I remain "in the middle•,
there would be no bright line guidance in this area where
every day there are hundreds of searches of automobiles.
For the foregoing reasons, I am deeply concerned
about our institutional responsibility to provide clear
guirlance that neither threatens substantive rights nor
handicaps law enforcement.
I would be happy to discuss this.
Sincerely,
The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Stewart
lfp/ss
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Dear Chief and Potter:
John's dissent puts into painful focus what will '
be perceived - correctly I fear - as the disarray of the
Court in automobile search casee if the opinions presently
circulated all come down. I acknowledge at the outset my
own contribution.
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To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Peter Byrne
Re: No. 80-148, Robbins v. California
Date: 06/26/81
I have a number of reactions to your draft of
6/26/81. Primarily, I think it an admirable

memorandum of the

exemplary dedication you have shown toward reaching a result in
this case that will square sound principle and sound practice,
even at the cost of eating crow on some of your prior language.
Nonetheless, it will not do as a "frame" for your circulated
concurring opinion.
As I read your thrust, you wish to acknowledge the
claims of both PS and the dissenters that a "bright line" rule
is necessary for effective police work and for practical
protection of privacy. As written the concurrence goes on at
some length about the dangers of bright lines rules, see pp 5 &
7-8. If you wish to change direction on the desireability of
bright line rules that opinion may need major surgery. Second,
I think you need not be apologetic about either Sanders or this
case. As you recognize no approach in this area will give
complete satisfaction, and both Sanders and this opinion do
abide by the principles you have consistently articulated int
he Fourth amendment area.
I suggest that you add something like the following
to the existing draft, probably as a footnote to the end of the
first full sentence on page 8:
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I have concluded to be simply shown as joining
the judgment, without more.
I have done several
separate opinions, but looking at the whole picture
I have decided none of them will add to the jurisprudence .
The clarification of the confusion on the 4th
Amendment is overdue and cannot be accomplished in any
one opinion. The Exclusionary Rule , a s I observed in
Biven s a nd othe r c ase s, is the albatros s we mus t r eexamine .
This case should be ready for We dnes day or
Thur sday, since all but Lewis' latest wr iti ng is in
p r int.
Regard s,

To: The Chief Justice
Mr . Justice :B.rennan
Mr. Justice
st-n~
Mr. Justice White
}~:e. Just toe M~'~. ~ha 1

·:r;>. tf -.s-

~!f • .,..

,T,_,. t;1r><')

"Y...,..

(,T 1 ~

r.r•; iCe

Mr. Jl.>

1'., ' CG

BJ. •>.·"km
Po"',ll
R "' .:::ui st

Stevens

No. 80-148

I

Jeffrey Richard Robbins, •
.
.
.
Petitioner
On Wnt of Certwran to the Court
'
of Appeal of California, First
vC. l'f .
Appellate District.
State of a 1 orma.
[June ...-, 1981]
JuSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
It is quite clear to most of us that this case and New York
v. Belton, post at - , should be decided in the same way/
Both cases involve automobile searches. In both cases, the
automobiles harl been lawfully stopped on the highway, the
occupants had been lawfully arrested, and the officers had
probable cause to believe that the vehicles contained contraband. Tn my opinion, the "automobile exception " to the
wa1-rant requirement therefore provided each officer the authority to make a thorough search of the vehicle-including
the glove compartment, the trunk. and any containers in the
vehicle that might reasonably contain the contraband.
Such was the state of the law prior to the Court's discursive 'niting in Arlran,sas v. Sanders, 4.42 U. S. 753. 2 Be1 Jufl't'TCE Bt.ACKMUN, .TusTICJ<: REHNQUIS'l',

nnd I would uphold the
s()arehc:-: in both ('fl.<:cs; .TURTTCJ' BRENN AN, JusTICE WHI'l'E , and JusTICJ~
MAnfi rrAT,L would invalidate boi h searches. Only THE CHmF .TusTIC~:,
JUR'I'J<.:Jc. 8'l'EWAH'l', n.nd .TURTICB Pow"M' reaeh the curious conclnRion that a
ciLir.1·n ha~ tL :;rreater 11rivacy inl·ercst, in n package of marihuana cnclo.·cd
in n plastic wrapper than in the poeket of a leather jacket.
2 Prior to the Court's decii'ion in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1, courts routinely relied on the n.utomobile exception to uphold the
search of fL contnincr found in a car. The court in United States v.
Sorimw, 497 F. 2d 147, 149 (CA5 1974), cited Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U. S. 42, and Rtatcd:
"And though it is true that the Court spoke of an automobile while we

\
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eause-as THE CHIEF JuSTICE cogently demonstrated in his
opinion in Sanders-the actual holdings in both
Sanders and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. R. 1. are
e11tirely consistent with that vie'"' of the law. I woulrl apply
it in this case. Sanders and Chadwick are both plainly
distinguishable from this case because neither case truly illvolvf'd the automobile exception. 3 In Chad1l'ick. federal
~Pparate

treat of containers in or just removed from one, the prineiplr i~ rwl
diffrrrut. The officer who nrrr~trd Soriano and hi::; f•ompauiou s imlisputably had probable cause to b('Jievr that the VC'hielt> eontained eontraband, a circumstance justifying t11P initial ineur~ion into thl' truuk. 1Tuder
e;;tabli::;hrd Jaw in thi;; circuit and t'bt'whcre, thi:,. .iu~tificatioll t•ut·ompa~::;ed
the ;;ra reh of contairwr,.: in the Yehiclr whieh could reatlollably be t·mplo) l:'d
in the illic·it carriage of the contrabnnd."
Sec abo United States v. Arulerson. 500 F. 2c1 1:311, 1:315 (CA5 1U7-l) :
United State~; v. Evan~;, 481 F. 2d 990, 99~-994 (CA9 197:{). Tndt·Pd. in
mnn~' cn~es it nppHrently nrver ocemrecl to drft'lldant~ ehallt•n:!iJJg thP
validity of automobiiP SParchr~ or thC' comt~ eou,.:iderinl! sueh ehallengl'~
that a search of a ~uitra~e or othrr eontainer loealt•d in an automobilt• pn·sented n differPnt queHtion than 1hC' sra reh of the t·ur itself. Sl't'. e. g.,
United States v. Butcmau. 487 F. 2d 1229 (CAlO 197a): l'nill'rl Statvs " ·
Gamer, 451 F. 2<.1 167 (CA6 1971): r'nited State8 v. Chap111an, ~7-! .F. 2d
300 (CA5 197a) . tNt. denirct, 41-! U. S. 35: State v. ff ram, 3-lO ~o. 2d
1365 (Ln. 1976): State v. Lee. 113 N.H. 31:~, 307 A. 2d 827 (197:3): Cf.
State v. Warren. 2R:{ So. 2d 7-!0 (Ln. 1973). Evl'n aftpr C'hwltci('k wn~
decided, courts continued to nppl~· tlw automobilr l'XC<'ption to uphold
searchrs of rontainC'rl' founct in ear~ and rejeeted th!' aqplmPnt that
Chadwi('k con~titnted a limitntion on the autornobilt· Pxc·c·ntion. See
United States v. Milhollau. 599 F. 2d 51S, 525-527 (CA3 H)/!l). f•t•rt.
dE>nird. 414 U.S. 909: United Statl's v. Finnvgan. 568 F. 2d ln7 (i!l (CA9
United States v. Milhollan. 5!)9 F . 2d 518, 525-517 (CA:{ Hl7\J). cert.
denied. 444 U. S. 955. But R<'C' Uuited State~; v. JohttiSOII. 5RS F. 2d 147,
150-152 and n. 6 (CA5 1979) (rPpudiating United Strtles v. Sm·icuw,
supra).
~A-, THE CHmF Jus•ricE pointed out iu hiii opinion c01rcurring in the
judgment in Sanders:
"The breadth of the Court's opinion and it~ rl'peatC'cl reft'l'l'JH't·~ to the
'automobiiP' from whirh l'l'~ponctrnt'~ l'uitt·a~C' wn:- ~Pized at thr tilllP of hi~
arre:,t, howeYer, might lcact tlw rpatler to bPiit•vP-Hl:' thp dil:'l:'C'I11l'r:s Hpparently do-that this case invohw the 'automobile' exeeption to the war-
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narcotic agents had probable cause to search a footlocker
which was seized immediately after being placed in tlw trunk
of a car. In Sanders, the officers had probable cause to
believe a particular piece of luggage contained contraband
before it was placed in the trunk of a taxi cab. The officers,
however, had no reason to search the vehicle in either case,
and no right to arrest the uriver in Sanders. The issue in
Chadwick and Sanders would have been exactly the sanw if
the officers had apprehended the suspects before they placed
the footlocker in the trunk of the car in Chadwick or before
they hailed the taxi in Sanders. 4 The officers' duty to obtain
raut rt>quirement. St'e aute. nt 762-7Ci5, nnd n. 14. It dol'S not. Hc•re, ns
in Chadwick, it was the luggage bring trnn~portrd b~, re~pondP!l! at the
time of the nrre~t, not the automobile in whieh it wa~ being earricd, !hal
wa,.; the r<u~>pected locus of the contraband. Thr relation~hip hetwf't'll the
automobile and the contraband was purely coinc·idental, as in Chadwick.
The fact that the !:luitease was re!:lting in the trunk of the automobile al
the lime of re~pondcnt'!:i nrre~t does not turn this into an 'automobile'
exception ca~e. The Court need say 110 more.
"Thi;,. eat;{' ~imply does not present thr que~t ion of whether a warrant is
required before openiug luggage when the police havt' probnbk eau~e to
believe eontraband .b located somewhere in the vehiele, but whcu the~· do
not know whethPr, for exumple, it i~ in!:iide n piece of luggage in the truuk,
in the glove compartment, or concealed in some part of the ear':, ::;lructure." 442 U. S., at 767.
4 Again, a;; pointed out by THE CHIEI<' JusTICE:
"Becau~e the police officer:; had probable cau~e to bdieve that respondent'~ gree.n ~uitca~c contained mnrijuann before it wa~ placed in the trunk
of the taxicab, their duty to obtain a search warrant before OJWiling il i::;
clear under United States v. Chadwick, 4a3 U. A. 1 ( 1977). The <'::i~l·uce
of our holding in Cluulwicl.: i;; that there i~ a if•gitimatP expel'lation of
pri\·aey in the content~ of a trunk or suitcase accompau~· ing or lwiug cHrried by a pcr"on; that expectation of privacy i:; not dimini;;lH'tl ::;imply
becau~e the owner's arref'L occurs in a public plare. Whdher arn·stcd in
a hol<'l lobby, :md airport, a railroad terminal , or ou :1 publie ~trc·C'I, as
here, the ow11er ha.~ the right to expect that the contrnt~ of hi~ luggHgc
will not, without hib con!:lenl, be expof'ed on demand Qf the police." ld ., at
766-767.
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a warrant in both cases could not be evaded by simply waiting
until the luggage was placed in a vehicle.
I therefore believe that neither Sanders nor Chadwick prrcludes application of the automobilr exception to authorize
searches of containers found in cars that police have probable
cause to search. Moreover, neither the law as it had developed before Sanders, nor the holdi11g in Sanders, requires the
Court to draw distinctions among different kinds of containers. JusTICE BLACKMUN is surely correct in his forcC'ful
demonstration that the Fourth Amendment cannot differentiate between "an orange cratr. a lunch bucket, an attaehe
case, a duffiebag, a cardboard box. a backpack a totcbag,
and a paper bag." Arkansas "· Sanders, 442 U. S., at 772
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Except for the author of the
Sanders dictum, 5 all Members of thP Court wisely avoid the
pitfalls of such an approach; unfortunately, however, instead
of adhering to the simple view that when a warralltless search
is within the automobile exception the entin' vehicle may be
searched, the Court today simultaueously moves too ft~r· in
opposite directions in these two cas!'s. Tn Robbins v. Califor'nia the plurality aud JPSTIC~ PowELL forbid a rPasonabk
search of a containf'r found in thr functional Pquivalt•rJt of
a trunk, and in New York v. Belton the C'ourt authorizes tillreasonable searches of vehicles and containers without 1)1'obable cause to believe that contraband will be found. T disagree with both of these new approaches and would decide•
both cases by a consistent application of thr automobile
exception.
I
Although a routinr application of the automobile excepSl'c POWELL, J ., concurring in tltr jud!!;ltH'llt , wde. at - . rr \'Oil·
laiuer;:; can bE' clas~ifird on tlw bn~is of tlu· ownrr'~ t'X!JC'datioll~ of privae~· ,
see ante. at-, it would ~C<'tn rather eh•ar to 111<' that a hric·k of ruarihuamt
wrappPd in ~reen plu:stir would l'nll in till' uonprinll<• (•atq~orY . I doubt
if many dealer;:; in thi~ ;;uh.:taneP would be n:ry ('OIIlfortablc ('arryiug
urouud ~uch packngc.· in plain Yicw.
5
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tion would provide an adequate basis for upholding the' search
in this case, the plurality instead quixotically coneludcs that I
notwithstanding an officer's probable cause to beli<'ve that
there is marihuana in a recessed luggage compartment in a
station wagon, a grec•n opaque plastic covering provides the
contraband with a mantle of constitutional protection. Instead of repudiating the unnecessarily broad dictum that it
employed in Sanders-a course the Court r<'cogniz<'d as necessary in other cases this Term c.-the plurality engagc•s in an f
unprecedented and unnecessary narrowiug of the automobile
exception.
In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U .•. 42, the Court reaffirmed
the automobile exception established a half-century <'arlier
in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, and upheld the
warrantless search of an automobile on probable caus<'. 7 The
"exception" recognized in Carroll and Chambers, however,
applies merely to the requirement that police f:ef'k a warrant
6 Compare McDaniels v. Sanrhrz, U. S. - , with Ea~t Carroll
Pm·iiSh Srhool Board v. Marshall. 424 U.S. 636, ~('e e;;pc•eially S'J'Jo:\\"AH'I', .J.,
dissenting in Mr.Daniels at-: Rce nl~o Donovan v. De1cey.- U. R. - ,
STJ,WAHT, .T., di~~enting and STEVE:->S, .J. , eoiH'11lTing.
_
7 The Chambers Court indicated that the :wtomobilr C'xec·ption i>< a
reC'ognit.ion of the fnct thnt F=rn.rches of automobiles gmrr:illy involve
cxi~enl circumstanrrs:
"In enforcing the Fourth AmrndmPnt 's prohihit ion n~nin:;t mll'<'nHonnble
s<.>arclws and seizurrs, thr Comt has in>;isted upon probablP <·au~P as a
minimum requirement for a rrasonnble search ])('rmitted hy tho Constitution. As a ~rnPrnl rule, il has also required thr judgment ol' a
magistrate on the probable-cause i~suP and the i~s11:1n<·<' of a wnrmnt hrfore a 8Nirch is madr . Only in exi~ent cireum;;t aner~ will t lw juclgnH'nt of
the police as to probable cause serve as a ::-uffieic·nt authorization for a
s<.>arch. Carroll, supra, holds a scareh warrant Ulllll'('l'"~'HI'~' whPre then'
is probable cause to sear<"h an automobile ~topped on the highway: the
car is movable, the occupants nrc alPrtcd, and the <"Hr's conl!·nt:s may
never be found again if a warrnnt must be obtained. Hence :.Jn immediate
srnrrh i~ constitutionally prrmif:<l'lible." 899 U. S., at 51.
The Chambrrs Court held that if a ear eould he ~:>earehcd on the scene of
~n arre~t, it could also be searched aiter being taken to the station hou~e ..

~
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from a magistrate before conducting a SC'arch of places or
things protected by the Fourth Amendment. ThC' scope of
any search that is within the exception should be just as broad
as a magistrate could authorize by warrant if he were on the
scene; the automobile exception to the warra11t roquirenwnL
therefore justifies neither more nor less than could a magistrate's wan·an t. If a magistrate is..<;ued a search warrau t for
an automobile, and officers in condueting the search authorIzed by the warrant discovered a suitcase ill the car. they
surely would not need to return to tlw magistrate for another warr·ant before searching the suitcase. 8 The fact that
the marihuana found in petitioner's car was '"Tapped in
opaque greeu plastic does not take thr search out of the automobile exception. 0 Accordingly. the search conducted here
was proper, and the judgment of the California Court of
Appeal should be affirmed.
II
In Belton, post, instead of relying on the automobile exception to uphold the search of respoudeut's jacket pocht.
Similarly, if n magistrate is>:ur. a warrant for the r;earch or a hou~c,
police executing that w:urnnt clearly need not obtain a Sl'paratP warrant
for the ~earrh of a suitcase found in the house, so long m; the thing~ to be
seizPd could rea~onnbly be found in Ruch a suitcase.
9 Of course, a proper application of th<' automobile PX!'Pplion willunhold
a earch of a container located in n cnr on!~· if the police have vrobable
cause to senrch the entire car. If, as in Scmders, thr police have probable cnuse only as to a suitcase, and not as to tlw f'ntirc ('Hr, thPn lhe
automobile exception is inapplicnblr and a warrant iH rl'quired uulr~:s some
other exigency exists. Thus polirr would not be ablr to avoid ~~ warnml
requirement simply by waiting for thr SUSJ)(-'Ct to plate an objer1 in a <'ar
and then invoking thr automobile rxcrption . If, howewr, the oc·eu]J:Ult 8
of a ear have an opportunity to takr eontraband out of n suitPHH' and
sccn·tc it ~omcwhere else iu a car, ~cc Sande1'8. 442 U . S., at 7oR, 770, n. :5
(BLACKMUN, J., coucutTing), tiH'n T would eoncludr that poli~e h:n·e
probable rau:se to search the entire ear, iJJcluding thl' ~uitra~e,withoul a
warrant.
8
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the Court takes an extraordinarily dangerous drtour to reach
the same result by adopting an arlmitted1y new rationale applicable to every "lawful custodial arrest" of the occupant
of an automobile.
The Court's careful and repeated use of the term "lawful
custodial arrest" 10 seems to imply that a significant distinction between custodial arrests and ordinary arrests exists. I
am familiar with the distinction between a "stop," sec, e. g.,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, and an "arrest." but I am not
familiar with any difference between custodial arrests and
any other kind of arrest. It is. of course, t1·ue that persons
apprehended for traffic violations are frequently not required
to accompany the arresting officer to the police station before
they are permitted to leave on their own recognizance or by
using their <.!river's licenses as a form of bond. Tt is also
possible that state law or local regulations may in some cases
forbid police officers from taking persons into custody for
violatiou of minor traffic laws. As a matter of constitutional
law, however, any person lawfully arrested for the pettiest
misdemeanor may be temporarily placed in custody. 11 In10 See pp. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and the quotation from United States v.
Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, on p. 7.
11 JuwriCE S·mwAH1' apparently believrR that the' Fourth all!! Fourteenth
Amendments might provide some imprdimPnt to poliec• taking a defrudant
into ('Ustod:v for violation of a "minor traffic offen~r." Src GWitafson ' '·
Flor·icla. 414 U. S. 260, 266 (Sn:wAH'J', J. concurring). Althou~h I a~n·c
that a police officer's authority to rrstrain an individual's libPrty should be
limitrd in the context of ~tops for routinr trnffie violation~, sec Peunsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 115 (STE\'ENR, .J., disRt>nfinp;) , tl1r Court
has not directly considered thr qurRtion whrthrr "tlwrr :tn• tOlll:'fitutinnal
limits upon the usc of 'cu~todial arrrHts' m; thr mran~ for invokiu~~: the
criminal process when relatively minor offrnsPs arc involvrd." &·e 2 W.
LaFave, Search and Reizurc § 5.2, p. 290 (197, ) : ~('<'also id., § 5.1, p. 256260, § 5.2, p. 2 1-291. To thP Pxtrnt that tllC' Court has con,:iderrd 1lw
scope of an officer's authority in mnking routinr !raffit i'top~, tlw Court
has not imposed con titutional rc~trictions on that authority. See Penn-
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deed, as the Court has repeatedly held. every arrest is a seizure
of the person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The rule of constitutional law the Court fashions today tht>re-·
fore potentially applies to every arrc~:>t of every occupant of
an automobile. 12
After the vehicle in which respondent was riding was
stopped, the officer smelled marihuana and thereby acquired
probable cause to believe that the vehicles colltained contraband.13 A thorough search of the car was therefore reasonable. But if there were no reason to believe that aHvtl)ing
more than a traffic violation had occurred. I should think it
sylvm1ia v. Mimms. supra; United States v. Robinson. supra; Gustafson v.
Flm·ida, supm. Thus the Court may br HH~uming that it~ new rule \\'ill be
limited by a constitutional rc~trirtion that doeR 11ot exif't.
12 After today, the driver of a vehicle stopped for a minor traffic- violation mu::;t look to state law for proteetion from tmrra~mutblr srarchP~.
Such protection may comr from two sourer:,;. Statutory law ma.v pr·oYidr
some protection. Lrgi~laturt'f' in somr ;;tat!'~ pPrmit oftiePl'H to take lr<lffil'
violator~ into cu~tod~r only for certftin violat"ionfl. SPe Mich. Camp. L.
§§ 257.727-728 (1970). In somr states. howewr, the polieP officer hns the
discretion to make a "custodial arrel"t." for violation of anv motor vchidc
law. Sec Iowa Code Ann. §§ 321.4R2, 321.485 (1979): Kan. Stat. A1•n .
§ 8-2105 (1975). See nl~o Tex. Ci,·. Stat. art. 6701d. §§ 147- 1.5:3 (HJ77);
Wallace v. State. 467 S. W. 601', G09-610 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Tore/! Y.
State. 518 S. W. 2d 378 (Trx. Crim. App . 1975) (offiePr maY lah tlrivN
into eustody for any traffic offrn~c exct·pt ~'peedin~.) Additionally. the
failure to producr a snb~ fartory bone! will oftC'u ju~t ih· ''det enlwn allll r·u~todial arre~t." PPoplr v. Math~. 5!5 Til. App. 3d o~O . :~71 >J. B. :.!d 2~5.
249 (1977). See a]l'o Y. Knmii'ar, W. LaFav<•, J. Israel. 1\Jotll•rtt Criminal
Procedure 402 n. a (5th ed. 1980). Given the itJr·omplrtP protection
nfforded by statutory lnw, driver~ in man~· Statr~ will have to per::;uadr
state supreme courts to interpret lhr·ir stntr cmditution '~ Pquivall'nt to
the Fourth Amendment to prohibit lhe tmrcasonable srarehes permitted
by the Court here.
1 3 The conclusion that the ofiieeri- had probablr cm1~P to search I he cat
is supported by Robbins, in whid1 thr Court ~ecm H to Hti8UtlH' the existetwe
of probnble ('HliSe on the ba~i~ of silllilar racts. cr. Ullit'ed States "·
Bowman, 487 F . 2d 1229. 1231 (CA10 1973); U11itfd State's v. Campos ,
471 :F. 2d 296 (CA9 1972) .

~
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palpably unreasonable to require the driver of a car to open
his briefcase or his luggage for inspection by the officer. 14
The driver so compelled, however, could make no constitutional obj ection to a decision by the officer to take the driver
into custody and thereby obtain justification for a search of
the entire interior of the vehicle. Indeed, under the Court's
new rule, the arresting officer may find reason to follow that
procedure whenever he sees an interesting looking briefcase
or package in a vehicle that has been stopped for a traffic
violation. That decision by a police officer will therefore
provide the constitutional predicate for broader vehicle
searches than any neutral magistrate could authori11e by issuing a warrant.
The Court's reasoning, which will lead to a massive broadening of the automobile exception , is particularly unfortunate
because that reasoning is not necessary to the decision. By
taking the giant step of permitting searches in the absence
of probable cause, the Court misses the shorter step of relying on the automobile exception to uphold the search. 15 By
taking this shorter step the Court could have adhered to the
fundamental distinction between a search that a magistrate
It would 8rem equally unreasonable to require a driver to open the
trunk of his rar, whi ch the Court would not permit, and to requ ire a
driver to open lug~?:age located in the back of a Rtation wagon, whi ch would
be permissiblr under the Court's rule. The Comt :ttt empt~:> to ju ~ tify the
search in thi8 casf' on the ba ~ i s of the officer'8 ~afrty , but J.u ~:>'J'L CE BnENNAN , dissrnting , post, at , ha s forc efully demonstrated the inadequacy
of that rationnle.
15 It is true that th e State in Relton did not a rguc that the automobile
exception justifird the search of rc•s pondmt'~ jac·ket pocket. Nrwrt:hele~s,
just as th e ndmi ~s ion of a pirce of evidenee will b<> affirnwd if an y valid
reason for aclmi ~s ion exist ed-even if the one relied upon by the t rial
judge was no t valid- ! would uphold the ndmi ~sion of this evidenc<' if an y
theory justifyi11g the search is valid . This is partieularly appropriate
given the Sta te's undcn;tmJdabl e relu ctance to ar~uc an is~ u e th Ht many
courts hnve considered to be forrclosed b~· Sande1's. SPe, e. g., United
States v. Rigales. 630 F . 2d 364 (CA5 1980) ; Uuitecl States v. MacKa y,
~O(i F . 2c1 264 (CA9 1979) ; Sta,te v. JenMns, G19 P . 2cl 108 (Haw . 1980).
14
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coultl uuthuriz<· hN~ausc it is baf'<•d on probabln cause and one
th<Lt is not :-o justified undt·r that ~tandard. Although :r mn
persuad<•d t hnt th<' Court has r<·aelwd the right result, its
opinion misf·on~true. the Fourth A rn<·ndmf'll t.
Beeauf'<' I do r1ot r<'gard the dictUJn in Sanders as a cotTcct
~tatern<>Ht. of the law. hrcaus<• thl' holding of that case is not
applieable in <·itlwr Rubl>in.~ or Belton. and b<'Cltu::i<~ the search
in both e~l.~<·s \ras supported by probable eause aud fc1lls withi11
the nutomobile exeeption, I re::;peetfully disseut in Robb-in~
and concur iu the j uclgmeut iu Belton.

.

.

'

..
June 29, 1981
PERSONAL
80-148 Robbins v. California
Dear Chief:
Knowing how troubled you have been about the
correct decision in this case, I hesitate to say anything
further. Yet, I write to suggest consideration by you of
what would be a quite minor change in your present tentative
position.
At present, there are four votes for Potter's
opinion, plus yours and mine making a total of six for the
judgment. There are three votes in dissent, favoring a new
"bright line• interpretation of the automobile exception.
This case will be read with care and concern by
prosecuting attorneys, u.s. Attorneys, by police
departments, and by lower courts. Searches with respect to
the contents of automobiles are made perhaps by the scores
every day.
The question that will be puzzling is how the
diversity of views i.n this case should be interpreted. As
we agree, Potter's opinion (with four Justices on it) will
impose a heavy new burden on law enforcement. The opinions
of the three dissenting Justices, being a clear minority,
will have to be ignored. This leaves you and me "in the
middle". My opinion sets forth a middle position that still
allows police and courts quite substantial latitude in the
various circumstances of automobile searches. If you simply
•concur in the judgment•, and say no more, law enforcement
authorities and lower courts may speculate as to your
present views. Some may think it necessary to follow the
plurality opinion.
My question is this: in the interest of affording
somewhat clearer quidance would it be better if you joined

·.

2.

my opinion, adding whatever you wish. Or you could say
simply that until we have an opportunity to reconsider the
scope of the autmobile search exception, you join my opinion
as being more consistent with the language - if not the
holdings - of prior cases.
4t
, I added the last paragraph of my opinion
specifically in light of your wish to make clear that we
were inviting a reconsideration when a proper case is
presented.
,
If you decide to go no further than simply
concurring in the judgment, I will, of course, understand.
I am sending this letter only to you, and no reply
is necessary.

Sncerely,

The
lfp/ss
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The dissenting opinions have prompted me to make ,
substantial revisions in my concurring opinion.

'r

i"'

••

Although its substance is much the same it is not
feasible ~ - because of rewriting - to indicate where the
changes ' have been made.
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:BL4~~~d~

On the early morning of January 5 ,la0!1'6~lated.

;J~~

~~ ~

.

._s~

~f~ornia H1ghway PaErol officers stopped the -t1E)
~ ~~)~PV~? ~ ~~~-A

petitioner's car--a 1966 Chevrolet station wagon~- ~ - ~

jJs ~cA_.;~~~,~~-Jz..-;q
because he had been driving erratically.

He got out o (:~

his vehicle and walked towards the patrol car.

When

~

~1'~of the officers~r /h~ driver's license
~d~ ~&;r~gi"":tr~f:>fu~

J

his wallet.

~get

When the petitioner opened the car door to

out the registration, the officers

marijuana smoke.

One of the officers

smelle~~

patted ~ ~
\

petitioner down, and discovered a vial of

li~ ~

officer then searched the passenger compartment of the
car, and found marijuana as well as equipment for using
it.

-2After putting the petitioner in the patrol car,
the officers opened the tailgate of the station wagon,
located a handle set flush in the deck, and lifted it
up to uncover a recessed luggage compartment.

~I

~rnpartrnent

pAl~

~

In the

were a tote bag and two packages wrapped in

green opaque plastic. 1

The police unwrapped the

packages; each one contained fifteen pounds of
marijuana.
The petitioner was charged with various drug
offenses, his pretrial motion to suppress the evidence
found when the packages were unwrapped was denied, and
a jury convicted him.

In an unpublished opinion, the

California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in all
relevant respects.

This Court granted a writ of

certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeal's judgment, and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442

u.s.

753.

443

u.s.

903.

On

~

remand, the Court of Appeal again found the warrantless

-3opening of the packages constitutionally permissible,
since the trial court "could reasonably [have]
conclude[d] that the contents of the packages could
~

have been inferred from their outward appearance, so
that appellant could not have held a reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to the contents."
103 Cal.App.3d 34, 40.

.

Because of continuing

--------

'J ,

uncertainty as to whether closed

''

containers found

during a lawful warrantless search of an automobile
themselves be searched without a warrant , this Court
granted certiorari.

u. s.
II

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution , which is
made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, establishes "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects ,
against unreasonable searches and seizures ."

This

Court has held that a search is per se unreasonable,

-4and thus violates the Fourth Amendment, if the police
making the search have not first secured from a neutral
magistrate a warrant that satisfies the terms of the
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
Katz v. United States, 389
United States, 269

u.s.

u.s.

20, 33.

See,~.,

347, 357; Agnello v.
Although the Court has

identified some exceptions to this warrant requirement,
the Court has emphasized that these exceptions are
"few," "specifically established," and "welldelineated."

Katz v. United States, supra, at 357.

Among these exceptions is the so-called
-~

"automobile exception."

u.s.

In ~ rroll

~

See Colorado v. Bannister,

v. United States, 267

u.s.

132,

the Court held that a search warrant is unnecessary
"where there is probable cause to search an automobile
stopped on the highway; the car is movable, the
occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never
be found again if a warrant must be obtained."

-5Chambers v. Maroney, 399

u.s.

42, 51.

In recent years,

we have twice been confronted with the suggestion that
this "automobile exception" somehow justifies the
warrantless search of a closed container found inside
an automobile.

Each time, the Court has refused to

accept the suggestion.
In United States v.

~dwick,

433

u.s.

l, the

Government argued in part that luggage is analogous to
motor vehicles for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that
the "automobile exception" should thus be extended to
encompass closed pieces of luggage.

The Court rejected

the analogy and insisted that the exception is confined
to the special and possibly unique circumstances which
were the occasion of its genesis.

First, the Court

said that "[o]ur treatment of automobiles has been
based in part on their inherent mobility, which often
makes obtaining a judicial warrant impracticable."
Id., at 12.

While both cars and luggage may be

-6-

"mobile," luggage itself may be brought and kept under
the control of the police.
Second, the Court acknowledged that "inherent
mobility" cannot alone justify the automobile
exception , since the Court has sometimes approved
warrantless searches in which the automobile's mobility
was irrelevant.

See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413

441-442; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428

u.s.

u.s.

433,

364, 367.

The automobile exception, the Court said, is thus also
supported by "the diminished expectation of privacy
~

which surrounds the automobile" and which arises from
~

the facts that a car is used for transportation and not
as a residence or a repository of personal effects,
that a car's occupants and contents travel in plain
view, and that automobiles are necessarily highly
regulated by government.
supra, at 12-13.

United States v. Chadwick,

No such diminished expectation of

"'

privacy characterizes luggage; on

-7typically is a repository of personal effects, the
contents of closed pieces of luggage are hidden from
view, and luggage is not generally subject to state

-----------------------~---------------'-------regulation.
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442

u.s.

753, the State of

Arkansas argued that the "automobile exception" should
be extended to allow the warrantless search of
everything found in an automobile during a lawful
warrantless

search of the vehicle itself.

The Court

rejected this argument for much the same reason it had
rejected the Government's argument in Chadwick.
Pointing out, first, that, "[o]nce police have seized a
suitcase, as they did here, the extent of _its mobility
is in no way affected by the place from which it was
taken," the Court said, that there generally "is no
greater need for warrantless searches of luggage taken
from automobiles than of luggage taken from other
places."

Id., at 763-764.

Second, the Court saw no

-8reason to believe that the privacy expectation in a
closed piece ofluggage taken from a car is necessarily
less than the privacy expectation in closed pieces of
luggage found elsewhere.
In the present case, the Court once again
encounters the argument--made in the Government's brief s;(r
I.

\'

l

amicus curiae--that the contents of a closed container
carried in a vehicle are somehow not fully protected by
the Fourth Amendment.

But this argument squarely ~

confl~s

with the Court's decisions in Chadwick

Sanders.

Those cases made clear, if it was not

before, that a

~losed

container ' iound in a

~

::

an~~~
clear ~

lawfully~

searched car is constitutionally protected to the same
extent as are closed containers found anywhere else.
The respondent, however, proposes that the nature
of a container may diminish the constitutional
protection to which it otherwise would be entitled -that the Fourth Amendment protects only containers

-9commonly used to transport "personal effects."

By

personal effects the respondent means property worn on
or carried about the person or having some intimate
relation to the person.

In taking this position, the

respondent relies on numerous opinions that have drawn
a distinction between pieces of sturdy luggage, like
suitcases, and flimsier containers, like a cardboar d
boxes.

Compare, e.g., United States v. Benson, 631

F.2d 1336 (CA8 1980)

(leather tote bag); United States

v. Miller, 608 F.2d 1089 (CAS 1979)

(plastic

portfolio); United States v. Presler, 610 F.2d 1206

--

(CA4 1979)

(briefcase); United States v. Meier, 602

F.2d 2S3 (CAlO 1979)

(backpack);

Johnson, S88 F.2d 147 (CAS 1979)

United States v.
(duffle bag); United

States v. Stevie, S82 F.2d ll7S (CA8 1978); with United
States v. Mannino, 63S F.2d 110 (CA2 1980)

(plastic bag

inside paper bag); United States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d
697

(CAl 1980)

(" [t]wo plastic bags, further in three

-10bro~gs,

further in two clear plastic bags"

) ;United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122 (plastic bag);
United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684 (CA9 1980)

(paper

-

bag); United States v. Neumann, 585 F.2d 355 (CAB 1978)
__.-;

(card boa r d box ) .
The

r~spondent's

least two reasons.

argument cannot prevail for at

First, it has no basis in the

language or meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

That

Amendment protects people and their effects, and it
protects those effects whether they are "personal" or
"impersonal."

----and

The contents of Chadwick's footlocker

Sanders' suitcase were immune from a warrantless

search because they had been placed within a closed,
opaque container and because Chadwick and Sanders had
thereby reasonably "manifested an expectation that the
contents would remain free from public examination."
United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 11.

Once placed

-11within such a container, a diary and a dishpan are
equally protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Second, even if one wished to import such a
distinction into the Fourth Amendment, it is difficult
if not impossible to perceive any objective criteria

---

which that task might be accomplished.

by ')~~

What one person

may put into a suitcase, another may put into a paper
bag.

United States v. Ross,

F. 2d

(en bane} •

And as the disparate results in the decided cases
indicate, no court, no constable, no citizen, can
sensibly be asked to distinguish the relative "privacy
interests" in a closed suitcase, briefcase, portfolio
---------~~----------~--------,

purse, satchel, backpack, knapsack, gym bag, tote bag,
travel bag, duffle bag, candy tin, plastic cooler,
pillow case, toolbox, lunch box, cardboard box, or

-----

paper bag.

The respondent protests that footnote 13 of the

Sanders opinion says that "[n]ot all containers and

-12packages found by police during the course of a search
will deserve the full protection of the Fourth
Amendment."

442

u.s.

753, at 764-765.

But the

exceptions listed in the succeeding sentences of the
footnote are the very model of exceptions which prove
the rule:

"Thus, some containers (for example a kit of

~

~
burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature

~ ~~

cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy
because their contents can be inferred from their
outward appearance.

Similarly, in some cases the

contents of a package will be open to 'plain view,'

---

thereby obviating the need for a warrant."

The second

of these exceptions obviously refers to items in a
container that is not closed.

The first exception is

likewise little more than another variation of the
"plain view" exception, since, if the distinctive
configuration of a container proclaims its contents,
the contents cannot fairly be said to have been remove

t5l{

-13from a searching officer's view.

The same would be

true, of course, if the container were transparent, or
were labelled to reveal its contents.

In short, the

negative implication of footnote 13 of the Sanders
opinion is that, unless the container is such that its
contents may be said to be in plain view, those
contents are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The California Court of Appeal believed that the
packages in the present case fell directly within the
second exception described in this footnote, since
"[a]ny experienced observer could have inferred from
the appearance of the packages that they contained
bricks of marijuana."

103 ca.App.3d 34, 40.

The only

evidence the Court cited to support this proposition
was the testimony of one of the officers who arrested
the petitioner.

When asked whether there was anything

about "these two plastic wrapped green blocks which

.)

-14attracted your attention," the officer replied,
somewhat obscurely,
"A.
I had previous knowledge of
transportation of such blocks. Normally
contraband is wrapped this way, merely
hearsay.
I had never seen them before.
"Q. You had heard contraband was packaged
this way?
"A. Yes." Ibid., n. 2.

This vague

that

testimony certainly did not establish

marijuana-~

really "packaged this way."

~

6

Expectations of privacy

are established by general social norms,

and to fall

within the second exception of the footnote in question
a container must so clearly announce its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or its label, that its contents are
obvious to a non-expert observer.

If indeed a green

plastic wrapping reliably indicates that a package
contain~9nl~marijuana,

said to be

~ould o~l/

that information can hardly be

~"--"'..---~~~

~~
~~

~UJL-v

-15· Although the two bricks of marijuana were
discovered during a lawful

se ~ ch

of the petitioner's

I..-

\

car, they were inside a

c~osed,

opaque container.

we

reaffirm today that such a container may not be opened
without a warrant, even if it is found during the
course of the lawful search of an automobile.

Since

the respondent does not allege the presence of any
circumstances that would constitute a valid exception
to this general rule, 3

it is clear that the opening of

the closed containers without a search warrant
violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
____......

Accordingly, the judgment of the California Court of
Appeal is reversed.
It is so ordered.

lA photograph was made of one of the packages, and it
was later described as follows:
"The package visible in the photograph
is apparently wrapped or boxed in an opaque
material covered by an outer wrapping of
transparent, cellophane-type plastic.

(The

photograph is not in color, and the 'green'
plastic cannot be seen at all.)

Both

wrappings are sealed on the outside with at
least one strip of opaque tape.

As thus

wrapped and sealed, the package roughly
~

resembles an oversized, extra-long cigar box
with slightly rounded corners and edges.

It

bears no l e gend or other written indicia
supporting any inference concerning its
contents."

103 Cal.App.3d 34, 44

J., dissenting).

(Rattigan,

-FN 22As Judge Rattigan wrote in his dissenting opinion in
the California Court of Appeal: "For all that I see, it
could contain books, stationery, canned goods, or any
number of other wholly innocuous items which might be
heavy in weight.

In fact, it bears a remarkable

resemblance to an unlabelled carton of emergency
highway flares that I bought from a store shelf and
have carried in the trunk of my own automobile."

103

Cal.App.3d 34, 44.
3In particular, it is not argued that the opening of
the packages was incident to a lawful custodial arrest.
~

Cf. Chimel v. California, 395

u.s.

752.

Such an

argument could not prevail in any event, since the
packages were found in the equivalent of the trunk of
the vehicle, and thus were not within the petitioner's
immediate control when he was searched.
v. Belton,

u.s.

supra, at 764 n. 11.

See New York

n. 4; Arkansas v. Sanders,

-FN 3Further, the respondent does not argue that the
petitioner consented to the opening of the packages.

.inprtmt (lfltllrl of tlft ,-mttb .Statts
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 1, 1981
Re:

No. 80-148

-

Robbins v. California

Dear Potter:
I will either dissent or, if someone senior to me
elects to write a dissent (which I prayerfully hope may
be the case) will await that dissent.
Sincerely,

/)~

Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

t.:

June 2, 1981

..~'

-~

"

~' -~

,i

I~

)..:.

Dear Potter:
Although I will join the judgment
resolution of the case on its facts, I
some of the language in your opinion.
1. I do not read either Chadwick or Sanders as
going as far as your opinion. Neither case said €fiat every
"closed container" (except where the "plain view rule
applies") in an automobile trunk is protected. Chadwick
involved a trunk in which personal belongings customarily
are carried. Sanders repeatedly referred only to "luggage,"
also historically the repository of personal belongings. I
could not say, therefore, that the SG's argument "squarely
conflicts" with these cases. P. 8. I do agree that, on
principle, Chadwick and Sanders require reversal here.
2. Pages 10 and 11 particularly give me trouble.
I would find it difficult to agree that a warrant to search
is required for any "gym bag, tote bag, travel bag, duffle
bag, candy tin, plastic cooler, pillow case, tool box, lunch
box, cardboard box, or paper bag." I would draw a line
somewhere along this continuum, because many of these
implicate no reasonable expectation of privacy.
3. On page 14 I suggest two language changes.
the second line of the first full paragraph, I would
eliminate "and nothing else." And in the last line on page
14, I would change "common knowledge• to read "known to
experienced police officers.• I have no idea what marijuana
smells like. Yet police officers, trained to know, are
better informed.

I agree for the most part with your discussion of
my note 13 in Sanders, and your elaboration of the "plain
view" doctrine when applied to packages and parcels.
You
could meet most - perhaps all - of my concerns with respect
to the reach of your opinion if you eliminated the string of
examples and recognized explicitly that the characteristics
of the container vary widely and are relevant to what I
think is the fundamental question whether there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
I

.

' f'\

-'. ";.'

y,

'

.,

2.

This case involves carefully sealed, opaque, and
somewhat unusual packages. But few bags, packages, and
miscellaneous containers carried in the back of a car are
protected so carefully. Bags may be open or loosely tied,
and boxes of merchandise usually will have nothing more than
wrapping paper and a string around them. Many of the
containers mentioned on page 11 will quite obviously not be
places where one normally has an expectation of privacy,
e.g., a tool box, lunch box, candy tin, or each and every
cardboard box or paper bag. Some containers are just too
insubstantial to require the protection of a warrant. The
test should be whether there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
I appreciate that the qualification I would make to
your opinion may not diminish line drawing problems for
police and courts. Yet, this is a task that law enforcement
undertakes in many Fourth Amendment cases.
My concern is heightened by the practicalities.
Absent the right to search on the scene bags and boxes that
are not securely sealed or locked and that typically are not
used to transport personal or private items, law enforcement
will face more serious problems.
Police officers will be
taking automobiles and people to police stations for
trifles. The police also will be removed from their more
important patroling duties, sometimes for hours.

* * *
I appreciate the difficulty of writing this
opinion, and regret adding to your problem. Yet, I do think
the line must be drawn more narrowly to protect the public
interest than your opinion does now - if I read it
correctly.
If you should be disposed, Potter, to accept the
substance of the views expressed above, or perhaps leave
room for them in a later case, I will join you. Otherwise,
I will circulate something along the lines of this letter
and write separately.
Sincerely,
Mr. Justice Stewart
lfp/ss
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I
On the early morning of January 5, 1975, California Highway Patrol officers stopped the petitioner's car-a 1966 Chevrolet station wagon-because h~ had been driving erratically.
He got out of his vehicle and walked towards the patrol car.
When one of the officers asked him for his driver's license
and state wagon's registration, he fumbled with his wallet.
When the petitioner opened the car door to get out the registration, the officers smelled marihua11a smoke. One of the
officers patted the petitioner down, and discovered a vial of
liquid. The officer then searched the passenger compartment
of the car, and found marihuana as well as equipment for
using it.
After putting the petitioner in the patrol car, the officers
opened the tailgate of the station wagon, located a handle
set flush in the deck, and lifted it up to uncover a recessed
luggage compartment. In the compartment were a tote bag
and two packages wrapped in green opaque plastic. 1 The
A photograph was made of one of the packages, and it was later
described as follows:
"The package visible in tl1e photograph is apparently wmppetl or boxed
in an opaque material covered by an outer wrapping of transparent, cello1
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police unwrapped the packages; each one contained 15 pounds
of marihuana.
The petitioner was cha.rged with various drug offenses, his
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence found when the
packages were unwrapped was denied, and a jury convicted
him. In an unpublished opinion, the CaliforJlia Court of
Appeal affirmed the judgment in all relevant respects. This
Court granted a · writ of certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeal's judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753. 443
U. S. 903. On remand, the Court of Appeal again fouhd the
warrantless opening of the packages constitutionally pennissible, since the trial court "could reasonably [have] conclude[<.l] that the contents of the packages could have been
inferred from their outward appearance, so that appellant
tould not have held a reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to the contents." 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40. Because
of continuing uncertainty as to whether closed containers
found during a lawful warrantless search of ap au.tomobile
may themselves be searched without a warrant, this Court
1ranted certiorari. U. S. - .

II
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which is made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
establishes "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
f!earches and seizures." This Court has held that a search
is per se unreasonable, and thus violates the Fourth Amendphane-type plastic. (The photograph is not in color, and the 'green'
plastic cannot be seen at all.) Both wrappings are sealed on the outside
with at least one strip of opaque tape. As thus wrapped and :sealed, the
package roughly resembles an overl:lized, extra-long cigar box with l:llightly
rounded corner::> and edges. It bears no legend or other written indicia
lttpporting any inference concerning its contents." 103 Cui. App. 3d 34, .
-44 (Rattigan, J., di:sl:ienting).
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ment, if the police making the search have not first secured
from a neutral magistrate a warrant that satisfies the terms
of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g.,
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357; ~llo v. United
States , 269, U. S. 20, 33. Although the Co~r'i'has ideutified
some exceptions to this warra.nt requirement, the Court has
emphasized that these exceptions are "few," "specifically established," and "well-delineated." Katz v. United States,
aupra, at 357.
Among these exceptions is the so-called "automobile excepU. S. - . Iu Carroll
tion." See Colorado v. Bannister, v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, the Court held that a search
warrant is unnecessary "where there is probable cause to
11earch an automobile stopped on the highway; the car is
movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents
may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained."
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42. 51. In recent years,
we have twice been confronted with the suggestion that this
"automobile exception" somehow justifies the warra11tless
~earch of a closed container found inside an automobile.
Each time, the Court has refused to accept the suggestion.
In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, the Government argued in part that luggage is analogous to motor vehicles for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that the "automobile exception" should thus be extended to encompass closed
piPces of luggage. The Court rejected the analogy and in!isted that the exception is confined to the special and possibly unique circumstances which were the occasionf of its
111enesis. First, the Court said that " [ o] ur treatment Of automobiles has been based in part on their inherent mobility,
which often makes obtaining a judicial warrant impracticable." ld., at 12. While both cars and luggage may ba
"mobile," luggage itself may be brought and kept under the
eontrol of the police.
Second, the Court acknowledged that "inhere11t mobility'~
eaunot alone justify the automobile exception, since the Court

i
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has sometimes approved warrantless searches in which the
automobile's mobility was irrelevant. See Cady v. Dom ..
browski, 413 U. S. 433, 441-442; South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U. S. 364, 367. The automobile exception, the Court
said, is thus also supported by "the diminished expectation
of privacy which surrounds the automobile" and which arises
from the facts that a car is used for transportation and not
as a residence or a repository of personal effects, that a car's
occupants and contents travel in plain view, and that auto ..
mobiles are necessarily highly regulated by govermnen t.
United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 12-13. No such diminished expectation of privacy characterizes 1uggage; on
contrary, luggage typically is a repository of person effects,
the contents of closed pieces of luggage are hidden from view,
and luggage is not generally subject to state regulation.
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753. the State of Arkansas
argued that the "automobile exception" should be extended
to allow the warrantless search of everything found in an
automobile during a lawful warrantless search of the vehicle
itself. The Court rejected this argument for much the same
reason it had rejected the Government's argument in Chadwick. Pointiug out, first. that, " [o] nee police have seized
a suitcase, as they did here, the extent of its mobility is in
no way affected by the place from which it was taken," the
Court said, that there generally "is no greater need for warrmttless searches of luggage ta.ken from automobiles than of
luggage taken from other places." ld., at 763-764. Second,
the Court saw no reason to believe that the privacy expectatiou in a closed piece of luggage taken from a car is necessarily less than the privacy expectation in closed pieces of
luggage found elsewhere.
In the present case, the Court once again encounters the
argument--made in the Government's brief amicus curiaethat the contents of a closed container carried in a vehicle
are somehow not fully protected by the Fourth Amendmeut.
But this argument is inconsistent with the Court's decisions l
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in Chadwick and Sanders. Those cases made clear, if it was
not clear before, that a closed piece of luggage found in a
lawfully searched car is constitutionally protected to the sameJ
-.~ L _ , - - - -•
extent as are closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else.
The respondent, however, proposes that the nature of a
,_~
container may diminish the constitutional protection t~ which
it otherwise would be ent1tled-that the Fourth Amendment
protects only containers commonly used to transport "per,(
sonal effects." By personal effects the respondent means
property worn on or carried about the person or having some
intimate relation to the person. In taking this position, the
respouden t relies on numerous opinions that have drawn a
distiuction between pieces of sturdy luggage, like suitcases,
and flimsier containers. like a cardboard boxes. Compare,
e. g., United States v. Benson, 631 F. 2d 1336 (CA8 1980)
(leather tote bag); United States v. Miller, 608 F. 2d 1089
(CA5 1979) (plastic portfolio); United States v. Presler, 610
]'. 2d 1206 (CA4 1979) (briefcase); United States v. Me·ier,
602 J..,. 2d 253 (CAlO 1979) (backpack); United States v.
Johnson, 588 F . 2d 147 (CA5 1979) (duffle bag); United
States v. Stevie, 582 F. 2d 1175 (CA8 1978); with United
States v. Mannino, 635 F. 2d 110 (CA2 1980) (plastic bag
inside paper bag); United States v. Gosfwrn, 628 F. 2d 697
(CAl 1980) ("[t] wo plastic bags, further in three brown
paper bags, further in two clear plastic bags"); United States
v. Gooch, 603 F. 2d 122 (plastic bag); United States v. Mackey, 626 F. 2d 684 (CA9 1980) (paper bag); United States v.
Neumann, 585 F. 2d 355 (CA8 1978) (cardboard box).
The respondent's argument cannot prevail for at least two
reasons. First, it has no basis in the language or meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. That Amendment protects ~o-~
pie and their effects, and it protects those effeCts whether
tney a~sOlliil" 'or "impersonal." The contents of Chadww s ootloc er an
an ers suitcase were immune from a
warrant ss search because they had been placed within a .
~ osed, opaque container nd because Chadwick and Sanders

I
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hai therebr_reasonably "manifested an expectation that the
contents would remain free from public examination."
United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 11. Once placed within
such a container, a diary and a dishpan are p::quallyf protected \
by the Fourth Amendment.
Second, even if one wished to import such a distinction into
the Fourth Amendment, it is difficult if not impossible to
perceive any objective criteria by which that task might be
accomplished. What one perso11 may put into a suitcase, I
another ma.y put into a box. United States v. Ross,- F. 2d ~
(en bane). And as the disparate results in the decided
~ases indicate, no court, no constable, uo citizen, can sensibly
be asked to distinguish the relative "privacy interests" in a
I
closed suitcase, briefcase, porlfOiio, ilutife bag, or 22_x.
The respondent protests that footnote 13 of the Sanders
opinion says that "[n lot aU contaiuers and packages fouud
by police during the course of a search will deserve the full
protection of the Fourth Amendment." 442 U. S. 753, at
764- 765. But the exceptious listed iu the succeediug sentences of the footnote are the very model of exceptions which
prove the rule: "Thus, some containers (for example a kit of
burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature caunot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open
to 'plain view,' thereby obviating the need for a warrant."
The second of these exceptions obviously refers to items in a
container that is not closed. The first exception is likewise
little more than another variation of the "plain view" exception , since, if the distinctive configuration of a container proclaims its contents. the contents cannot fairly be said to have
been removed from a searching officer's view. The same
would be true, of course, if the container were transparent, or
otherwise clearly revealed its contents. In short, the uega-f
tive implication of footnote 13 of the Sanders opinion is that,

?
I
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unless the container is such that its contents may be said to
be in plain view, those contents are fully protected by the
Fourth Amendment.
The California Court of Appeal believed that the packages
in the prese11t case fell directly within the second exception
described in this footuote. since " [a] ny experienced observer
could have inferred from the appearance of the packages
that they contained bricks of marijuaua." 103 Cal. App. 3d
34, 40. The only evidence the Court cited to support this
proposition was the testimony of one of the officers who arrested the petitioner. When asked whether there was anything about "these two plastic wrapped green blocks which
attracted your attention," the officer replied, somewhat
obscurely,
"A. I had previous knowledge of transportation of
such blocks. Normally contraband is wrapped this way,
merely hearsay. I had never seeu them before.
"Q. You had heard contraband was packaged this
wayY
"A. Yes." Id., n. 2.
This vague testimony certainly did not establish that marihuana is ordinarily "packaged this way." E_B?ectations
privacy are established by general social 11orms. and to fall
tlie footnote in question a
witnin tfiesecOiiefex"'Cei)tlon
container must so clearly am10unce its cou tents, whether f)yHs ffis~guratTon. Its frans arency, or otherwise,
that its contents are
vious o au observe
If iudeed a
green plastic wrapping reliably indicates at a package could
only contain~ marihuana, that fact was not shown by the evidence of recdrd in this case. 2

ofl

or

I

~As Judg•· Rattigan wrote in hi;; di~:;entiug opinion in the California
Court of A['peal: "For all that I sec, it euuld contain buuk~, :;tittionery,
canned goods, or any mnnbC'r of otht'r wholl~· iuuucuou~ item.- which
might uc ht•avy in weight. In fact, it bear,.; a remarknble r<•semblaucc to
an unlabelled C'a rton uf emergenC'y highwuy flareti that I brought Jrum a.

,.
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Although the two bricl<s of marihuana were discovered
during a lawful search of the petitioner's car, they were inside
a closed, opaque container. We reaffirm today that such
a container may not be opened without a warrant, even if it
is found duripg the course of the lawful search of an automobile. Since the respondent qoes not allege the presence
of any circumstances that would constitute a valid exception
to this general rule, 3 it is clear that the openi"ng of the closed
containers without a search warrant violated the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the judgment of
the California Court of Appeal is reversed.

It is so ordered.

11tore shelf and have carried in the trunk of my owrl automobile." 103
Cal. App. 3d 34, 44.
3
In particular, it is not argued that the opening of the packages was
incident to a lawful custodial arrest. Cf. Ohimel v. California, 395 U. S.
752. See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, at 764, n. 11.
:Further, the respondent does not argue that the petitioner consented tlJ·
the opening of the packages.
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JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

I
On the early morning of January 5, 1975, California Highway Patrol officers stopped the petitioner's car-a 1966 Chevrolet station wagon-beca.use h~ had been driving erratically.
He got out of his vehicle and walked towards the patrol car.
When one of the officers asked him for his driver's license
and state wagon's registration, he fumbled with his wallet.
When the petitioner opened the car door to get out the registration, the officers smelled marihuana smoke. One of the
officers patted the petitioner down, and discovered a vial of
liquid. The officer then searched the passenger compartment
of the car, and found marihuana as well as equipment for
using it.
After putting the petitioner in the patrol car, the officers
opened the tailgate of the station wagon, located a handle
set flush in the deck, and lifted it up to uucover a recessed
luggage compartment. In the compartment were a tote bag
and two packages wrapped in green opaque plastic. 1 The
A photograph was made of one of the packages, and it was later
as follows:
"The package visible in the photograph is apparently wrapped or boxed
in 8D opaque material covered by an outer wrapping of tran~p~trent, cello-·
1

d~cribed
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police unwrapped the packages; each one contained 15 pounds
cf marihuana.
The petitioner was charged with various drug offenses, his
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence found when the
packages were unwrapped was denied, and a jury convicted
him. In an unpublished opinion, the Califoq1ia Court of
Appeal affirmed the judgment in all relevant respects. This
Court granted a writ of certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeal's judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753. 443
U. S. 903. On remand, the Court of Appeal again fot111d the
warrantless opening of the packages constitutiona.lly permissible, since the trial court "could reasonably [have] conclude [ d] that the contents of the packages could have been
inferred from their outward appearance, so that appellant
tould not have held a reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to the contents." 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40. Because
cf continuing uncertainty as to whether closed co11tainers
found during a lawful warrantless search of ap automobile
may themselves be searched without a warrant, this Court
tranted certiorari. U. S. - .

II
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which is made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
establishes "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects. against unreasonable
~earches and seizures." This Court has held that a search
is per se unreasonable, and thus violates the Fourth Amendphane-t ype plastic. (The photograpl1 is not in color, and the 'green'
plastic cannot be seen at all.) Both wrappings are sealed on the outsid6
with at least one strip of opaque tape. As thus wrapped and sealed, the
package roughly re~;embl es an oversized, extra-long cigar box with slightly
rounded corners and edges. It bears no legend or other writteu indicia
1upporting any inference concerning its contents." 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, .
-i4 (Rattigan, J ., dissenting).
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ment, if the police ma.king the sea.rch have not first secured
from a neutral magistrate a warrant that satisfies the terms
of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g.,
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357; Jrldello v. United
States, 269, U. S. 20, 33. Although the Co~rP has identified
some exceptions to this warrant requirement, the Court has
emphasized that these exceptions are "few," "specifically established," and "well-delineated." Katz v. United States,
aupra, at 357.
Among these exceptions is the so-called "automobile excepU. S. - . In Carroll
tion." See Colorado v. Bannister, v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, the Court held that a search
warrant is unnecessary "where there is probable cause to
1earch an automobile stopped on the highway; the car is
movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents
may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.''
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 51. In recent years,
we have twice been confronted with the suggestion that this
"automobile exception" somehow justifies the warrantless
l!learch of a closed container found inside an automobile.
Each time, the Court has refused to accept the suggestion.
In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, the Government argued in part that luggage is analogous to motor vehicles for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that the "automobile exception" should thus be extended to encompass closed
pieces of luggage. The Court rejected the analogy and inl!isted that the exception is confined to the special and possibly unique circumstances which were the occasion\ of its
genesis. First, the Court said that " [o] ur treatmeu t of automobiles has been based in part on their inhereut mobility,
which often makes obtaining a judicial warraut impracticable.'' !d., at 12. While both cars and luggage may ba
11
mobile," luggage itself may be brought and kept under the
eontrol of the police.
Second, the Court acknowledged that "inherent mobility'~
eannot alone justify the automobile exception, since the Court
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has sometimes approved warrantless searches in which the
automobile's mobility was irrelevant. See Cady v. Darn ..
browski, 413 U. S. 433, 441-442; South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U. S. 364, 367. The automobile exception, the Court
said, is thus also supported by "the diminished expectation
of privacy which surrounds the automobile" and which arises
from the facts that a car is used for transportation and not
as a residence or a repository of personal effects, that a car's
occupants and contents travel in plain view, and that aut<> ..
mobiles are necessarily highly regulated by government.
United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 12-13. No such dimiu- ~
ished expectation of privacy characterizes luggage;~
contrary, luggage typically is a repository of personfJ. effects,
the contents of closed pieces of luggage are hidden from view,
and luggage is not generally subject to state regulation.
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, the State of Arkansas
argued that the "automobile exception" should be extended
to allow the warrantless search of everything found in an
automobile during a lawful warrantless search of the vehicle
itself. The Court rejected this argument for much the same
reason it had rejected the Government's argument in Chadwick. Pointing out, first. that, " [ o] nee police have seized
a suitcase, as they did here, the extent of its mobility is in
no way affected by the place from which it was taken," the
Court said, that there generally "is no greater need for warralltless searches of luggage ta.ken from automobiles than of
luggage taken from other places." Id., at 763-764. Second,
the Court saw no reason to believe that the privacy expectation in a closed piece of luggage taken from a ca.r is necessarily less than the privacy expectation in closed pieces of
luggage found elsewhere.
In the present case, the Court once again encounters the
argument--made in the Government's brief amicus curiaethat the contents of a ~ carried in a vehicle
are somehow not fully protected by the Fourth Amendment.
But this argument is inconsistent with the Court's decisions\
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in Chadwick and Sanders. Those cases made clear, if it waa
not clear before, that a closed piece of luggage found in al
lawfully searched car is constitutionally protected to the same
extent as are closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else. I
The respondent, however, proposes that the nature of a
container may dimin~sh the constitutional :protection to which
it otherwise would be entitled-that the Fourth Amendment
protects only containers commonly used to transport "personal effects." By personal effects the respondent means
property worn on or carneaat>out the person or having some
intimate relation to the person. In taking this position, the
respondent relies on numerous opinions that have drawn a
disti11ction between pieces of sturdy luggage, like suitcases,
and flimsier containers, like a cardboard boxes. Compare,
e. g., United"""mare;-v. Benson, 631 F. 2d 1336 (CAS 19SO)
(leather tote bag); United States v. Miller, 60S F. 2d 10S9
(CAS 1979) (plaatic portfolio); United States v. Presler, 610
F. 2d 1206 (CA4 1979) (briefcase); United States v. Meier,
602 Ji'. 2d 253 (CAlO 1979) (backpack); United States v.
Johnson, 5SS F. 2d 147 (CA5 1979) (duffle bag); United
States v. Stevie, 582 F. 2d 1175 (CAS 197S); with United
States v. Mannino, 635 F. 2d 110 (CA2 19SO) (plastic bag
inside paper bag); United States v. Gosfwrn, 62S F. 2d 697
(CAl 19SO) ("[t]wo plaatic bags, further in three brown
paper bags, further in two c1ear plastic bags"); United States
v. Gooch, 603 :F'. 2d 122 (plastic bag) ; United States v. M
key, 626 F. 2d 6S4 (CA9 19SO) (paper bag); United States :;_1
Neumann, 5S5 F. 2d 355 (CAS 197S) (cardboard box).
The respondent's argument cannot prevail for at least two
reasons. First, it has no basis in the language or meaning
t'Jf the Fourth Amendment. That Amendment protects people and their effects, and it prote<j,s those effects whm_her
they are " ersonal" or "impersonal.'~he cm1tents of Chadwick's ootlocker an
an ers suitcase were immune from a
warrantless search because they had been placed within a
~~ 9~~e cont~and because Chadwick and Sanders

ac-1
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had thereby reasonably "manifested an expectation that the
contents would remain free from public examination."
United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 11. Once placed within
such a container, a diary and a dishpan are equally protected
by the Foli'rlh Am~ent.
Second, even if one wished to import such a distinction into
the Fourth Amendment, it is difficult if not impossible to
perceive any objective criteria by which that task might be
accomplished. What one person may put into a suitcase,
another may put into a box. United States v. Ross,- F. 2d I
(en bane). And as the disparate results in the decided
tases indicate, no court, no constable, no citizen, can sensibly
be asked to distinguish the relative "privacy interests" in a
closed suitcase. briefcase, portfolio, duffle bag, or box.
f
The respondent protests that footnote 13 of theSanders
opinion says that "[n 1ot all containers and packages fouud
by police during the course of a search will deserve the full
protection of the Fourth Amendment." 442 U. S. 753, at
764-765. But the exceptions listed iu the succeeding sentences of the footnote are the very model of exceptions_which
prove the rule: "Thus, some containers (for example a kit of
bu;giar i(;ols or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectatiou of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open
to 'plain view,' thereby obviating the need for a warrant."
The second of these exceptions obviously refers to items in a
container that is not closed. The first exception is likewise
little more than another variation of the "plain view" exception, since, if the distinctive configuration of a container proclaims its contents. the contents cannot fairly be said to have
been removed from a searching officer's view. The same
would be true, of course, if the container were transparent, or
otherwise clearly revealed its contents. In short, the nega-1
tive implication of footnote 13 of the Sanders opinion is that,

--
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unless the container i such tha its coHtents m be said to
e m p · 1 v1ew, those contents are fully protected by the
Pourth A1nendment.
The California Court of Appeal believed that the packages
in the preseut case fell directly within the second excPption
described in this footnote. since " [a] ny experieuced observer
could have inferred from the appearance of the packages
that they contained bricks of marijuana." 103 C'al. App. 3d
34, 40. The only evidence the Court cited to support this
proposition was the testimony of one of the officers who arrested the petitioner. When asked whether there was anything about "these two plastic wrapped green blocks which
attracted your attention," the officer replied, somewhat
obscurely,
"A. I had previous kuowledge of transportation of
such blocks. Normally coutraband is wrapped this way,
merely hearsay. I had never see11 them before.
"Q. You had heard contraband was packaged this
way?
"A. Yes." /d., n. 2.
This vague testimouy certainly did not establish that marihuana is ordinarily "packaged this way." Expectations ofl
privacy are established by general social Horms. and to fall
within the second exception of the footnote in question a
CQ!_ltainer must so clearly am10unce its contents, whether by
its~distinetive configuration. its transpare11dy, or otherwise, (
that its contents are obvious to au observer. If indeed a
green plastic wrapping reliab ly indicates that a package could
only contain\ marihuana, that fact was not showu by the evidence of record in this case. 2
1 As Judg•· Hattigan wrote in his di::!tlentiug opinion in thl· California
Court of At>Jleal: "For all tllHt I tiCC, it could contain book~, titfttionery,
canned goods, or any number of other wholly iunocuou~ itPlllti which
might be !wavy in weight. In faet , it b<·ar,; a remarkable re~emblaucc to
au unlabelled carton of emergeney highway Hare::! that I brought from a.
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Although the two bricl<:s of marihuana were discovered
during a lawful search of the petitioner's car, they were inside
a closed, opaque container. We reaffirm today that such
a container may not be opened without a warrant, even if it
is found duripg the course of the lawful search of an automobile. Since the respondent qoes not allege the presence
of any circumstances that would' constitute a valid e~ception
to this genen'l.l rule, 3 it is clear that the opening of the closed
containers without a search warrant violated the Fourth
and Fourteenth .Amendments. Accordingly, the judgment of
the California Court of Appeal is reversed.

It is so ordered.

itore shelf and have carried in the trunk of my own automobile." 103 ·
Cal. App. 3d 34, 44.
3 In particular, it is not argued that the opening of the packages was
incident to a lawful custodial arrest. Cf. Ohimel v. California, 395 U. S
752. See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, at 764, n. 11.
l<'urther, the respondent does not argue that the petitioner consented t .
the opening of the packages.

l

Although I will join the judgment and agree
your resolution of the case on its facts, I have
considerable trouble with the extremely broad scope of your
opinion.
While recognizing the difficulty of line drawing
in Fourth Amendment cases, and particularly with respect to
what one may transport in the trunk of an automobile, I
would find it difficult to agree that the •contents• of a
container must be "obvious to an observer• before an officer
with probable cause to stop the automobile may examine the
contents.
,·;:
• lit.-4W

.
In a broad sense, the purpose of the •search•
provision of the Fourth Amendment is to protect privacy • .
almost infinite variety of parcels, packages, bags, etc.,
are transported in automobiles. There usually is little or
no expectation of privacy such as that evidenced in this
case by the careful wrapping and sealing of an unusual type
package. I probably will write a brief opinion concurring
in the judgment.

.§ltp'ttmt <!Jo-ttrl o-f tltt ~t~ ~tait.tl'

Jkutfringfo-n. tB. <!J. 20bl~$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

June 3, 1981

Re:

80-148 - Robbins v. California

Dear Potter,
I

shall

await

Bill

Brennan's

suggestions to you if he has any.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference
cpm

,jnpr t:ttU C!J ourl of f!rt ~b ,jtate~
~rurl[in¢on, ~.
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE

w ... .

20.;TJ4.~

/

June 3, 1981

.J . BRENNAN , .JR.

RE:

<!J.

No. 80-148 Robbins v. California

Dear Potter:
I agree.
Sincerely,

(~t
Justice Stewart
cc: The Conference

lfp/ss 6/17/81

Rider A, p. 2 (Robbins)
A

The Court today extends the warrant clause
requirement of the Fourth Amendment to every "closed, opaque
container" found in the trunk or rear compartment of an
automboile - without regard to size or shape or whether
common experience makes reasonably clear that the owner was
protecting no privacy interestj

in the contents.!

The Court

relies primarily on United States v. Chadwick, supra, and
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442

u.s.

753 (1979).

cases remotely justifies today's holding.

Neither of these
One involved a

personal footlocker and the other a suitcase.

The decisions

in both cases emphasized

1.
"container", used herein for convenience,
includes in accordance with the Court's opinion any and all
"closed, o aque" boxes, bags, tins, bottles and the like regardless size, shape, or the normal or customary purpose
for which the container is used. The only exception to this
sweeping definition recognized by the Court is where the
"contents may be said to be in plain view". ~, at 6, 7.

l

The Court today extends the warrant clause
of the Fourth Amendment to every "closed,
container" found in the trunk or rear compartment of an
automboile - without regard to size or shape or whether
common experience makes reasonably clear that the owner was
no privacy interests in the contents. ~

The

relies primarily on United States v. Chadwick, supra, and
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442

u.s.

753 (1979).

cases remotely justifies today's holding.

One involved a

personal footlocker and the other a suitcase.

The

in both cases emphasized

I.

Tlie term "container", used herein for convenience,
includes in accordance with the Court's opinion any and all
"closed, opaque" boxes, bags, tins, bottles and the like regardless size, shape, or the normal or customary purpose
for which the container is used. The only exception to this
sweeping definition recognized by the Court is where the
"contents may be said to be in plain view". Ante, at 6, 7.

lfp/ss

6/17/81

Rider A, p. 7 (Robbins)

ROB7 SALLY-POW
The infinite variety of what is transported in the trunks of
automobiles forecloses the practicability of any "bright
line" rule that would "safeguard both Fourth Amendment
rights and the public interest in a fair and effective
criminal justice system."

lfp/ss

6/17/Bl

Rider A, p. 11 (Robbins)

ROBll SALLY-POW
In sum, I would hold that a warrant to search the
contents of a container in the rear compartment of an
automobile is required only when the container is one that
normally serves as a repository for personal effects or when
the considerations stated above, supra, at p.

, indicate

a reasonable expectation that the contents will not be
opened to public scrutiny.

•.

lfp/ss

6/17/81

Rider A, p. 3 (Robbins)

ROB3 SALLY-POW

Peter:

Consider

addin~

a footnote along the following

lines:
___/

Personal effects

~,

of course, be carried

in containers (e.g., appropriate bags or boxes) other than
in the traditional types of luggage with respect to which
there is a presumption of intended privacy.
indicia of such an intent, see infra, p.

Absent other
, there should

be no such presumption with respect to miscellaneous
containers (e.g., a grocery bags, ~ boxes or parcels with
the typical store wrapping and string around it, a shoe box
or a dixie cup).

c h<

lfp/ss

6/17/81

_R_id_e__
r_A_.,~P~·--___(_R_o_b_b_i_n_s~)

ROBB SALLY-POW
Peter:

Add a footnote at some appropriate place along the

following lines:

___/

In Sanders we repeatedly emphasized that a

"suitcase" customarily is associated with privacy.

We

described it as "a common repository of one's personal
effects, and therefore is inevitably associated with the
expectation of privacy".

g.,

at 762, 764.

The Court

attempts to extend the rationale of Sanders by
reliance on;tn. 13, ~., at 764.

The examples cited in that

note (after stating first that "not all containers and
packages • • • deserve the full protection of the Fourth
Amendment") are relied upon

~fl9to~roader

"

privacy is implicated.

~'t

thi. C01u·e

as "exceptions"

rule than one applicable where
The Court fails to mention, however,

2.

that the last sentence in n. 13 states explicitly: "Our
decision in this case means only that a warrant generally is
required before personal luggage can be searched • . • " (~

~)

lfp/ss

6/17/81

Rider A, p.

(Robbins}

ROBFN SALLY-POW
Peter:

Add a footnote at some appropriate place along the

following lines:
___/

I have joined the Court•s opinion in New
.$

York v. Belton, No. 80-328, announced today, that Qee6

adop~

a "bright line" with respect to the search of the passenger
compartment of an automobile incident to an arrest.

I view

the appropriateness of such a rule in Belton quite
differently from the

pre~~ental
to one•s reasonable expection of

The passenger compartment of an automobile is

to all
who choose to look.

Automobiles are driven and parked on

public streets and in public
lights~

places~

they stop at traffic

are subject to being stopped for traffic

violations~

lfp/ss

6/17/81

~ider

A, p .

(Robbins)

ROBFN SALLY-POW
Peter:

Add a footnote at some appropriate place along the

following lines:
_/

I have joinea the Court's opinion in New

York v. Belton, No. 90-328, announced today, that does adopt
a "bright line" with respect to the search of the passenger
compartment of an automobile incident to an arrest.
the appropriateness of such a rule in
differently from the present case.

~~

I view

quite

The fundamental question

common to hoth relates to one's reasonable expection of
privacy.

The passenger compartment of an automobile is

hardly a place where one expects privacy at all.

Its

contents, unless concealed in containers, are visible to all
who choose to look.

Automobiles are driven and parked on

public streets and in public places: they stop at traffic
lights: are subject to being stopped for traffic violations:

.. ·

2.

and friends and even strangers often are invited to ride in
them.

Moreover, the passenger area of an automoblle

normally is within the complete control of the driver or
passengers within it.

The trunk of an automobile is

incomparably different.

It is closed, usually locked, and

its contents normally are seen only when the owner or driver
chooses to open it.

Many of our cases have recognized a

general distinction between automobiles and residences or
offices.

See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders,

United States v.
t1.aro..ney, 399

u.s.
413

453

at 7637

u.s., at 12: Chambers v.

u.s., at 49-50: Carroll v. United States,

132, 153.

u.s.

Chadwic~,

supr~,

267

See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,

266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).

The logic

of this distinction applies also to the locked trunk of an
automobile •

......

ROB6

PETER-POW

jpb/06/19/81

~~~~)
~~~

~·~eed-.J.o ~f: 9,L~

No.

----~------c_a_1_1_f_o_r_n_1_a

Mr.
4.

~~
~

is another shot at footnote 4:
I

have

the

Belton,

Court's

opinion

in

New

(1981) , announced today,
that

necessary

a

"bright

line"

York

v.

because I
rule

was

different cricumstances addressed

there.

•

volatile

4-L~ .A k-"" vf ~

and

fluid

~encounter

between an arresting officer and a suspect apprehended on
the public highway. While Chime! v. California, 395
752

(1969),

determines

in

principle

the

scope

u.s.
of

a

warrantless search incident to arrest, practical necessity
~

requires that we allow

t.Jii,.Q

....._~,~~

off i_?er '\to secure thoroughly

the automobile without requiring him in haste and under
~~~~)

'1 ~

pressure to make close calculations about danger-"
Any "bright

line"

rule

involves costs.

Belton

trades marginal privacy of containers within the passenger
area of an automobile for protection of the officer and of
destructible

evidence.

The

balance

of

these

interests

2.

strongly

favors

the

Court's

rule.

The

occupants

of

an

automobile enjoy only a limited expectation of , privacy in
the interior of the automobile itself.

See supra, at

see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
279

413

u.s.

266,

(1973)(Powell, J., concurring). This limited interest
L4--

mtiSt:

be diminished further when the occupants are placed

"

under custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414

u.s.

218,

237

(1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Immediately

preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control
over the

interior of the automobile,

and can place loose

weapons or contraband into pockets or other containers as
the officer approaches. Thus, practically speaking, it is

.

difficult

to~ ttb~~m~nt~trie~

.

~the interior of the car • K~ere --t~ey
A.
concideratio{ dor not
the

ca!l which

7either
arrest.

appl~

w.ithin

the

before

o4S

may

oours~

control of

nor

during

ta>e

£et!md.

Th~

to the trunk of
the passengers
the

process

of

aD
~9~~~

I

1 ' ~~~
!.

~~ J~ e::;r;ee7Vi~ '

: ~~~

t~ ~~4.J~
~ --,·~-- <»'~

'7

~

~~~~-·*
---If:=;~~
rA\ (./ ~r~ . vf'&J

I
}'

.

...

to ride in
them.
no rmally is within the complete control of the driver or

passengers, wi.~~i~-4 t~' The trunk of an

a~omobile is-~

iRG<>Rif'l~erent • •Are"~(~~Clo~s;;;~~d
__............----·-·······z····-~-··::t;l!
·:ts contents)r~-!y.-....e

I

seen only when the owner or d4iver
'

hooses to open it.

I

.

)

Many of our cases have recognized '

p'

eneral distinction between automobiles and residences o!/ ..
ffices.

See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, suera, at 763;

nited States v. Chadwick, 453

u.s., at

12; Chambers v.

I

\
!

United States, 267 \
US. 132, 153.
4

o

u.s.
this

\

See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,' !

266, 279

(1~~~~ ~o=~~~c
: ,·

distinction~ ai{;i:le~so to ~ locked trunk of :;;

~--·--- ···---·· ·-·--·--..~~
)
---- -~·
.

~~

~~
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-
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No.

80-148, Robbins v. California

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
I
believe

concur

in

the

that petitioner

Court's

had a

judgment

because

I

reasonable expectation . of

privacy in the opaquely wrapped and sealed package in the
rear

compartment

Court's

opinion

obtain

warrants

of

his

automobile.

because
in

it

order

would
to

I

cannot

require

examine

the

join

the

officers

to

contents

of

insubstantial containers in which no one had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
rationales
burdens

of

on

our
law

The Court's approach strains the

prior

cases

enforcement

and

imposes

without

substantial

vindicating

any

significant values of privacy.
I

Petitioner
Amendment

does

prohibited

the

not

argue

that

officers

from

the

Fourth

searching

thoroughly the interior of his station wagon. The officers
had

smelled

and

seen

marijuana

within

the

passenger

lfp/ss

6/23/81

Rider A, p. 2 (Robbins)

~/d5~V

See also Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 ( 1977) ,

(not

1\
"an automobile case" as probable cause for arrest ripened
before the foot locker was placed in the taxi cab) .

'

..

2.

compartment and thus had probable cause for searching the
remainder

of

the

automobile,

including

the

recessed

luggage compartment in the rear of the station wagon. We
have held in numerous cases that police need not obtain a
warrant

!

to search an automobile when they have probable

cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found
therein,

both because an automobile is inherently mobile

and because drivers enjoy only a limited privacy interest
in the interior of an automobile. See, e.g.JJnited St.te&

Cha.dwick,
Opperman, 428

u.s.

583,

441-442

~~3-

u.s.

590

(1973):

u.s.

1,

1-2-13 --(1 97"7"):

South Dakota v.

364, 367 (1975): Cardwell v. Lewis, 417

(1967):

Cady v.

Carroll

v.

Dombrowski,

United

States,

413 U.S.
267

U.S.

433,
132

A

The Court

today extends

the Warrant Clause of

the Fourth Amendment to every "closed, opaque container,"
without regard to size, shape or whether common experience
would

suggest

that

the

owner

interest in the contents.l

was

asserting

a

privacy

The Court relies primarily on

1 The term "container," used herein for convenience,
includes, in accordance with the Court's usage, any and

~

3.

United States
442

u.s.

753

(1979).

holding. The former case involved a
a

sui tease.

Each

decision

emphasized

the latter
that

a

search

of

personal luggage implicated significant privacy interests
separate from and superior to those raised by the search
of the automobile. We stressed that luggage functions "as
a

repository

for

personal

effects."

United

States

v.

Chadwick, supra, at 13; see Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, at
764. Personal luggge carries the privacy ;o~j home onto
the public highway and is entitled to th~ ections of
the Fourth Amendment.
"By placing personal effects within a doublelocked footlocker, respondents manifested an
expectation that the contents would remain free
from public examination. No less than one who
locks the doors of his home against intruders,
one who safeguards his personal possessions in
this manner is due the protection of the Fourth
Amendment Warrant Clause." United States v.
Chadwick, supra, at 11.
We concluded that "a person's privacy interest in personal

?~

...,

•~

.~ ~

.l.vf

~-(\'-,

all boxes, bags, tins, bottles and the like, regardless of
size, shape, or customary function. The Court would exempt
from the broad reach of its opinion only those "closed,
opaque containers" where the "contents may be said to be
in plain view. " Ante , at 6 , 7 •
I

'

7N p~·~ ~
~w,.ft

v!R•r ..

7

4.

luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile."
United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 13.
I read Chadwick and Sanders to require police to
I

obtain

a

warrant

to search the contents of

a container

only when the the container is one that generally serves
as

a

repository

sealed

for

personal

effects

in a manner manifesting a

that

the

See,

e.g.,

or

that

reasonable

has

been

expectation

contents will not be open to public scrutiny.
United States v.

Mannino,

635 F.2d 110,

114

(CA2 1980); United States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697, 700-01
(CAl 1980), United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684, 687-88
(CA9 1980); United States v. Ross,
1981) (en

bane) (Tamm,

J.

(CADC

F.2d

dissenting).

This

resembles

in

principle the inquiry courts must undertake to determine
whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment rights of a
complaining
(1978;

party.

See Rakas

id., at 150-152

instance,

v.

Illinois,

u.s.

(Powell, J., concurring).

"[t]he ultimate question

claim to privacy from government

u.s.

In each

intrusion is reasonable
Id;

see Katz

347 (1967) .2

Footnote(s) 2 appear on following page(s) •

.·

'

128

is whether one's

in light of the surrounding circumstances."
v. United States, 389

439

5.

The
basic

Court's

concern

mechanical
search
Sanders

any

with

requirement.

interests

requirement
closed

justifies

approach

for

a

today
in

Indeed,

privacy,

warrant

container.
this

departs
and

before

Nothing

in

extreme extension of
the

Court

in

from

Sanders

this

adopts

a

police may
Chadwick

or

the warrant
explicitly

foreclosed that reading:3
"There will be difficulties in determining which
parcels taken from an automobile require a
warrant for their search and which do not. Our
decision in this case means only that a warrant
2 This case does not present the question whether
police need probable cause to search the contents of a
container not entitled to the full protection of the
Fourth Amendment. It could be argued that if the defendant
lacks a substantial expectation of privacy in some
particular
container,the
Fourth
Amendment
is
simply
inapplicable to police examination of its contents. Cf.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 u.s. 735 (1979). Nonetheless, it is
apparent that the Court has inquired into the nature of a
defendant's privacy interest, not just its existence, to
determine the extent of protection the Fourth Amendment
provides. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590
(1974) (plurality opinion) (reduced expectation of privacy
in a car); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316
(1972) (reduced
expectation
of
privacy
in
regulated
business premises) .
3 I agree with the Court's reading of footnote 13 of
Sanders, so far as that reading goes. Ante at
. No
expectation of privacy attaches to a container that by its
form or label proclaims it contents. But Sanders dealt
only with luggage, and footnote 13 must be read in that
context. The footnote cannot fairly be read to extend the
protection of the Warrant Clause beyond the functional
equivalent of luggage.

6.

generally is required before personal luggage
can be searched and that the extent to which the
Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other
parcels depends not at all upon whether they are
siezed from an automobile." 442 u.s. at 765,
n.l3.
While

the

Court • s

blanket

warrant

requirement

does not even purport to protect any privacy interest, it
imposes

substantial

new

burdens

on

law

enforcement.

Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course
of a probable cause search of an automobile for narcotics,
the

conscientious

magistrate,
decision,

fill
and

vehicles

policeman
out

finally

the

will

take

appropriate

obtain

the

the

object

forms,

warrant.

to

await
Suspects

a

the
or

normally will be detained while the warrant is

of

such time

and effort, drawn from the public's limited resources for
detecting

or

preventing

crimes,

is

justified

when

it

~·.l · ~4«•~A
p~vacy

protects an individual's reasonable

1nterests. In

A

my view, the Court's requirement cannot be so justified.
The

aggregate

officer

has

burden
probable

of

procuring

cause

to

war rants

search

the

whenever
most

an

trivial

container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the
advancement of important Fourth Amendment values.

7.

The

Court

undertakes

to

justify

its

sweeping

warrant requirement by invoking a perceived necessity for
easily applicable criteria.
before

the

horse,

and

This rationale puts the cart

invites

the

criticism

that

a

brighter line can be fashioned by not requiring a warrant
for

the

search

(Blackmun,

J.,

of

any

containers.

dissenting).

See

Our quest

rooted

at

should not

simple criteria in the first instance,
rule

post,

be

for

but for a general

in the policies
the Fourth
~ c»V ,."":~~::HP"l~~~"'"~~,.:
The
infinite
variety
may
be

Hw:t.:l-

Amendment I\

transported in the trunk of an automobile renders futile
the search for a "bright line" rule that would "safeguard
both Fourth Amendment rights and the public interest in a
fair

and

effective
supra,

Illinois,

criminal

u.s.,

439

justice
at

system."

Rakas

(Powell,

157-58

concurring). See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra,

v.
J.,

442 U.S.

at

768 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
B

The

Court

overestimates

the

difficulties

involved in determining whether a party has a reasonable
expectation

of

privacy

containers,

such

as

in

a

personal

particular
luggage,

container.
are

Many

"inevitably

associated with the expectation of privacy." Arkansas v.

····"~.

8.

fU Hv-~~ ~ ~ .4./--rrc.~
Sanders,

supra,

762~~ny

at

others,

varying

from

a

plastic cup to the ubiquitous brown paper grocery sack,
consistently lack such an association.
I

In the middle are

•

taC.t..•.. ,

G~,

containers, such asAcardboard boxes and laundry bags, that
may

be

personal

used,

although

effects.

imperfectly,

as

repositories

~ut often~ not.

As

to

of

such

containers, I would adopt the view of Chief Judge Coffin:
[W]e disagree that the mere possibility of such
use leads to the conclusion that such containers
are "inevitably" associated with an expectation
of privacy. The many and varied uses of these
containers that entail no expectation of privacy
militate against applying a presumption that a
warrantless search of such a container violates
the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Goshorn,
supra, 628 F.2d at 700.
When confronted with
obtained

a

the

warrant

claim

before

that

police

searching

an

should

have

ambiguous

container, a court should conduct a hearing to determine
whether

the

defendant

had

manifested

a

reasonable

expectation of privacy in the contents of the container.
See id., at 701. Relevant to such an inquiry should be the
size, shape, material, and condition of the exterior, the
context within which

it

is

discovered,

and whether

the

possessor had taken some significant precaution, such as
securely sealing or binding the container, that indicates

9.

a desire to prevent the contents from being displayed upon
simple mischance. A prudent officer will err on the side
of respecting ambigous assertions of privacy, see Rakas v.
Illinois,

supra,

concurring),

439

and a

U.S.,

at

realistic

152,

n.l

(Powell,

J.,

court seldom should second

guess the good faith judgment of the officer in the field
when

the

public

consequently

must

suffer

from

the

suppression of probative evidence, cf. Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 611-612 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
II.
These principles may be applied easily
facts

of

rectangular

this

case.

package

We

deal

wrapped

in

here
green

with

a

opaque

to the
sealed,
plastic.

Examining a photograph, the dissenter below saw "a package
that had been tightly wrapped for shipment by mail, or to
protect its contents, or for both purposes." 103 Cal. App.
3d

34,

44;

see ante,

at

,

n.

1.

The owner

thus

had

manifested a desire that the public at large not casually
observe the contents, even when the package is subject to
rough handling. Our society's traditional respect for the

privacy

of~J':!';"'!&6~~~asonableness

of

such expectations. This Court long ago recognized that the
Fourth Amendment

requires

postal

inspectors

to obtain

a

10.

warrant before examining the contents of sealed packages
to determine whether there has been a violation of postal
regulations.

Ex Parte Jackson,

97

u.s.

727,

733

(1978).

The Court then stated:
"Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the
mail are as fully guarded from examination and
inspection, except as to their outward form and
weight, as if they were retained by the parties
forwarding
them
in
their
domiciles.
The
constitutional guaranty of the right of the
people to be secure in their papers against
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to
their papers, thus closed against inspection,
wherever they may be." Id.
See

also

(1970).

United

States

v.

Van

Leeuwen,

397

U.S.

249

Petitioner's securely wrapped and sealed package

cannot

lose

constitutional

protection

because

he

transported it in his car rather than sent it in the mail
or left

u.s.

it at home.

See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra,

442

at 764-765.
Fourth Amendment adjudication requires courts to

apply the broadest of principles
While
where

clarity
an

of

decision

officer

must

is
make

to ever

varying

desireable,
speedy

particularly

evaluations

of

u.s.

218

(1981) ,4

the

circumstances, see United States v. Robinson, 414
(1973);

New York

v.

Belton,

u.s.

facts.

Footnote(s) 4 appear on following page(s).

11.

search for bright line rules threatens to divorce practice
from principle and reduce our reasoning to pigeonholing.

4 I have joined the Court's opinion in New York v.
Belton,
u.s.
(1981), announced today, because I
concludedthat a "bright line" rule was necessary in the
quite different circumstances addressed there. Belton,
unlike this case, involves the exception to the warrant
requirement for a search incident to arrest. It presents
the volatile and fluid situation of an encounter between
an arresting offcier and a suspect apprehended on the
public highway. While Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969), determines in principle the scope of a warrantless
search incident to arrest, practical necessity requires
that we allow an officer in these circumstances to secure
thoroughly the automobile without requiring him in haste
and under pressure to make close calculations about danger
to himself or the vulneribilty of evidence.
Any "bright line" rule involves costs. Bel ton
trades marginal privacy of containers within the passenger
area of an automobile for protection of the officer and of
destructable evidence. The balance of these interests
strongly favors the Court's rule. The occupants of an
automobile enjoy only a limited expectation of privacy in
the interior of the automobile itself. See supra, at ___ ;
see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 u.s. 266,
279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). This limited interest
is diminshed further when the occupants are placed under
custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218,
237
(1973) (Powell,
J.,
concurring).
Immediately
preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control
over the entire interior of the automobile, and can place
loose
weapons
or
contrband
into
pockets
or
other
containers as the officer approaches. Thus, practically
speaking, it is difficult to justify varying degrees of
protection for various containers and the general interior
of the car. These considerations do not apply to the trunk
of the car, which is not within the control of the
passengers either immediately before or during the process
of arrest.

12.

Although
field

I

recognize

often

may

the difficulties an officer

have

distinguishing

in the

between

those

containers requiring a warrant and those not, see Arkansas
v.

Sanders,

dissenting),
of

supra,
I

adherence

442

U.S.

at

772

(Blackmun,

J. ,

think this problem is an unavoidable cost
to

the

principles

that

give

the

Fourth

Amendment its significance.
In sum,

I would hold that the Fourth Amendment

requires an officer to obtain a warrant before searching a
container only when the container is one that customarily
serves as a repository for personal effects, or ·when the
circumstances indicate that the defendant has a reasonable
expectation that the contents will not be open to public
scrutiny. The wrapped and sealed package involved in this
case

plainly

Accordingly,

falls

within

the

second

category.

I agree with the Court's conclusion that the

judgment below should be reversed.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
I
believe

concur

in

the

that petitioner

Court's

had

a

judgment

reasonable

because

I

expectation of

privacy in the opaquely wrapped and sealed package in the
rear

compartment

Court's

opinion

obtain

warrants

of

his

automobile.

because
in

it

order

would
to

I

cannot

require

examine

the

join

the

officers

to

contents

of

insubstantial containers in which no one had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
rationales
burdens

of

on

our
law

The Court's approach strains the

prior

cases

enforcement

and

imposes

without

substantial

vindicating

any

significant values of privacy.
I

Petitioner
Amendment

does

prohibited

the

not

argue

that

officers

from

the

Fourth

searching

thoroughly the interior of his station wagon. The officers
had

smelled

and

seen

marijuana

within

the

passenger

2.

compartment and thus had probable cause for searching the
remainder

of

the

automobile,

including

luggage compartment in the rear of

the

recessed

the station wagon. We

have held in numerous cases that police need not obtain a
warrant

to

search an

automobile when : they have probable

cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be
therein,

found

both because an automobile is inherently mobile

and because drivers enjoy only a limited privacy interest
in the interior of an automobile. See, e.g. United States
v.

Chadwick,

433

u.s.

1,

12-13

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367
U.S.

583,

441-442

590

(1973);

(1967);

v.

South Dakota v.

(1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417

Cady v.

Carroll

(1977);

Dombrowski,

United

States,

413 U.S.
267

U.S.

433,
132

(1925).
A

The Court

today extends

the Warrant Clause of

the Fourth Amendment to every "closed, opaque container,"
without regard to size, shape or whether common experience
would

suggest

that

the

owner

interest in the contents.l

was

asserting

a

privacy

The Court relies primarily on

1 The term "container," used herein for convenience,
includes, in accordance with the Court's usage, any and

(l
f

3.

United States v. Chadwick, supra, and Arkansas v. Sanders,
442

u.s.

753

(1979).

Neither decision justifies today's

holding. The former case involved a footlocker, the latter
a

sui tease.

Each

decision

emphasized

that

a

search

of

personal luggage implicated significant privacy interests
separate from and superior to those raised by the search
of the automobile. We stressed that luggage functions "as
a

repository

for

personal

effects."

United

States

v.

Chadwick, supra, at 13; see Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, at
764. Personal luggge carries the privacy of the home onto
the public highway and is entitled to the protections of
the Fourth Amendment.
"By placing personal effects within a doublelocked footlocker,
respondents manifested an
expectation that the contents would remain free
from public examination. No less than one who
locks the doors of his home against intruders,
one who safeguards his personal possessions in
this manner is due the protection of the Fourth
Amendment Warrant Clause." United States v.
Chadwick, supra, at 11.
We concluded that "a person's privacy interest in personal

all boxes, bags, tins, bottles and the like, regardless of
size, shape, or customary function. The Court would exempt
from the broad reach of its opinion only those "closed,
opaque containers" where the "contents may be said to be
in plain view." Ante, at 6, 7.

4.

luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile."
United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 13.
I read Chadwick and Sanders to require police to
I

obtain

a

warrant

to search the contents of

a

container

only when the the container is one that generally serves
as

a

repository

sealed

for

in a manner

that

the

contents

See,

e.g.,

personal
manifesting

will

United

effects
a

or

that

reasonable

has

been

expectation

not be open to public scrutiny.

States v.

Mannino,

635 F.2d 110,

114

(CA2 1980); United States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697, 700-01
(CAl 1980), United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684, 687-88
(CA9 1980); United States v. Ross,
1981) (en

bane) (Tamm,

dissenting).

J.

(CADC

F.2d
This

principle the inquiry courts must undertake

resembles

in

to determine

whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment rights of a
complaining
(1978;

party.

See

id., at 150-152

instance,

"[t]he

Rakas

v.

Illinois,

U.S.

(Powell, J., concurring).

claim to privacy from government

one's

intrusion is reasonable

in light of the surrounding circumstances."

u.s.

128

In each

is whether

ultimate question

v. United States, 389

439

Id;

347 (1967) .2

Footnote(s) 2 appear on following page(s).

t

see Katz

5.

The
basic

Court's

concern

mechanical
search
Sanders

any

with

requirement.

interests

requirement
closed

justifies

approach

for

a

today
in

Indeed,

privacy,

warrant

container.
this

departs
and

before

Nothing

in

extreme extension of
the

Court

in

from

Sanders

this

adopts
police

Chadwick

a

may
or

the warrant
explicitly

foreclosed that reading:3
"There will be difficulties in determining which
parcels taken from an automobile require a
warrant for their search and which do not. Our
decision in this case means only that a warrant

2 This case does not present the question whether
police need probable cause to search the contents of a
container not entitled to the full protection of the
Fourth Amendment. It could be argued that if the defendant
lacks
a
substantial expectation of
privacy in some
particular
container,the
Fourth
Amendment
is
simply
inapplicable to police examination of its contents. Cf.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). Nonetheless, it is
apparent that the Court has inquired into the nature of a
defendant's privacy interest, not just its existence, to
determine the extent of protection the Fourth Amendment
provides. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590
(1974) (plurality opinion) (reduced expectation of privacy
in a car); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316
( 197 2) (reduced
expectation
of
privacy
in
regulated
business premises) .
3 I agree with the Court's reading of footnote 13 of
Sanders, so far as that reading goes. Ante at
No
expectation of privacy attaches to a container that by its
form or label proclaims it contents. But Sanders dealt
only with luggage, and footnote 13 must be read in that
context. The footnote cannot fairly be read to extend the
protection of the Warrant Clause beyond the functional
equivalent of luggage.

6.

generally is required before personal luggage
can be searched and that the extent to which the
Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other
parcels depends not at all upon whether they are
siezed from an automobile." 442 U.S. at 765,
n.l3.
While

the

Court's

blanket

\,¥arrant

requirement

does not even purport to protect any privacy interest, it
imposes

substantial

new

burdens

on

law

enforcement.

Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course
of a probable cause search of an automobile for narcotics,
the

conscientious

magistrate,
decision,
vehicles

fill
and

policeman
out

the

finally

will

appropriate

obtain

normally will be

take

the

the

object

forms,

warrant.

detained while

to

await

a

the

Suspects

or

the warrant

is

sought. This process may take hours, removing the officer
from

his

normal patrol

duties.

Expenditure of

such time

and effort, drawn from the public's limited resources for
detecting

when

it

protects an individual's reasonable privacy interests.

In

my view,
The

or

crimes,

is

justified

the Court's requirement cannot be so justified.

aggregate

officer

preventing

has

burden
probable

of

procuring

cause

to

warrants

search

the

whenever
most

an

trivial

container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the
advancement of important Fourth Amendment values.

l
f

7.

The

Court

undertakes

to

justify

its

sweeping

warrant requirement by invoking a perceived necessity for
easily applicable criteria.
before

the

horse,

and

This rat ion ale puts the cart

invites

the

criticism

brighter line can be fashioned by not

~equiring

for

See

the

search

(Blackmun,

J.,

of

any

containers.

dissenting).

Our quest

rule

and purposes

of

variety

what

in

Amendment.

the

The

policies
infinite

at

should not

instance,

a

a warrant

post,

simple criteria in the first
rooted

that

be

for

but for a general

of

the

Fourth
may

be

transported in the trunk of an automobile renders futile
the search for a "bright line" rule that would "safeguard
both Fourth Amendment rights and the public interest in a
fair

and

effective

Illinois,

supra,

criminal

u.s.,

439

concurring). See Arkansas v.
768

justice
at

system."

157-58

Sanders,

Rakas

(Powell,

supra,

v.
J.,

442 U.S.

at

(Burger, C.J., concurring).
B

The

Court

overestimates

the

difficulties

involved in determining whether a party has a reasonable
expectation

of

containers,

such

associated with

privacy
as

in

a

personal

particular
luggage,

container.
are

Many

"inevitably

the expectation of privacy." Arkansas v.

8.

Sanders,
plastic

supra,
cup

to

at
the

762.

Many

ubiquitous

others,

varying

from

a

brown paper grocery sack,

consistently lack such an association.

In the middle are

containers, such as cardboard boxes and laundry bags, that
may

be

used,

although

effects,

personal

imperfectly,
often

but

are

as

repositories

not.

to

As

of
such

containers, I would adopt the view of Chief Judge Coffin:
[W]e disagree that the mere possibility of such
use leads to the conclusion that such containers
are "inevitably" associated with an expectation
of privacy. The many and varied uses of these
containers that entail no expectation of privacy
militate against applying a presumption that a
warrantless search of such a container violates
the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Goshorn,
supra, 628 F.2d at 700.
When

confronted

a

obtained
container,
whether

with

the

warrant

claim

before

that

police

searching

an

should

have

ambiguous

a court should conduct a hearing to determine

the

defendant

had

manifested

a

expectation of privacy in the contents of

reasonable

the container.

See id., at 701. Relevant to such an inquiry should be the
size, shape, material, and condition of the exterior, the
context

within

possessor

had

which

it

is

discovered,

and

whether

taken some significant precaution,

the

such as

securely sealing or binding the container, that indicates

9.

a desire to prevent the contents from being displayed upon
simple mischance. A prudent officer will err on the side
of respecting ambigous assertions of privacy, see Rakas v.
Illinois,

supra,

concurring),

439

and

a

U.S.,

at

realistic

152,

court

n.l

(Powell,

seldom should

J.,

second

guess the good faith judgment of the officer in the field
when

the

public

consequently

must

suffer

from

suppression of probative evidence, cf. Brown v.
422

u.s.

the

Illinois,

590, 611-612 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).

II.
These
facts

of

rectangular

this

principles may
case.

package

We

be

deal

wrapped

in

applied easily
here
green

with

a

opaque

to

the

sealed,
plastic.

Examining a photograph, the dissenter below saw "a package
that had been tightly wrapped for shipment by mail, or to
protect its contents, or for both purposes." 103 Cal. App.
3d

34,

44;

see

ante,

at

n.

1.

The owner

thus

had

manifested a desire that the public at large not casually
observe the contents, even when the package is subject to
rough handling. Our society's traditional respect for the
privacy of sealed packages confirms the reasonableness of
such expectations. This Court long ago recognized that the
Fourth Amendment

requires

postal

inspectors

to obtain

a

10.

warrant before examining the contents of sealed packages
to determine whether there has been a violation of postal
regulations.

Ex Parte Jackson,

97 U.S.

727,

733

(1978).

The Court then stated:
"Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the
mail are as fully guarded from examination and
inspection, except as to their outward form and
weight, as if they were retained by the parties
forwarding
them
in
their
domiciles.
The
constitutional guaranty of the right of the
people to be secure in their papers against
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to
their papers, thus closed against inspect ion,
wherever they may be." Id.
See

also

(1970).

United

States

v.

Van

Leeuwen,

397

U.S.

249

Petitioner's securely wrapped and sealed package

cannot

lose

constitutional

because

protection

he

transported it in his car rather than sent it in the mail
or

left

it at home.

See Arkansas v.

Sanders, supra,

442

U.S. at 764-765.
Fourth Amendment adjudication requires courts to
apply the
While
where

broadest of principles

clarity
an

of

decision

officer

must

is
make

to ever

varying

desireable,
speedy

facts.

particularly

evaluations

of

circumstances, see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973);

New

York

v.

Belton,

u.s.

(1981) ,4

Footnote(s) 4 appear on following page(s).

the

11.

search for bright line rules threatens to divorce practice
from principle and reduce our

reasoning

to pigeonholing.

4 I have joined the Court's opinion in New York v.
Belton,
u.s.
(1981), announced today, because I
concludedthat a "bright line" rule was necessary in the
quite different circumstances addressed there. Belton,
unlike this case, involves the exception to the warrant
requirement for a search incident to arrest. It presents
the volatile and fluid situation of an encounter between
an arresting offcier and a suspect apprehended on the
public highway. While Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969), determines in principle the scope of a warrantless
search incident to arrest, practical necessity requires
that we allow an officer in these circumstances to secure
thoroughly the automobile without requiring him in haste
and under pressure to make close calculations about danger
to himself or the vulneribilty of evidence.
Any "bright line" rule involves costs. Belton
trades marginal privacy of containers within the passenger
area of an automobile for protection of the officer and of
destructable evidence. The balance of these interests
strongly favors the Court's rule. The occupants of an
automobile enjoy only a limited expectation of privacy in
the interior of the automobile itself. See supra, at
see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 u.s. 266,
279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). This limited interest
is diminshed further when the occupants are placed under
custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218,
237
(1973) (Powell,
J.,
concurring).
Immediately
preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control
over the entire interior of the automobile, and can place
loose
weapons
or
contrband
into
pockets
or
other
containers as the officer approaches. Thus, practically
speaking, it is di ff icul t to justify varying degrees of
protection for various containers and the general interior
of the car. These considerations do not apply to the trunk
of the car, which is not within the control of the
passengers either immediately before or during the process
of arrest.

12.

Although
field

I

recognize

often

may

the

have

di ff icul ties

an officer

distinguishing

in the

between

those

containers requiring a warrant and those not, see Arkansas
v.

Sanders,

dissenting),
of

supra,
I

adherence

442

u.s.

at

772

(Blackmun,

J.,

think this problem is an unavoidable cost
to

the

principles

that

give

the

Fourth

Amendment its significance.
In sum,

I would hold that the Fourth Amendment

requires an officer to obtain a warrant before searching a
container only when the container is one that customarily
serves as a repository for personal effects, or · when the
circumstances indicate that the defendant has a reasonable
expectation that the contents will not be open to public
scrutiny. The wrapped and sealed package involved in this
case

plainly

Accordingly,

falls

within

the

second

category.

I agree with the Court's conclusion that the

judgment below should be reversed.

lfp/ss

6/26/81
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
This is another in long line of cases in which

the Court
contents
Amendment

has
and

addressed
persons

searches

riding

principles

have

in

been

of

automobiles,

them.

Although

stated

repeatedly

e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
has

been

a

confusing

application.
which

Also

principle

absence

there

should

has

of

,

consistency

Fourth

or

was

5

(see,

) , there
in

been some confusion

be

their

applied

their
as
in

to
a

10

particular case.
Our
Chadwick,

433

although each -

recent
U.S.

decisions
1

and

in

Arkansas

United
v.

States

Sanders,

v.

supra,

in my opinion - was correctly decided have

been both praised and criticized.

Much of the criticism

15

has centered on a perceived failure of the Court to afford
clear guidance to law enforcement and the courts that are
confronted with search questions perhaps more frequently
than any other

single question in the administration of

criminal justice.

As the author of the Court opinion in

Sanders, I acknowledge at the outset my own contribution

20

2.

to

whatever

noted,

confusion

however,

typical

that

"automobile

properly
Chadwick

search

It

exists.
and

Sanders

case"

in

should

are

which

not
there

probable cause to search the automobile itself.

be
the
is

Rather,

25

in both of those cases probable cause had attached to the
luggage itself before it had been placed in the trunk of
an

automobile.

Moroever,

in each case personal

luggage

was involved and we emphasized the traditional expectation
of privacy in a type of container in which highly personal
belongings customarily are transported.

30

Neither this case

nor Belton, also brought down today, presented a similar
question.

Here, we have a sealed, opaque container in the

trunk of a car, but the probable cause was not to search
that particular container;
automobile
cause

itself.

to search was

presented was
arrest.

Thus,

rather,

In Belton,
not

the proper
neither

it was to search the

the question of

involved at all.
scope of
Chadwick

a

search

nor

probable

The quest ion
incident

Sanders

to

controls

either of the cases we bring down today.
It is evident,

nevertheless,

35

40

from the plethora

of opinions filed today that there are varied perceptions

3.

among

the

Justices

of

this

decided in prior cases.

Court

as

to

what

we

have

There is a manifest need for the

Court to form a majority opinion that gives far
quidance than exists at present.

clearer

45

In his opinion for the

Court in Belton, Justice Stewart has articulated a bright
line

that

will

be applicable where

incident to a

valid

arrest of an occupant, the interior area of an automobile
and its contents may be searched without a warrant.

This

50

holding follows, and perhaps extends in the context of the
finite area of an automobile interior, settled principles
applicable to the need to search incident to arrest.
This case presents for me a far more difficult
question.
respect

There is an equal need for a bright line with

to

the

scope

of

permissible

warrantless

55

search

where no arrest is involved, and where the probable cause
is

to

search

particular
need,

the

container

automobile
located

itself

within

rather

it.

than

Despite

a

this

I cannot accept the severe limitation that Justice

Stewart's opinion would impose upon law enforcement by the
line

he

would

draw.

The

alternative,

as

suggested

by

dissenting Justices, would be to clarify the "automobile

60

4.

search" exception to the warrant requirement - or perhaps
extend

it

search

the

located.

-

to

include

vehicle

We

are at

where

or

all

probable
of

its

cause

exists

contents

to

65

wherever

the end of a long and tiring Term,

there has been much writing, and little or no consultation
beyond our
accept

initial Conference.

this

broader

view

Although I am tempted to

of

the

automobile

search

70

exception, I join the Court's judgment and state below my
reasons

for

securely

holding

wrapped

sufficient

that
and

indicia of

this

particular

sealed

opaque

container -

package

acknowledge

that

making

parcels,

the

full

force

distinctions

bags,

of

between

packages

and

what

least

for

automobile

I

consider more

myself,

I

exception

area of the law.

may

the

great

containers

carried

a

75

view

variety

of
in

In a future case,

thorough consideration -

accept

in the

In doing this,

Justice Stewart's

automobiles, will be difficult indeed.
after

has

an expectation of privacy to have

made a warrant desirable if not necessary.
I

a

broader

interest of

view

of

clarifying

at
the
this

80

'

.

~

rider A p. 5
While providing guidance to officers in the field who must
implement our decisions is a plain necessity,

Rider p. 7
Those
Fourth

who

Amendment

properly

cases

balance

enforcement

Belton, ___

the

to

receive

opinions

u.s. ___

Court's

articulate

individual

will

caucophany of

expect

privacy

little

in

adjudication
clear

and

rules

efficient

gratification

this case and

from

of

that
law
the

in New York v.

{1981}. The Court apparently cannot

agree even on what it has held previouly, let alone on how
these

cases

should

be

decided.

Much of

this

di ff icul ty

comes from the necessity of applying the general command
of

the Fourth Amendment

stem

from

the

exclusionary

often

rule,

to ever-varying facts;

unpalatable

which

spur

consequences

the

Court

to

more may
of

the

reduce

its

analysis to simple mechanical rules so that the constable
has a fighting chance not to blunder.
This

case

Fourth

Amendment

warrant

clause

and

Belton

questions:
protect;

involve

what

what

three

containers
is

the

different
should

scope

automobile exception to the warrant clause;

'

of

the
the

and, what is

2.

the scope of
the

the search incident to arrest exception to

warrant

intertwined,
both

involve

cause,

clause?
as

the

the

similar

stop

the arrest of

personal

These

container.

of

issues

facts of
an

necessarily

the cases suggest:

automobile

the occupants,
Nonetheless,

are

upon

probable

and the search of a

the

cases

have

been

litigated under entirely different theories, and analysis
cannot

proceed

unless

the

issues

are

kept

separate.

Viewing similar facts from entirely different perspectives
need not lead to identical results.
I have joined the Court's opinion in New York v.

u.s.

Belton,

(1981),

announced today,

because

I

concluded that a "bright line" rule was necessary in the
quite
unlike

different

circumstances

this case,

involves the

addressed

there.

Belton,

exception

to

warrant

requirement for a search incident to arrest.

the

It presents

the volatile and fluid situation of an encounter between
an

arresting

offcier

and

a

suspect

public highway. While Chimel v.

apprehended

California,

on

the

395 U.S.

752

(1969), determines in principle the scope of a warrantless
search

incident

to

arrest,

practical

necessity

requires

that we allow an officer in these circumstances to secure
thoroughly the automobile without requiring

'

him in haste

3.

and under pressure to make close calculations about danger
to

himself

or

the

vulneribilty

of

evidence.

Justice

Stevens is simply wrong in suggetsing that any member of
the Court has

held

interest

zippered pocket than in a sealed package;

the

in a

extent

container
searched

of
is

that

an

a

person has

arrestee's

simply

without

a

greater

privacy

irrelevant
warrant

a

to

and

privacy

interest

whether

without

it

in
may

a
be

probable

cause

costs.

Belton

incident to an arrest.
Any

"bright

line"

rule

involves

trades marginal privacy of containers within the passenger
area of an automobile for protection of the officer and of
destructable
strongly

evidence.

favors

the

The

balance

Court • s

rule.

of
The

these

interests

occupants

of

an

automobile enjoy only a limited expectation of privacy in
the interior of the automobile itself. See supra, at
see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
279

413 U.S.

266,

(1973) (Powell, J., concurring). This limited interest

is diminshed further when the occupants are placed under
custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218,

237

(1973) (Powell,

J.,

concurring).

Immediately

preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control
over the entire interior of the automobile, and can place

'

4.

weapons

loose

containers

as

speaking,

it

the

into

contrband

or

officer

is difficult

pockets

approaches.

Thus,

or

other

practically

to justify varying degrees of

protection for various containers and the general interior
of the car. These considerations do not apply to the trunk
of

the

car,

which

is

not

within

the

control

of

the

passengers either immediately before or during the process
of arrest.
The

Court's

opinion

in

this

case

concerns

itself primarily with the kinds of containers requiring a
warrant for their search when police have probable cause,
but there has been no arrest. As I have explained, supra,
I

believe

the

that

Court's

"bright-line"

rule

imposes

unacceptable burdens upon law enforcement without securing
important interests in personal privacy. Its single virtue
is simplicity.
The final

issue is the scope of the "automobile

exception" to the warrant requirement.

Three memebers of

the Court would allow the police to search any container
within

the

auto

upon

probable

cause

without

a

warrant.

Adoption of this view would require rejection of much of
the

reasoning

concededly

in

in

Arkansas

accord

with

v.
its

Sanders,

supra,

basic

holding,

'

although
because

5.

probable cause in that case attached only to the suitcase,
not the entire automobile, and ripened before the luggage
was

placed

expanding

in

the

the

automobile.

scope

of

the

Resolving

this

automobile

case

by

exception

is

attractive not so much for its logical virtue, but because
it may provide ground for a agreement on a basic rule that
can

slake

the

inceessant

suppression

litigation

by

introducing clarity. This benefit will not undoubtedly be
realized;

courts

may

find

themselves

probable cause ripened, or whether

deciding

when

suspicion focussed on

the suitcase or the car in which it travelled.
The parties

have

not

pressed

this

argument

in

this case, Sanders would have seemed to preclude it, and
it

is

late

in

reconsideration
constraints,

I

the
of

term for
basic

us

to

undertake

doctrines.

sua sponte

Given

these

adhere to my reading of Sanders that the

fact that the container was seized from an automobile is
irrelevant to the question whethe r a warrant is needed to
search its contents. Some future case offering opportunity
for more thorough consideration of the basic principles at
risk may offer some better,
the

confusion

that

infects

if more radical solution to
this

beknighted

law.

'

area of

the

lfp/ss
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Revision of First Part of Opinion

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
The Court's judgment is justified, though not
compelled, by what I wrote in Sanders v. Arkansas, 442
756 (1979).

Accordingly, I join the judgment.

u.s.

As the Court

goes well beyond Sanders or any prior case to establish a
new "bright line", I cannot join its opinion.

It would

require officers to obtain warrants in order to examine the
contents of an infinite variety of insubstantial containers
in which no one had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Court's approach strains the rationales of our prior
cases and imposes substantial burdens on law enforcement

f

• •'

2.

without vindicating any significant values of privacy.*
I nevertheless concur in the judgment because of the manner
in which the package at issue was carefully wrapped and

~p_~~
sealed evidenced on behalf of petitioner an expectation of

1\

privacy.

As

~I

have

~ior

decisons, a clear

purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard one's
reasonable expectation of privacy.
Having reached this decision on the facts of this
, 1
rI r!lAtfs•
"U!tf -:t.q

case, I recognize - as the dissenting opinions find it easy
?w

,g

1\

r

/

,w:...

\ o proclaim - that the law of search and seizure with
respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing.

*The Court's bright line would extend the warrant clause of
the Fourth Amendment to every "closed, opaque container",
without regard to size, shape, or whether common experience
would suggest that the owner . was asserting a privacy
interest in the contents. I use the term "container" herein
in accordance with the Court's usage to include any and all
boxes, bags, tins, bottles and the like. I note that the
Court would exempt from the broad reach of its opinion only
those "closed, opaque containers" where the "contents may be
said to be in plain view". ~, at 6,7.

..

ROBBINS9

PETER-POW

jpb/06/27/81

No.

80-148, Robbins v. California
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.

I concur in the Court's judgment because I
I
I believe that petitioner had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the opaquely wrapped and sealed package in the
rear compartment of his station wagon.

To this extent, I

believe that the judgment is justified, if not compelled,
by Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
the

Court's

opinion,

u.s.

however,

756 (1979). I cannot join
because

its

new

"bright

line" would require officers to obtain warrants in order
to

examine

the

contents

of

insubstantial

containers

in

which no one had a reasonable expectation of privacy.l The

1

The Court's "bright-line" rule would extend the
warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment to every "closed,
opaque container," without regard to size, shape or
whether common experience would suggest that the owner was
asserting a privacy interest in the contents. The Court
woudl exempt from the broad reach of its rule only those
"closed, opaque contiainers" where the "contents may be
said to be in plain view." In accordance with the Court's

2.

Court's appraoch strains the rationales of our prior cases

\

and imposes substantial burdens on law enforcement without
\ vindicating any significant values of privacy.
Having joined the judgment on the facts of this
case,
that

I

nevertheless

the

law

of

automobiles

has

apparently

cannot

agree with

the

search

and

become

sadly

agree

even

dissenting

seizure

with

opinions

respect

confused~he
on

what

it

to

Court

has

held

previouly, let alone on how these cases should be decided.
Much

of

this

applying

difficulty

comes

the general command of

ever-varying

more

facts;

may

from

the

necessity

of

the Fourth Amendment

to

stem

from

the

unpalatable consequences of the exclusionary rule,

often
which

spur the Court to reduce its analysis to simple mechanical
rules so that the constable has a fighting chance not to
blunder.
This case and New York v. Belton,
(1981),

decided

Amendment

today,

questions~Athe

involve

three

u.s.

different

Fourth

.-

scope of the search incident to
m~l)\
.I r
/! r tA/-~-'t..i·kJt.T-_,' So 4
arrest on the public highway, l\ t:b8;e ~e.s.s.ity f.Qr officers
f\

usage I use the term "container to include
bags, boxes, tins, bottles and the like •

,·,

..

any

and

al

\

3.

~btain

a

warrant

when

they

have

cause

to

search a particular container in which the suspect has a
reasonable expectation of privacy;
"automobile exception"
potentially
containers

includes
found

ant., '

t,~e

scope of the

to the warrant requirement, which
both

the

therein.

interior

These

of

issues

the

car

and

frequently

are

intertwined, as the similar facts of these cases suggest:
both

involve

cause,

the

the

stop

arrest

of

of

an

the

automobile

occupants,

upon

the

probable

search of

the

automobile, and the search of a

~o~

therein.

have been litigated and

Nonetheless,

presented

to

us

the cases

under

entirely

container found

different

theories.

Intelligent analysis cannot proceed unless the issues are

separatel~ Viewing

addressed

similar facts from entirely

different perspectives need not lead to identical results.

<J!
because

I

h ave

I

• • ~
d
JOlne

concluded

t Ah' e •. c our t I s

that

a

•
•
op1n1on

"bright

line"

•
1n

B e 1 t on

rule

was

necessary in the quite different circumstances addressed
there.

Belton,

unlike

this

case,

concerns

only

the

exception to the warrant requirement for a search incident
to arrest; contrary to Justice Stevens's implication, the
courts

below

never

found

that

cause to search the automobile.

the

officer

had probable

It presents the volatile

4.

and fluid situation of an encounter between an arresting
offcier and a suspect apprehended on the public highway.
While

Chi mel

California,

v.

u.s.

395

752

(1969)'

determines in principle the scope of a warrantless search
incident to arrest, practical necessity requires that we
allow

an

officer

in

these

circumstances

thoroughly the automobile without requiring

to

secure

him in haste

and under pressure to make close calculations about danger
to himself or the vulneribilty of evidence.
Any
Belton

"bright

line"

rule

does

trades marginal privacy of

passenger

area

of

an

involve

costs.

containers within the

automobile

for

protection

of

the

officer and of destructable evidence. The balance of these
interests strongly favors the Court's rule. The occupants
of

an

automobile

privacy

in

the

enjoy

interior

only

a

of

the

limited

expectation

automobile

itself.

of
See

----)\

supra, at ___ ; see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413

U.S.

266,

279

(1973) (Powell,

J.,

concurring).

This

limited interest is diminshed further when the occupants
are placed under

custodial arrest.

Robinson,

u.s.

concurring).

414

218,

Immediately

Cf.

237

preceding

United States v.

(1973) (Powell,

J. '

arrest,

the

the

passengers have complete control over the entire interior

5.

of

the

automobile,

and

can

place

loose

weapons

or

contrband into pockets or other containers as the officer
approaches. Thus, practically speaking, it is difficult to
justify

varying

containers

and

degrees
the

protection

of

general

interior

of

for
the

various

car.

These

considerations do not apply to the trunk of the car, which
is

not

within

the

control

of

the

passengers

either
~

immediately before or during the process of arrest.

~
case

~

Although

was

litigated

officers needed a

peti~ner
only

on

warrant~pen

Robbins was arrested, this
the

question

whether

the

a sealed, opaquely wrapped

container in the rear compartment of a station wagon. The
Court

treats

this

situation

United States v. Chadwick, 433
supra,

as

identical

u.s.

with

that

in

1 (1977), and Sanders,

which addressed warrantless searches of a double-

locked footlocker and personal luggage respectively. Thus,
the Court's opinion in this case concerns itself primarily
with the kinds of containers requiring a warrant for their
~
search when police have probable cause to search them, ~

~re
1\

has been no arrest. For reasons explained more fully

below, I will share the Court's assumption that the police
had probable cause to search t~ container rather than the
automobile generally. Viewing this as a "container case,"

6

0

I concur in the judgment.
Chadwick and Sanders require police to obtain a
to search the contents of a container only when
the container is one that generally serves as a repository
for personal effects or that has been sealed in a manner
manifesting

a

reasonable

expectation

that

the

contents

will not be open to public scrutiny. See Chadwick, supra,
at 13; Sanders, supra, at 764. See, e.g., United States v.
Mannino,

635 F.2d 110,

114

(CA2 1980);

United States v.

Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697, 700-01 (CAl 1980), United States v.
Mackey, 626 F.2d 684, 687-88
Ross,

F.2d

__ ,

(CADC

dissenting).

This

courts

undertake

must

violates

the

(CA9 1980); United States v.

resembles

Fourth

to

1981) (en

in

principle

determine

Amendment

rights

party. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439
150-152
"[t]he

J.,

(Powell,
ultimate

u.s.

concurring).

question

bane) (Tamm,

is

the

whether
of

a

J.

inquiry
a

search

complaining

128 (1978; id., at
In

whether

each

instance,

one's

claim to

privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in light
of the surrounding circumstances." Id; see Katz v. United
States, 389

u.s.

The
basic

concern

347 (1967).

Court's
with

approach

interests

today
in

departs

privacy,

and

from

this

adopts

a

7.

mechanical
search

requirement

any

Sanders

closed

justifies

requirement.

for

a

warrant

container.
this

Indeed,

before

Nothing

in

police may
Chadwick

extreme extension of
the

Court

in

or

the warrant

Sanders

explicitly

foreclosed that reading:
"There will be difficulties in determining which
parcels taken from an automobile require a
warrant for their search and which do not. Our
decision in this case means only that a warrant
generally is required before personal luggage
can be searched and that the extent to which the
Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other
parcels depends not at all upon whether they are
siezed from an automobile." 442 U.S. at 765,
n.l3.
While

the

Court's

blanket

warrant

requirement

does not even purport to protect any privacy interest, it
imposes

substantial

new

burdens

on

law

enforcement.

Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course
of a probable cause search of an automobile for narcotics,
the

conscientious

magistrate,
decision,
vehicles

fill
and

policeman
out

finally

the

will

take

appropriate

obtain

the

the

object

forms,

warrant.

normally will be detained while

to

await

Suspects

a

the
or

the warrant is

sought. This process may take hours, removing the officer
from

his normal patrol

duties.

Expenditure of

such time

and effort, drawn from the public's limited resources for

·~

l•

8.

detecting

or

preventing

crimes,

is

justified

when

it

protects an individual's reasonable privacy interests. In
my view,
The

the Court's requirement cannot be so justified.

aggregate

officer

has

burden
probable

of

procuring

cause

to

warrants

search

the

whenever
most

an

trivial

container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the
advancement of important Fourth Amendment values. The sole
virtue of the Court's rule is simplicity.2

2
The Court overestimates the difficulties involved
in
determining
whether
a
party
has
a
reasonable
expectation of privacy in a particular container. Many
containers, such as personal luggage, are "inevitably
associated with the expectation of privacy." Arkansas v.
Sanders, supra, at 762. Many others, varying from a
plastic cup to the ubiquitous brown paper grocery sack,
consistently lack such an association. In the middle are
containers, such as cardboard boxes and laundry bags, that
may be used, although imper~ectly, as repositories of
personal
effects,
but
often are
not.
As
to
such
containers, I would adopt the view of Chief Judge Coffin:
[W]e disagree that the mere possibility of such
use leads to the conclusion that such containers
are "inevitably" associated with an expectation
of privacy. The many and varied uses of these
containers that entail no expectation of privacy
militate against applying a presumption that a
warrantless search of such a container violates
the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Goshorn,
supra, 628 F.2d at 700.
When confronted with the claim that police should have
obtained
a
warrant
before
searching
an
ambiguous
container, a court should conduct a hearing to determine

9.

The dissenters argue, with some justice, that the
controlling question should be the scope of the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement. In their view, when
the police have probable cause to search an automobile,
rather than only to search

a 1\~at

fortuitously

is located in an automobile, the exigencies that allow the
police to search the entire automobile without a warrant

"

support the warrantless search of every container
therin.
·

.

See post,
·

1
=~,
ls

at

t · 1
en 1re y

(Stevens J.,
· t
t
cons1.s en

found

dissenting).

This

~
th~ ~
ch a d w1c
· k $ ~... 1-- Jr ~~-~Jp=wts~~ 4ft

w1

~""=->'~t~~e,"
D tbQr:-e had probable cause ~ to search

because
the

th~ policl ~

aou b l e

l ocked

footloc~~~e ~'QekeiJ eveif.came ~~~-tH
~

whether

~

~

.----

A

defendant
had
manifested
a
reasonable
of privacy in the contents of the container.
See id., a 701. Relevant to such ah inquiry should be the
size, sha e, material, and condition of the exterior, the
context w thin which it is discovered, and whether the
possessor had taken some significant precaution, such as
securely sealing or binding the container, that indicates
a desire to' prevent the contents from being displayed upon
simple mischance. A prudent officer will err on the side
of respecting ambigous assertions of privacy, see Rakas v.
Illinois, supra, 1439 U.S,., at 152, n.l (Powell, J.,
concurring), and a realistic court seldom should second
guess the good faith judgment of the officer in the field
when
the
public
consequently must · suffer
from
the
suppression of probative · evidence, cf. Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 611-612 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).

"'/ ~

~~

~~~b'le.

(~~~~~~~

See Chadwick, supra, at ___
Adoption

of

the

dissenters'

v1ew

a..~d.c,-1.

would

~ ~~i"r v.

require rejection of ~~ of the reasoning in .. pr''

~lthough concededly their view is

Sanders,

with the necessary holding of the case, because there too

prob~e

entire

cause attached .only

automob1le,

and

to

ripened

the

sui tease,

before

the

not

the

luggage

was

laced in the automobile.

--.......
Resolving

X XX
this case by expanding the scope of

the automobile exception is attractive not so much for its
logical

virtue,

but

because

it may

provide

ground, for

~1-4 ~~.u.,~Jt

agreement by a majority of the Court dh ' an approach that
~ ~J
t~e"l ·
fA.. · ~
,.i ..tiii:Ml g1ve guiaance to police and ~e-r courts in. .

\-a-

recurring situation that has led to incef ssant litigation.
J~,~l& .
.,...T his benefit would not be realized fully, as courts may

~

find themselves deciding when probable cause ripened, or
whether suspicion focussed on the suitcase or on the car
in which

-

I

The

parties

have not pressed this

argument

this case, ~
it

is

late

in

reconsideration
constraints,

I

the T ,- erm for
of

basic

adhere

in
and

us

to undertake

doctrines.

sua sponte

Given

these

to statements in Sanders that the

l..-'

"~ AL...

...~~~~..~. 1/l ' tH

0

,La

vu,;' ~~~~

11.

fact that the container was seized

~~~

from ~an

automobile is

irrelevant to the question whether a warrant is needed to
search its contents. Some future case offering opportunity
for more thorough consideration of the basic principles at
risk may offer some better,

if more radical

solution to

the confusion that infects this benighted area of the law.

~

~

r.,;..-- ~,_

_........._6_

~ ~ ~ .teO ---~
~v-

~

£. 1-:(1.
~~
"

tojzq /~I

®
No.

80-148, Robbins v. California

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
The

Court's

judgment

is

justifie

though

·s

compelled;-. by wbnl:! I ur8-4!e £or

the Cour ~

Sanders,

Accordingly,

442

U.S.

756

(1979).

not

n Arkansas v.
I

join

the

judgment. As the Court today goes well beyond Sanders or
any other
rule,

I

prior
cannot

officers

to

case

to

join

obtain

establish

its

a

new

opinion.l

warrants

in

It

order

"bright
would

to

line"

require

examine

the

contents of insubstantial containers in which no one had a
reasonable
strains

the

expectation of
rationales

of

privacy.
our

The Court's

prior

cases

and

approach
imposes

substantial burdens on law enforcement without vindicating

1

The Court's "bright-line" rule would extend the
warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment to every "closed,
opaque container," without regard to size, shape or
whether common experience would suggest that the own~rJ; as
asserting a privacy interest in the contents. The Court
wouQf exempt from the broad reach of its rule only those
"closed, opaque contiainers" where the "contents may be
said to be in plain view." In accof ance with the Court's
usage I use the term "container. o 1nc u e any and al
bags, boxes, tins, bottles and the like.

2.

any significant values of privacy.

I

nevertheless concur

in the judgment because the manner in which the package at
issue

was

carefully

wrapped

evidenced

sealed

and

As~~

petitioner's expectation of privacy in its contents.

have stressed in prior decisions, a central purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is to safeguard reasonable expectations
of privacy.
Having

reached

this

this case, I recognize

decision

on

the

facts

of

as the dissenting opinions find

it easy to proclaim -- that the law of search and seizure
with respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing. The
Court

apparently

cannot

agree even on what

it has

held

previouly, let alone on how these cases should be decided.
Much

of

applying

this

difficulty

comes

the general command of

ever-varying

facts;

more

may

from

the

necessity

of

the Fourth Amendment to
stem

from

the

unpalatable consequences of

the exclusionary rule,

spur the Court to reduce its

analy~is

ofte~

~~:S~-1--

to simple mechanical

rules so that the constable has a fighting chance not to
blunder.
This case and New York v. Belton,
(1981),

u.s.

d e cided today, involve three different Fourth
~~i-e-v~~~:
.·
Am e ndment qu e stions: (A) the scope of the search incid e nt
1\

'

'

3.

to arrest on the public highway;

(B) whether officers must

obtain a warrant when they have probable cause to search a
particular container in which the suspect has a reasonable
expectation

of

privacy;

"automobile exception"
potentially
containers

includes
found

and,

(C) · the

scope

of

the

to the warrant requirement, which
r;~~
B&tliP;x-l:le il'lter;i,Qc of the car and

therein.

These

issues

frequently

are

intertwined, as the similar facts of these cases suggest:
both

involve

cause,

the

the

arrest

stop
of

of
the

an

automobile

occupants,

the

upon

probable

search

of

the

automobile, and the search of a personal container found
therein.

Nonetheless,

presented

to

us

the

cases have
entirely

under

been litigated
different

and

theories.

Intelligent analysis cannot proceed unless the issues are
addressed separately. Viewing similar facts from entirely
different perspectives need not lead to identical results.

A't9I
because

I

have

joined

concluded

the

that

Court 1 s
a

opinion

"bright

line"

in

Bel ton

rule

was

necessary in the quite different circumstances addressed

there~Belton,

unlike

this

case,

concerns

only

the

exception to the warrant requirement for a search incident

.

rJ:uY-Lf: a../--

J

to arrest; contrary to Justice Stevens 1 s implication,A the

4.

courts

below

never

found

that

the officer

cause to search the automobile.

had

probable

It presents the volatile

and fluid situation of an encounter between an arresting
officer and a suspect apprehended on the public highway.
;C~h~i~m~e~l~~v~·~_;C~a~l~i~f~o~r~n~i~a,

While

u.s.

395

(1969),

752

determines in principle the scope of a warrantless search
incident to arrest, practical necessity requires
allow

an

officer

in

these

circumstances

thoroughly the automobile without requiring

that we

to

secure

him in haste

and under pressure to make close calculations about danger
CJ.--

to himself or the vulner~bilty of evidence.
Any

"bright

line"

rule

does

Belton trades marginal privacy of
passenger

area

of

an

automobile

~

involve

costs.

containers within the
for

protection

of

the

officer and of destructable evidence. The balance of these
interests strongly favors the Court's rule. The occupants
of

an

automobile

privacy

in

the

Almeida-Sanchez
(1973) (Powell,

dimin~hed
1\

enjoy

interior
v.
J.,

further

only

a

of

the

United

the

expectation

automobile

States,

concurring).
when

limited

413

itself.

u.s.

266,

of
See
279

This limited interest is

occupants

are

placed

under

custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
/

218,

237

( 19 7 3) (Po we 11 , ., J. ,

concurring) .

Immediately

5.

preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control
over the entire interior of the automobile, and can place
loose

weapons

containers
speaking,

as
it

or

contrband

the

officer

into

pockets

approaches.

is difficult

or

Thus,

other

practically

to justify varying degrees of

protection for various containers and the general interior
of the car. These considerations do not apply to the trunk
of

the

car,

which

is

not

within

the

control

of

the

passengers either immediately before or during the process
of arrest.
B

Although petitioner Robbins was arrested, this
case

was

officers
wrapped
wagon.

litigated
needed

only

a

container

on

warrant
in

the

the

to

rear

question

open

a

whether

sealed,

compartment of

the

opaquely
a

station

The Court treats this situation as identical with

that in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), and
Sanders, supra, which addressed warrantless searches of a
double-locked
respectively.
concerns
requiring

footlocker
Thus,

itself
a

the

primarily

warrant

for

and

Court's
with
their

personal
opinion

the

in

this

of

containers

kinds

search

luggage

when

police

case

have

probable cause to search them, and where there has been no

..

..

.

6.

arrest.

For ·reasons

explained more

fully

below,

I . will

share the Court's assumption that the police had probable
cause to search the container rather than the automobile
generally. Viewing this as a

"contain~r

case," I concur in

the judgment.
Chadwick and Sanders require police to obtain a
warrant to search the contents of a container only when

--

the container is one that generally serves as a repository
for personal effects or that has been sealed in a manner
manifesting

a

reasonable

expectation

that

the

contents

will not be open to public scrutiny. See/Chadwick, supra,
at 13; Sanders, supra, at 764.
Mannino,

635 F.2d 110, 114

::l

S~

e.g., United States v.

(CA2 I980);

United States v.

Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697, 700-01 (CAl 1980), United States v.
Mackey, 626 F.2d 684, 687-88 (CA9 1980); United States v.
Ross,

r___-u.s,

A-fJ(J.

F.2d ~ __ ,

1

o,__
c,

dissenting).

This

courts

undertake

must

violates

the

-,

(~

resembles

Fourth

to

in

198l)(en

principle

determine

Amendment

banc)(Tamm,

rights

the

whether
of

a

J.

inquiry
a

search

complaining

party. See,Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978; id., at

..

150-152
"[t]he

~

(Powell,
ultimate

J.,

concurring).

question

is

In

whether

each

instance,

one's

claim to

privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in light
'

;

.,

---------

,.'

7.

of the surrounding circumstances." Id; see Katz v. United
States, 389

u.s.

The
basic

Court 1 s

concern

mechanical
search

with

approach

interests

requirement

any

Sanders

347 (1967).

closed

justifies

requirement.

for

today
in

a

departs

privacy,

warrant

container.

and

before

Nothing

in

the

Court

in

this

adopts

a

police may
Chadwick

this extreme extension of

Indeed,

from

or

the warrant

Sanders

explicitly

foreclosed that reading:
"There will be difficulties in determining which
parcels taken from an automobile require a
warrant for their search and which do not. Our
decision in this case means only that a warrant
generally is required before personal luggage
can be searched and that the extent to which the
Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other
parcels depends not at all upon whether they are
siezed from an automobile." 442 U.S. at 765,
n.l3.
While

the

Court 1 s

blanket

warrant

requirement

does not even purport to protect any privacy interest, it
imposes

substantial

new

burdens

on

law

enforcement.

Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course
of a probable cause search of an automobile for narcotics,
~ -t.L~~ -lt:!J
the co ns ci e ntious ' policeman A~ ta ke th# object to a
magi s t ra te,
decision,

fill
and

out

finally

...

~

the

a pprop riat e

obtain
..; '

""'

the

f or ms,

warrant.

await

Suspects

the
or

8.

vehicles

normally will be

detained while

the warrant is

sought. This process may take hours, removing the officer
from

his

normal

~duties.

Expenditure of

such time

and effort, drawn from the public's limited resources for
detecting

when

it

protects an individual's reasonable privacy interests.

In

my view,
The

or

crimes,

is

justified

the Court's requirement cannot be so justified.

aggregate

officer

preventing

has

burden
probable

of

procuring

cause

to

warrants

search

the

whenever
most

an

trivial

container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the
advancement of important Fourth Amendment values. The sole
virtue of the Court's rule is simplicity.-2"3

3 .z" The Court overestimates the difficulties involved
in
determining
whether
a
party
has
a
reasonable
expectation of privacy in a particular container. Many
containers, such as personal luggage, are "inevitably
associated with the expectation of privacy." Arkansas v.
Sanders, supra, at 762. Many others, varying from a
plastic cup to the ubiquitous brown paper grocery sack,
consistently lack such an association. In the middle are
containers, such as cardboard boxes and laundry bags, that
may be used, although imperfectly, as repositories of
personal
effects,
but
of ten
are
not.
As
to
such
containers, I would adopt the view of Chief Judge Coffin:
(('1/) [W]e dlsagree that the mere possibility of such
use leads to the conclusion that such containers
are "inevitably" associated with an expectation
of privacy. The many and varied uses of these
containers that entail no expectation bf privacy

/

9.

cl9The dissenters argue, with some justice, that the
controlling question should be the scope of the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement.· In their view, when
the police have probable cause to search an automobile,
rather

than only

to

search a

particular

.
1ocate d 1n
. d)
'-'1
fortuitously lS
aA aMtomoulLe,

container

that

the exigencies

1'\

that

allow

the

police

to

search

the

entire

automobile

without a warrant support the warrantless search of every

militate against applying a presumption that a
warrantless search of such a container violates
the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Goshorn,
supra, 628 F.2d at 700.

//when confronted with the claim that police should have
obtained
a
warrant
before
searching
an
ambiguous
container, a court should conduct a hearing to determine
whether
the
defendant
had
manifested
a
reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the container.
See id., at 701. Relevant to such an inquiry should be the
size, shape, material, and condition of the exterior, the
context within which it is discovered, and whether the
possessor had taken some significant precaution, such as~
/securely sealing or binding the container, that indicates
.
1
a desire to prevent the contents from being displayed upon
simple mischance. A prudent officer will err on the side
of respecting ambigous assertions of privacy, see Rakas v.
Illinois, supra, 439 U.S., at 152, n.l (Powell, J.,
concurring) , and a realistic court seldom should second
guess the good faith judgment of the officer in the field
when
the
public
consequently must
suffer
from
the
suppression of probative evidence, cf. Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 611-612 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
/

10.

container

~~ost,

J.,
1
dissenting). This analysis is entirely consistent with the
holdings

found

therin.

to

search

because the police there had probable
the

double

respectively

suitcase
automobile.
761;

(Stevens

in Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which is an

"automobile case,"
cause

at

before

?~Chadwick,

~ id.,

see

Adoption of

locked

at

footlocker

either

came

and

the

near

an

supra, at 11; Sanders, supra, at
(Burger,

766

the dissenters'

view

C.J.,

co. .ncurring).
.

w~~ejection
~

of a good deal of the reasoning in the latter case.
r

------*---------------*--------------~~

~----~-----------------------------------Resolving

this

case

by expanding

the

scope

of

the automobile exception is attractive not so much for its
logical

virtue,

but

because

it

may

provide

ground

for

agreement by a majority of the presently fractured Court
on an approach that would give more specific guidance to
police and courts in this recurring
to

incessant

litigation.

I

situ~~o~

note,

however,

benefit would not be

realized fully,

as

themselves

when

cause

deciding

probable

has led

that

this

courts may find
ripened,

or

whether suspicion focussed on the suitcase or on the car
in which it travelled .
/

The

par~ies

have

not

pressed

this

argument

in

11.

this case and it is late in the Term for us to undertake
sua sponte reconsideration of basic doctrines. Given these
constraints,

I

adhere

to statements in Sanders that the

fact that the container was seized from the trunk of an
automobile is irrelevant to the question whether a warrant
is

needed

to

~~

search

~ ~g j opportunity
the

its
for

basic principles at

contents.

more

Some

future

case

thorough consideration of

risk may of fer

some

better,

if

more radical solution to the confusion that infects this
1
benighted area of the law;3

3
We have an institutional responsibility not only
to respect stare decisis but also to harmonize our views
on
constitutional
questions
of
broad
practical
application.

rider A p. 5
While providing guidance to officers in the field who must
implement our decisions is a plain necessity,

Rider p. 7
Those
Fourth

who

Amendment

properly

cases

balance

enforcement

Belton, ___

the

to

receive

opinions

u.s. ___

Court's

articulate

individual

will

caucophany of

expect

privacy

little

in

this

adjudication
clear

and

rules

efficient

gratification
case

and

from

of

that
law
the

in New York v.

(1981}. The Court apparently cannot

agree even on what it has held previouly, let alone on how
these

cases

should

be

decided. f Much of

this

difficulty

comes from the necessity of applying the general command
of

the Fourth Amendment

stem

from

the

exclusionary

often

rule,

to ever-varying facts;

unpalatable

which

spur

more may

consequences

the

Court

to

of

reduce

the
its

analysis to simple mechanical rules so that the constable
has a fighting chance not to blunder.
This

case

Fourth

Amendment

warrant

clause

and

Belton

questions:
protect;

involve

what

what

three

containers
is

the

should

scope

automobile exception to the warrant clause;

'

J ".

different

and,

of

the
the

what is

2.

the scope of
the

the search incident to arrest exception to

warrant

intertwined,
both

clause?
as

the similar

involve

cause,

~

~

personal

These

stop

issues

facts of

of

an

necessarily

are

the cases suggest:

automobile

upon

probabl e

e:t

arrest of

container.

the occupants,
Nonetheless,

nd t.h.e search of a

the

cases

have

been

litigated under entirely different theories, and an alysis
cannot

proceed

unless

the

issues

are

kept

separate.

Viewing similar facts from entirely different perspectives
need not lead to identical results.
I have joined the Court's opinion in New York v.

u.s.

Belton,

(1981),

announced today,

because I

concluded that a "bright line"

rule was necessary in the

quite

addressed

unlike

different

circumstances

this case,

involves

the

there.

Belton,

exception to

the warrant

requirement for a search incident to arrest.

It presents

the volatile and fluid situation of an encounter between
an

arresting

offcier

and

a

suspect

apprehended

public highway. While Chimel v. California,

on

the

395 U.S.

752

(1969), determines in principle the scope of a warrantless
search

incident

to

arrest,

practical

necessity

requires

that we allow an officer in these circumstances to secure
thoroughly the automobile without requiring

'

him in h a st e

3.

and under pressure to make close calculations about danger
to

himself

or

the

vulneribilty

of

~stice
any~ember of

evidence.

Stevens is simply wrong in suggetsing that
the Court has

held

interest

zippered pocket than in a sealed package;

the

in a

extent

container
searched

of
is

that

an

a

person has

arrestee's

simply

without

a

greater

privacy

irrelevant
warrant

a

to

and

privacy

interest

whether

without

it

in
may

probable

a
be

cause

incident to an arrest. 2
Any

"bright

ine"

rule

involves

costs.

Bel ton

trades marginal privacy of containers within the passenger
area of an automobile for protection of the officer and of
destructable
strongly

evidence.

favors

the

The

balance

Court's

rule.

of
The

these

interests

occupants

of

an

automobile enjoy only a limited expectation of privacy in
the interior of the automobile itself. See supra, at
see also Almeida-Sanchez v.
279

United States,

413 U.S.

266,

(1973) (Powell, J., concurring). This limited interest

is diminshed further when the occupants are placed under
custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218,

237

(1973) (Powell,

J.,

concurring).

Immediately

preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control
over the entire interior of the automobile, and can place

'

4.

loose

weapons

containers

as

speaking,

it

or
the

contrband
officer

is difficult

into

pockets

approaches.

Thus,

or

other

practically

to justify varying degrees of

protection for various containers and the general interior
of the car. These considerations do not apply to the trunk
of

the

car,

which

is

not

within

the

control

of

the

passengers either immediately before or during the process
of arrest.
The

Court's

opinion

in

this

case

concerns

itself primarily with the kinds of containers requiring a
warrant for

their search when police have probable cause,

but there has been no arrest. As I have explained, supra,
I

believe

the

that

Court's

"bright-line"

rule

imposes

unacceptable burdens upon law enforcement without securing
important interests in personal privacy. Its single virtue
is simplicity.
The final
exception"

issue is the scope of the "automobile

to the warrant requirement.

Three memebers of

the Court would allow the police to search any container
within

the

auto upon

probable

cause

without

a

warrant.

Adoption of this view would require rejection of much of
the

reasoning

concededly

in

in

Arkansas

accord

with

v.
its

Sanders,

supra,

basic

holding,

'

although
because

5.

probable cause in that case attached only to the suitcase,
not the entire automobile, and ripened before the luggage
was

placed

expanding

in

the

the

automobile.

scope

of

the

Resolving

this

automobile

case

by

exception

is

attractive not so much for its logical virtue, but because
it may provide ground fo ~ agreement on a basic rule that
can

slake

the

inceessant

suppress ion

litigation

by

introducing clarity. This benefit will not undoubtedly be
realized;

courts

may

deciding

themselves

find

probable cause ripened, or whether

when

suspicion focussed on

the suitcase or the car in which it travelled.
The parties

have

not

pressed

this

argument

in

this case, Sanders would have seemed to preclude it, and
it

is

late

in

reconsideration
constraints,

I

the
of

term

for

basic

us

to

undertake

doctrines.

sua sponte

Given

these

adhere to my reading of Sanders that the

fact that the container was seized from an automobile is
irrelevant to the question whether a warrant is needed to
search its contents. Some future case offering opportunity
for more thorough consideration of the basic principles at
risk may offer some
the

confusion

that

better,
infects

if more radical solution to
this

beknighted

law.

'

..•.

area of

the
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80-148, Robbins v. California
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
The Court's

judgment is

justified,

though not

compelled, by the Court's opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders,
442

u.s.

756 (1979). Accordingly, I join the judgment. As

the Court

today goes

well

beyond Sanders or

any other

prior case to establish a new "bright line" rule, I cannot
join

its opinion. 1 It would

require officers

to obtain

warrants in order to examine the contents of insubstantial
containers in which no one had a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
our

The Court's approach strains the rationales of

prior cases

and

imposes

substantial burdens on law

1
The Court's "bright-line" rule would extend the
warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment to every "closed,
opaque container," without regard to size, shape or
whether common experience would suggest that the owner was
asserting a privacy interest in the contents. The Court
would exempt from the broad reach of its rule only those
"closed, opaque contiainers" where, because of shape or
some other characteristic,
the "contents may be said to
be in plain view." In accordance with the Court's usage I
use the term "container" to include any and all packages,
bags, boxes, tins, bottles and the like.

\

2.

enforcement without vindicating any significant values of
privacy. I nevertheless concur in the judgment because the
manner in which the package at issue was carefully wrapped
and sealed evidenced petitioner's expectation of privacy
in its contents. As wehave stressed in prior decisions, a
central J?Urpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard
reasonable expectations of privacy.
Having

reached

this case, I recognize

this

decision on

the

facts

of

as the dissenting opinions find

it easy to proclaim -- that the law of search and seizure
with respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing. The
Court apparently cannot agree even on what it has held
previouly, let alone on how these cases should be decided.
Much

of

this

difficulty

comes

applying the general command of
ever-varying

facts;

more

may

from

the

necessity

of

the Fourth Amendment to
stem

from

the

often

unpalatable consequences of the exclusionary rule, which
spur the Court to reduce its analysis to simple mechanical
rules so that the constable has a fighting chance not to
blunder.

u.s.

This case and New York v. Belton,
(1981),

decided

today,

involve

three

different

Amendment questions regarding automobiles:

(A)

Fourth

the scope

3•

of the search incident to arrest on the public highway;
(B) whether officers must obtain a warrant when they have
probable cause to search a particular container in which
the suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy: and,
(C) the scope of the "automobile exception" to the warrant
requirement, which potentially includes all areas of the
car and containers found therein. These issues frequently
are

intertwined,

suggest:

both

as

the

involve

similar

the

stop

facts
of

an

of

these

cases

automobile

upon

probable cause, the arrest of the occupants, the search of
the automobile,

and

the search of

a personal container

found therein. Nonetheless, the cases have been litigated
and

presented

to

us

under

entirely different

theories.

Intelligent analysis cannot proceed unless the issues are
addressed separately. Viewing similar facts from entirely
different perspectives need not lead to identical results.
A.
I
because

I

have

joined

concluded

the Court's opinion

that

a

"bright

line"

in

Belton

rule

was

necessary in the quite different circumstances addressed
there. 2

Belton,

unlike

this

case,

concerns

only

Footnote(s) 2 appear on following page(s).

the

4.

exception to the warrant requirement for a search incident
to

arrest;

post,

contrary

at

the

to

Justice

courts

Stevens's

below

never

implication,

found

that

the

officer had probable cause to search the automobile.

It

presents the volatile and fluid situation of an encounter
between an arresting officer and a suspect apprehended on
the public highway. While Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752

(1969),

determines

in

principle

the

scope

of

a

warrantless search incident to arrest, practical necessity
requires that we allow an officer in these circumstances
to secure thoroughly the automobile without requiring him
in haste and

under

pressure

to make close calculations

about danger to himself or the vulnerabilty of evidence.
Any

"bright

line"

rule

does

involve

costs.

Belton trades marginal privacy of containers within the
passenger

area

of

an

automobile

for

protection of

the

officer and of destructable evidence. The balance of these
interests strongly favors the Court's rule. The occupants
of

an

automobile

enjoy

only

a

limited

expectation

of

2 The one significant factual difference is that
Belton involved only the passenger compartment
(the
"interior") of an automobile, whereas this case involves
the search of the functional equivelent of the trunk.

5.

privacy

in

interior

the

v.

Almeida-Sanchez
(1973) (Powell,
diminished

of

United

the

States,

concurring).

J.,

further

when

automobile

the

413

U.S.

This limited

occupants

See

itself.
266,

279

interest is

are

placed

under

u.s.

custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414
218,

237

(1973) (Powell,

concurring).

J.,

Immediately

preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control
over the entire interior of the automobile, and can place
loose

weapons

containers
speaking,

as

or

contrband

the

officer

into

pockets

approaches.

it is difficult to

or

Thus,

other

practically

justify varying degrees of

protection for various containers and the general interior
of the car. These considerations do not apply to the trunk
of

the

car,

which

is

not

within

the

control

of

the

passengers either immediately before or during the process
of arrest.
B.
Although petitioner Robbins was arrested,
case

was

litigated

officers

needed

wrapped

container

wagon.

a

only

on

warrant
in

the

to

rear

the

question

open

a

whether

sealed,

compartment

The Court treats this situation as

of

this
the

opaquely
a

station

identical with

that in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), and

6.

Sanders, supra, which addressed warrantless searches of a
double-locked

footlocker

respectively.
concerns

Thus,

itself

requiring

a

the

and

Court's

primarily

warrant

for

with
their

personal
opinion

the

kinds

search

luggage

in

this

of

containers

when

police

case

have

probable cause to search them, and where there has been no
arrest.

For

reasons

explained more

fully

below,

I

will

share the Court's assumption that the police had probable
cause to search the container rather

than the automobile

generally. Viewing this as a "container case," I concur in
the judgment.
Chadwick and Sanders require police to obtain a
warrant

to search the contents of

a container only when

the container is one that generally serves as a repository
for personal effects or that has been sealed in a manner
manifesting

a

reasonable

expectation

that

the

contents

will not be open to public scrutiny. See Chadwick, supra,
at 13; Sanders, supra, at 764. See, e.g., United States v.
Mannino,

635 F.2d 110,

114

(CA2 1980);

United States v.

Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697, 700-01 (CAl 1980), United States v.
Mackey,
Ross,

626 F.2d 684, 687-88
F.2d

dissenting).

This

(CA9 1980); United States v.

(CADC
resembles

in

198l)(en

banc)(Tamm,

principle

the

J.

inquiry

7.

courts

must

violates

undertake

the

Fourth

to

determine

Amendment

whether

rights

of

a

party. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
150-152
"[t] he

J.,

(Powell,
ultimate

concurring).

question

privacy from government

is

In

whether

a

search

complaining

(1978; id., at
each

instance,

one's

claim

to

intrusion is reasonable in light

of the surrounding circumstances." Id; see Katz v. United
States, 389

u.s.

The
basic

Court's

concern

mechanical
search
Sanders

347 (1967).

with

approach

interests

requirement

any

closed

justifies

requirement.

for

today
in

a

this extreme
the

privacy,

warrant

container.

Indeed,

departs
and

before

Nothing

in

extension of

Court

in

from

Sanders

this

adopts

a

police may
Chadwick

or

the warrant
explicitly

foreclosed that reading:
"There will be difficulties in determining which
parcels taken from an automobile require a
warrant for their search and which do not. Our
decision in this case means only that a warrant
generally is required before personal luggage
can be searched and that the extent to which the
Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other
parcels depends not at all upon whether they are
siezed from an automobile." 442 U.S. at 765,
n.l3.
While

the

Court's

blanket

warrant

requirement

does not even purport to protect any privacy interest, it

8.

imposes

substantial

new

burdens

on

law

enforcement.

Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course
of a probable cause search of an automobile for narcotics,
the conscientious policeman would be required to take the
object to a magistrate,
await

the

decision,

fill out the appropriate forms,

and

finally

obtain

the

warrant.

Suspects or vehicles normally will be detained while the
warrant is sought. This process may take hours, removing
the officer from his normal police duties. Expenditure of
such

time

and

effort,

drawn

from

the

public's

limited

resources for detecting or preventing crimes, is justified
when

it

interests.

protects

an

individual's

reasonable

privacy

In my view, the Court's requirement cannot be

so justified.

The aggregate burden of procuring warrants

whenever an officer has probable cause to search the most
trivial container may be heavy and will not be compensated
by the advancement of important Fourth Amendment values.
The sole virtue of the Court's rule is simplicity.3

3

The Court overestimates the difficulties involved
in determining
whether
a
party
has
a
reasonable
expectation of privacy in a particular container. Many
containers, such as personal luggage, are "inevitably
associated with the expectation of privacy." Arkansas v.
Sanders, supra, at 762. Many others, varying from a

9.

c.
The dissenters argue, with some justice, that the

plastic cup to the ubiquitous brown paper grocery sack,
consistently lack such an association. In the middle are
containers, such as cardboard boxes and laundry bags, that
may be used, although imperfectly, as repositories of
personal
effects,
but of ten are not.
As
to such
containers, I would adopt the view of Chief Judge Coffin:
[W]e disagree that the mere possibility of such
use leads to the conclusion that such containers
are "inevitably" associated with an expectation
of privacy. The many and varied uses of these
containers that entail no expectation of privacy
militate against applying a presumption that a
warrantless search of such a container violates
the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Goshorn,
supra, 628 F.2d at 700.
When confronted with the claim that police should have
obtained
a
warrant
before
searching
an
ambiguous
container, a court should conduct a hearing to determine
whether
the
defendant
had
manifested
a
reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the container.
See id., at 701. Relevant to such an inquiry should be the
size, shape, material, and condition of the exterior, the
context within which it is discovered, and whether the
possessor had taken some s igni f ican t precaution, such as
locking, securely sealing, or binding the container, that
indicates a desire to prevent the contents from being
displayed upon simple mischance. A prudent officer will
err on the side of respecting ambigous assertions of
privacy, see Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S., at 152,
n.l (Powell, J., concurring), and a realistic court seldom
should second guess the good faith judgment of the officer
in the field when the public consequently must suffer from
the suppression of probative evidence, cf. Brown v.
Illinois,
422 u.s.
590,
611-612
(1975) (Powell,
J.,
concurring).

10.

controlling question should be the scope of the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement.
the pol ice
rather

than

have

probable

only

In their view, when

cause to search an autornobi le,

to search

a

particular

container

that

fortuitously is located in it, the exigencies that allow
the

police

to

search

the

entire

automobile

without

a

warrant support the warrantless search of every container
found therin. See post,

at

(Stevens J., dissenting).

This analysis is entirely consistent with the holdings in
Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which is an "automobile
case,"

because

search

the

respectively

the

double

pol ice

there

locked

footlocker

before either

carne

had

near

probable
and

the

cause

to

suitcase

an automobile.

See

Chadwick, supra, at 11; Sanders, supra, at 761; see also
id.,

at

766

dissenters'

(Burger,

C.J.,

view would

concurring).

require,

however,

Adoption of

the

rejection of

a

good deal of the reasoning in the latter case.
Resolving

this case

by expanding

the scope of

the automobile exception is attractive not so much for its
logical

virtue,

but

because

it

may

provide

ground

for

agreement by a rnajori ty of the presently fractured Court
on an approach that would give more specific guidance to
police and courts in this recurring situation -- one that

11.

has

led to

incessant litigation.

I

note,

this benefit would not be realized fully,

however,

that

as courts may

find themselves deciding when probable cause ripened, or
whether suspicion focussed on the suitcase or on the car
in which it travelled.
The parties have not pressed this argument in
this case and it is late in the Term for us to undertake
sua sponte reconsideration of basic doctrines. Given these
cons train ts,

I adhere to statements in Sanders that the

fact that the container was seized from the trunk of an
automobile is irrelevant to the question whether a warrant
is

needed

to

search

its

contents.

Some

future

case

affording an opportunity for more thorough consideration
of the basic principles at risk may offer some better, if
more radical solution to the confusion that infects this
benighted area of the law.4

4

We have an institutional responsibility not only
to respect stare decisis but also to harmonize our views
practical
on
constitutional
questions
of
broad
application.

..

No.

80-148, Robbins v. California
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
The Court's

compelled,
Sanders,

judgment

by what I wrote for
442

u.s.

756

is

justified,

though

not

the Court in Arkansas v.

(1979).

Accordingly,

I

join

the

judgment. As the Court today goes well beyond Sanders or
any other
rule,

I

prior
cannot

officers

to

case

to

join

obtain

establish

its

a

new

opinion.l

warrants

in

It

order

"bright
would

to

line"

require

examine

the

contents of insubstantial containers in which no one had a
reasonable
strains

the

expectation of
rationales

of

privacy.
our

The Court's

prior

cases

and

approach
imposes

substantial burdens on law enforcement without vindicating

1

The Court's "bright-line" rule would extend the
warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment to every "closed,
opaque container," without regard to size, shape or
whether common experience would suggest that the owner was
asserting a privacy interest in the contents. The Court
woudl exempt from the broad reach of its rule only those
"closed, opaque contiainers" where the "contents may be
said to be in plain view." In accordance with the Court's
usage I use the term "container to include any and al
bags, boxes, tins, bottles and the like .

.,.

'

2.

any significant values of privacy.

I

nevertheless concur

in the judgment because the manner in which the package at
issue

was

carefully

wrapped

and

sealed

evidenced

petitioner's expectation of privacy in its contents. As I
have stressed in prior decisions, a central purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is to safeguard reasonable expectations
of privacy.
Having

reached

this

this case, I recognize

decision

on

the

facts

of

as the dissenting opinions find

it easy to proclaim -- that the law of search and seizure
with respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing. The
Court apparently

cannot agree even on what

it has

held

previouly, let alone on how these cases should be decided.
Much

of

applying

this

difficulty

comes

the general command of

ever-varying

facts;

more

may

from
the

the

necessity

of

Fourth Amendment to

stem

from

the

unpalatable consequences of the exclusionary rule,

often
which

spur the Court to reduce its analysis to simple mechanical
rules so that the constable has a fighting chance not to
blunder.
This case and New York v.
(1981),

decided

today,

Amendment questions:

involve

Belton,

three

u.s.

different

Fourth

(A) the scope of the search incident

3.
_\

to arrest on the public highway;

(B) whether officers must

obtain a warrant when they have probable cause to search a
particular container in which the suspect has a reasonable
expectation

of

privacy;

"automobile exception"
potentially
containers

includes
found

and,

(C) - the

scope

of

to the warrant requirement,
both

therein.

the

interior

These

of

issues

the

the
which

car

and

frequently

are

intertwined, as the similar facts of these cases suggest:
both

involve

cause,

the

arrest

automobile,
therein.

the

stop
of

the

an

automobile

occupants,

the

upon

probable

search

of

the

and the search of a personal container found

Nonetheless,

presented

of

to

us

the cases

under

have

entirely

been litigated
different

and

theories.

Intelligent analysis cannot proceed unless the issues are
addressed separately. Viewing similar facts from entirely
different perspectives need not lead to identical results.
A.
I
because

I

necessary
there.

have

joined

concluded

the

that

Court's
a

opinion

"bright

line"

in

Bel ton

rule

was

in the quite different circumstances addressed

Belton,

unlike

this

case,

concerns

only

the

exception to the warrant requirement for a search incident
to arrest; contrary to Justice Stevens's implication, the

,,'·li

;:

4.

courts

below never

found

that

the

cause to search the automobile.

officer

had

probable

It presents the volatile

and fluid situation of an encounter between an arresting
officer and a suspect apprehended on the public highway.
While

Chime!

v.

California,

u.s.

395

752

(1969)

1

determines in principle the scope of a warrantless search
incident to arrest, practical necessity requires
allow

an

officer

in

these

circumstances

thoroughly the automobile without requiring

that we

to

secure

him in haste

and under pressure to make close calculations about danger
to himself or the vulneribilty of evidence.
Any
Belton

"bright

line"

trades marginal

passenger

area

of

an

rule

does

privacy of
automobile

involve

costs.

containers within
for

protection

of

the
the

officer and of destructable evidence. The balance of these
interests strongly favors the Court's rule. The occupants
of

an

automobile

privacy

in

the

Almeida-Sanchez
(1973) (Powell,
diminshed

enjoy

interior
v.
J.,

further

only

a

of

the

United

the

expectation

automobile

States,

concurring).
when

limited

413

itself.

U.S.

266,

of
See
279

This limited interest is

occupants

are

placed

under

custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
/

218,

237

(1973) (Powell, . J.,
•

I

concurring).

Immediat e ly

5.

preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control
over the entire interior of the automobile, and can place
loose

weapons

containers
speaking,

as
it

or

into

contrband

the

officer

pockets

approaches.

is difficult

to

or

Thus,

other

practically

justify varying degrees of

protection for various containers and the general interior
of the car. These considerations do not apply to the trunk
of

the

car,

which

is

not

within

the

control

of

the

passengers either immediately before or during the process
of arrest.

B.
Although petitioner Robbins was arrested, this
case

was

officers
wrapped
wagon.

litigated
needed

a

container

only

on

warrant
in

the

the

to

question

open

rear

a

whether

sealed,

compartment

of

the

opaquely
a

station

The Court treats this situation as identical with

that in United States v. Chadwick, 433

u.s.

1 (1977), and

Sanders, supra, which addressed warrantless searches of a
double-locked
respectively.
concerns
requiring

footlocker
Thus,

itself
a

the

warrant

for

probable cause to search
.;

'•

Court's

pr irnar ily

with
their

th~m,

. .;

personal

and

opinion
the

kinds

s e arch

luggage

in

this

of

containers

when

police

case

have

and where there has been no

6.

arrest.

For ·reasons explained more

fully

below,

I

will

share the Court's assumption that the police had probable
cause to search the container rather than the automobile
generally. Viewing this as a

"contain~r

case," I concur in

the judgment.
Chadwick and Sanders require police to obtain a
warrant to search the contents of

a container only when

the container is one that generally serves as a repository
for personal effects or that has been sealed in a manner
manifesting

a

reasonable

expectation

that

the

contents

will not be open to public scrutiny. See Chadwick, supra,
at 13; Sanders, supra, at 764. See, e.g., United States v.
Mannino,

635 F.2d 110,

114

(CA2 1980);

United States v.

Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697, 700-01 (CAl 1980), United States v.
Mackey,

626 F.2d 684, 687-88

Ross,

F. 2d

__ ,

(CADC

dissenting).

This

courts

undertake

must

violates

the

(CA9 1980); United States v.

resembles

Fourth

to

1981) (en

in

principle

determine

Amendment

rights

party. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439
150-152
"[t]he

(Powell,
ultimate

J.,

u.s.

concurring).

question

is

bane) (Tamm,
the

whether
of

a

J.

inquiry
a

search

complaining

128 (1978; id., at
In

whether

each

instance,

one's

claim to

privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in light

---'

.

'

7.

of the surrounding circumstances." Id; see Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Court 1 s

The
basic

concern

mechanical
search

interests

requirement

any

Sanders

with

approach

closed

justifies

requirement.

for

today
in

a

this extreme
the

privacy,

warrant

container.

Indeed,

departs
and

before

Nothing

in

in

this

adopts

a

police may
Chadwick

extension of

Court

from

or

the warrant

Sanders

explicitly

foreclosed that reading:
"There will be difficulties in determining which
parcels taken from an automobile require a
warrant for their search and which do not. Our
decision in this case means only that a warrant
generally is required before personal luggage
can be searched and that the extent to which the
Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other
parcels depends not at all upon whether they are
siezed from an automobile." 442 u.s. at 765,
n.l3.
While

the

Court 1 s

blanket

warrant

requirement

does not even purport to protect any privacy interest, it
imposes

substantial

new

burdens

on

law

enforcement.

Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course
of a probable cause search of an automobile for narcotics,
the

conscientious

magistrate,
decision,

fill
and

policeman
out

fin~lly

the

will

appropriate

obtain
.. "'

take

the

the

object

forms,

warrant.

to

await

Suspects

a

the
or

8.

vehicles

normally will be detained while the

~arrant

is

sought. This process may take hours, removing the officer
from his

normal patrol duties. Expenditure of such time

and effort, drawn from the public's limited resources for
detecting

or

preventing

crimes,

is

justified

when

it

protects an individual's reasonable privacy interests.

In

my view, the Court's requirement cannot be so justified.
The

aggregate

officer

has

burden

probable

of

procuring

cause

to

warrants

search

the

whenever
most

an

trivial

container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the
advancement of important Fourth Amendment values. The sole
virtue of the Court's rule is simplicity.2

2
The Court overestimates the difficulties involved
in
determining
whether
a
party
has
a
reasonable
expectation of privacy in a particular container. Many
containers, such as personal luggage, are "inevitably
associated with the expectation of privacy." Arkansas v.
Sanders, supra, at 762. Many others, varying from a
plastic cup to the ubiquitous brown paper grocery sack,
consistently lack such an association. In the middle are
containers, such as cardboard boxes and laundry bags, that
may be used, although imperfectly, as repositories of
personal
effects,
but
often
are
not.
As
to
such
containers, I would adopt the view of Chief Judge Coffin:

[W]e disagree that the mere possibility of such
use leads to the conclusion that such containers
are "inevitably" associated with an expectation
of privacy. The many and varied uses of these
containers that entail no expectation of privacy·

/

·

9.

c.
The dissenters argue, with some justice, that the
controlling question should be the scope of the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement.· In their view, when
the police have probable cause
rather

than only

to search

a

to search an automobile,
particular

fortuitously is located in an automobile,
that

allow

the

police

to

search

the

container

that

the exigencies

entire

automobile

without a warrant support the warrantless search of every

militate against applying a presumption that a
warrantless search of such a container violates
the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Goshorn,
supra, 628 F.2d at 700.
When confronted with the claim that police should have
obtained
a
warrant
before
searching
an
ambiguous
container, a court should conduct a hearing to determine
whether
the
defendant
had
manifested
a
reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the container.
See id., at 701. Relevant to such an inquiry should be the
size, shape, material, and condition of the exterior, the
context within which it is discovered, and whether the
possessor had taken some significant precaution, such as
securely sealing or binding the container, that indicates
a desire to prevent the contents from being displayed upon
simple mischance. A prudent officer will err on the side
of respecting ambigous assertions of privacy, see Rakas v.
Illinois, supra, 439 u.s., at 152, n.l (Powell, J.,
concurring), and a realistic court seldom should second
guess the good faith judgment of the officer in the field
when
the
public
consequently must suffer
from
the
suppression of probative evidence, cf. Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 611-612 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).

----------------

..

~

10.

container

found

therin.

See

post,

at

(Stevens

J.,

dissenting}. This analysis is entirely consistent with the
holdings

in Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which is an

"automobile case,"
cause

to

search

because the pol ice there had probable
the

double

respectively

suitcase

locked

before

footlocker

either

came

and

the

near

an

automobile. See Chadwick, supra, at 11: Sanders, supra, at
761;

see

also

Adoption of

id.,

at

766

(Burger,

the dissenters'

C.J.,

concurring}.

view would require rejection

of a good deal of the reasoning in the latter case.

*

*
Resolving

*

*
this case by

expanding

the

scope of

the automobile exception is attractive not so much for its
logical

virtue,

but

because

it

may

provide

ground

for

agreement by a majority of the presently fractured Court
on an approach that would give more specific guidance to
police and courts in this recurring situation that has led
to

incessant

litigation.

I

note,

however,

that

this

benefit would not be realized fully,

as courts may find

themselves

cause

deciding

when

probable

ripened,

or

whether suspicion focussed on the suitcase or on the car
in which it travelled.
The

par~ies

have

not pressed this argument

in

'y
,.

.

'

,,

11.

this case and it is late in the Term for us to undertake
sua sponte reconsideration of basic doctrines. Given these
constraints,

I

adhere

to statements in Sanders that the

fact that the container was seized from the trunk of an
automobile is irrelevant to the question whether a warrant
is

needed

of fer ing
the

to

search

opportunity

its
for

contents.

more

Some

future

case

thorough consider at ion of

basic principles at risk may offer

some

better,

if

more radical solution to the confusion that infects this
benighted area of the law.3

3

We have an institutional responsibility not only
to respect stare decisis but also to harmonize our views
on
constitutional
questions
of
broad
practical
application~ Adjudication of cases in this area has been
characterized
by
adherence
to
individual
theories,
sometimes in disregard of subsequent decisions, although
police and courts clamour for guidance on legal issues
they must face on a daily basis.

.

-
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While providing guidance to officers in the field who must
implement our decisions is a plain necessity,

Rider p. 7
Those
Fourth

who

Amendment

properly

cases

balance

enforcement

expect
to

will

receive

Court's

articulate

individual

caucophany of opinions
Belton, ___

the

privacy

little

in

~ is

clear
and

rules

case and

of

that

efficient

gratification

(198l) ~he

u.s. ___

adjudication

from

law
the

in New York v.

Court apparently cannot

agree even on what it has held previouly, let alone on how
these

cases

should

be

decided.

Much of

this

difficulty

comes from the necessity of applying the general command
of

the Fourth Amendment

stem

from

the

exclusionary

often

rule,

to ever-varying facts;

unpalatable

which

spur

the

consequences
Court

to

more may
of

the

reduce

its

analysis to simple mechanical rules so that the constable
~

has a fighting chance not to blunder.
This

case

Fourth

Amendment

warrant

clause

and

v, ·~~ ~

Belton J\ invol v

three

questions~~h~t) contain~rs
protect [ iL1 hat

automobile .. exceptio: to

· is

t~e warfa~t

the

~_____..

,

I 1

different
should

scope

clause;

(11?J

of

and ~hat

the
the

is

~

..

2.

the scope of
the

the search

warrant

intertwined,
both

involve

cause,

clause?
as

the

the

similar

stop

the arrest of

personal

These

container.

of

suggest:

facts of
an

automobile

the occupants,
Nonetheless,

~~4A.to ~

upon

probable

and the search of a

the

cases

litigated under entirely different theoriesf

have

been

~~:;,;r

-aaa ~analysis

~M
issues
are ~~~~G
separate~,
4
Viewing similar facts from entirely different perspectives
cannot

"

proceed

unless

...

the

need not lead to identical results.
I have joined the Court's opinion in~
Belton,

announced today,

because

I

concluded that a "bright line"

rule was necessary in the

quite

addressed

unlike

different

circumstances

this case,

involves

the

there.

Belton,

exception to

the warrant

'd ent to arrest.
.
requirement f or a searc h 1nc1

It presents

*

the volatile and fluid situation of an encounter between
an

arresting

offcier

public highway.

and

a

suspect

While Chimel v.

apprehended

California,

on

the

395 U.S.

752

(1969}, determines in principle the scope of a warrantless
search

incident

to

arrest,

practical

necessity

requires

that we allow an officer in these circumstances to secure
thoroughly the automobile without

a--t-Ju~~

7t-

~~ ~, r~~~~~ ~~

~~~~-4~~-~
Hc.-J- ~ ~ ~~~1-d ,Lo~
~ C:Ut_.J·~A..C~,

.91

w~ ~~~

3.

and under pressure to make close calculations about danger
to

himself

or

the

vulneribilty

of

evidence.

Stevens is simply wrong in sugge~ ing that any member of
the Court has

held

that a

person has

a greater

privacy

a sealed package;
the

an--------~--------------~--------------~arrestee's privacy interest in a

extent

container
searched

is

simply

without

a

irrelevant
warrant

and

incident to an arrest.
Any

to

whether

without

it

may

be

probable

cause

costs.

Belton

~

"bright

line"

rule 1\ involve;

trades marginal privacy of containers within the passenger
area of an automobile for protection of the officer and of
destructable
strongly

evidence.

favors

the

The

balance

Court's

rule.

of
The

these

interests

occupants

of

an

automobile enjoy only a limited expectation of privacy in
the interior of the automobile itself. See supra, at
see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
279

413 U.S.

266,

(1973) (Powell, J., concurring). This limited interest

is diminshed further when the occupants are placed under
custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218,

237

(1973) (Powell,

J.,

concurring).

Immediately

preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control
over the entire interior of the automobile, and can place

~~-

Ujt lo ~ uf ~ ~/ ~ •
~~~~~~P-f~~
~~~~ ~kJ~. ~ ~
4

~~~4'1 ct-~. .Hu...~ ~loose

weapons

containers as
speaking,

or

contrband

the officer

into

pockets

approaches.

Thus,

or

other

practically

it is difficult to justify varying degrees of

protection for various containers and the general interior
of the car. These considerations do not apply to the trunk
of

the

car,

which

is

not

within

the

control

of

the

passengers either immediately before or during the process

Court's
it:m!l:f"---p-r-iH"H'il¥ with the kinds of containers requiring a
1-z,.~~~

warrant for their search when police have probable

.

cause ~

J~~ :rtf.s~ ~i~la,
t~ourt'
s
A

·

"bright-line"

rule

imposes

unacceptable burdens upon law enforcement without securing
important interests in personal privacy. Its single virtue

4~~~

is simplicity.

of the "automobile

The final issue is

Three memebers of

exception" to the warrant
the Court would allow the police to

earch any container

within the autof on ~bable cause

a war ~ t-.

Adoption of this view would require

of ~of

the

reasoning

concededly

~

in

in

Arkansas

accord

with

v.
its

supra,
holding,

""although
because

erd~~~

trW~~~~

~~;::;;~-

i

5.

probable cause in that case attached only to the suitcase,
not the entire automobile, and ripened before the luggage
was

placed

in

the

·~~~i the

R~solving

automobile.

scope

of

the

this -ease

S.y

exception

is

automobile

attractive not so much for its logical virtue, but because

ka-~~~~G/

it may provide ground for j(' agreement on a 'basic 'r ule that

~~~~~-:~~~~
c~1

sJ:altoe \

inceess .fnt -~suppress1on

the

introducing clarity. This benefit will not

~ealize~ 1 ~rts

may

find

themselves

litigation

by

~neoubt~dly

be

deciding

~

when

probable cause ripened, or whether suspicion focussed· on

~A;.._,

the suitcase or the car in which it travelled.
The parties

have not

pressed

this

~~
\

arg-ument
,,

in

this case, Sanders would have seemed to preclude it, and
it

is

late

in

reconsideration
constraints,

I

the
of

term for
basic

us

to undertake

doctrines.

sua sponte

Given

these

adhere to my reading of Sanders that the

fact that the container was seized from an automobile
irrelevant to the question whether a warrant is needed
search its contents. Some future case offering opportunity
for more thorough consideration of the basic principles at
I
I

risk may offer some better,
the

confusion

that

infects

if more radical solution to
this

beknighted

rea of

the

law.
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JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the Court's judgment because I believe that
petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
opaquely wrapped and sealed package in the rear compartent of his automobile. I cannot join the Court's opiuion
because 1t
require officers to obtain warrants in order
to examine t e contents of insubstantial coHtainers in which
no one had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court's
approach strains the rationales of our prior cases and imposes
substantial burdens on law enforcement without vindicating
any significv..nt values of privacy.

I
Petitioner does not argue that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the officers from searching thoroughly the interior of
his station wagon. The officers had smelled and seen marihuana within the passenger compartmeHt aud thus had probable cause
~eftFe~iR~ the remainder~ of the automobile,
including the recessed luggage compartmei'1t in the rear of the
station wagon. We have held in numerous cases that police
need not obtain a warrant to search an automobile when they
have probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will
be found therein, both because an automobile is inherently
mobile and because drivers enjoy only a limited privacy int erest in the interior of an automobile. See, e. g., .Y.nitmi

*''
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ates v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 12-13 (1977 ; South Dakota

v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 367 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U. S. 583, 590 (1967); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S.
433, 441-442 (1973) i Carroll v.~United States, 267 U. S. 132 1
,1
(1925). See~ lso f&co/t~ft'
( ll'b't- ~h "'Juh~noiJ/1~ ('2-!e; b
Sf ,.,.1~{/tc~tA~e rJfPI}I(Jp/
P

.f't

~

-{(;~

(IY'f

il'r-

The Court today extends the Warrant Clauses of the Fourth t .P
f/o.j'C
Amendment to every "closed, opaque container," without reJ.f
U
gard to size, shape or whether common experience would sug- ~
~ -~)
gest that the owner was asserting a privacy interest in the I"' f: h(' J
"'' 1 'I ,
contents. 1 The Court relies primarily on United States v.
Chad'wick, supra, and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. T
'S'U j)P~
(1979). Neither decision · · s today's ho mg. The
!I
ormer case mvolved a oot ocker, the latter a suitcase. Each
decision emphasized that a search of personal luggage implicated significant privacy interests separate from and superior to those raised by the search of the automobile.
stressed that luggage functions "as a repository for personal
effects." United States v. Chadwic~Asupra, at 13; see Ar- f=-kansas v. Sanders, supra, at 764. Personal luggage carries
r-----t~h~e6
p~
ri~
v~
ac~y:_;of the home onto the public highway and is en~
-----title
protections of the Fourth Amendment.
"By placing personal effects withiu a double-locked
footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that
the contents would remain free from public examination.
No less than one who locks the doors of his home against
intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions in
this manner is due the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause." United States v. Chadwick,
sup·ra, at 11.

f4

t fo

,.(s

''re

The term "container," used hen>in for ronvrnirnrP, illClndt·~. in aC"rordance with the Court's usage, any and all boxrs, bags, tins, bottle~ and
the like, regardless of size, shape, or customary function. The Com! would
exempt from the broad reach of its opinion only those "clo~ed, opaque
containers" where the "contents may be said to be in plaitWiew." Ante,
at 6, 7.
)
1

--::/::/:=-
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a _(pttft?ctJtlo~

We concluded that 11 a person's privacy ~n personal
luggage are substantially greater than
an automobile."
United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 13.
I read Chadwick and Sanders to require police to obtain a
warrant to search the contents of a container only when the
container is one that generally serves as a repository for personal effects or that has been sealed in a manner manifesting
a reasonable expectation that the contents will not be open
to public scrutiny. See, e. g., United States v. Mannino, 635
F. 2d 110, 114 (CA2 1980); United States v. Goshorn 62
F. 2d 697, 700-701 (CAl 1980); nited States v. ackey, 626
F. 2d 684, 687-688 (CA9 1980); United Slates v. Ross, - U. S. App. D. C. - , F. 2d - , (1981) (en bane)
(Tamm, J., dissenting). This resembles in principle the inquiry courts must undertake to determine whether a search
violates the Fourth Amendment rights of a complaining party.
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 (1978); id., at 150-152
(PowELL, J., concurring). In each instance, "[t]he ultimate
question ... is whether one's claim to privacy from gowrnment intrusion is reasonable in light of the surroundin~ circumstances." Ibid.; see Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347
(1967). 2
The Court' approach today departs from this basic concern
with interests in privacy, and adopts a mechanical require-

'il1

L

~This case does not present the question whether police need probable
cause to search the contents of a container not entitled to the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. It could be argued that if the defendant
lacks a substantial expectation of privacy in some particular container, the
Fourth Amendment is simply inapplicable' to police' C'xuminntion of its
contents. Cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979). Nonetheless ,
it is apparent that the Court has inquired into the nature of a defendant 's
privacy interest, not just its existence, to determine the extent of protection the Fourth Amendment provides. See, e. g., Cardwell"· Lewis, 417
U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion) (reduced C'Xpeetation of privn<'y
in a car); Umted States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311, 316 (1972) (recluecd
l_}xpectatiou of pdvary in regulated business premisrs) . ~

- ~~~~~74t

~ ~ trtJ~ C4~t

~~
'_1;
/)A-~~
._}

~~··

ervod t; ~ .j/A JJ

() {2
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ment for a warrant before police may search any closed con.,
tainer. Nothing in Chadwick or Sanders justifies this ex.,
, treme extension of the warrant requirement. Indeed, the
Court in Sanders explicitly foreclosed that reading: 3
"There will be difficulties in determining which parcels
taken from an automobile require a warrant for their
search and which do not. Our decision in this case
means only that a warrant generally is required before
personal luggage can be searched and that the extent to
which the Fourth Amendment applies to contaiuers and
other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are
seized from an automobile." 442 U. S., at 765, n. 13.
While the Court's blanket warrant requirement does not
even purport to protect any privacy interest, it imposes substantantial new burdens on law enforcement. Confronted
with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course of a probable
caus0 search of an automobile for narcotics, the conscientious
policeman will take the object to a magistrate, fill out the
appropriate forms, await the decision. and finally obtain the
warrant. Suspects or vehicles normally will be detained while
the warrant is sought. This process may J.ake hours, removing the officer from his normal-pa~ duties. Expenditure of such time and effort, drawn from the public's limited
resources for detecting or preventing crimes. is justified when
it protects an individual's reasonable Jrivacy mtere~ts. In
my view, the Court's requirement canno be so justified. The
aggregate burden of procuring warrants whenever an officer
~ has probable cause to search the most trivial container may

(td),C.e
~,/

'?J tJ'IIA I r, t'

a I agree with the Court's rrading of footnote 13 of SandeTs, so far as
that reading goes. Ante, at - . No expectation of riv r
es
a container that by its form or labrl proclaim~ i eoutents. But 8andet'S
dealt only with luggage, and footnote 13 must be read in that context .
The footnote cannot fairl y be read to extend the protection of the
Warrant Clause beyond the functional equivalent of luggage.

.,

.,·. ..;.
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·be heavy and will not be compensated by the advancement
of important Fourth Amendment values.
The Court undertakes to justify its sweeping warrant requirement by invoking a perceived necessity for easily applicable criteria. This rationale puts the cart before the horse,
and invites the criticism that a brighter line can be fashioned
b not re uiring a warrant for the search of any containers.
See post, at
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Our quest
should not be for simple criteria in the first instance, but for
a general rule rooted in the policies and purposes of the
Fourth Amendment The infinite variety of what may be
ransported 111
e trnnk of an automobile renders futile the
search for a "bright line" rule that would "safeguard both
·F ourth Amendment rights and the public interest in a fair
and effective criminal justice system.'' Rakas v. Illinois,
supra, 439 U. S .. at 157-158 (FowELL, J.. concurring). See
Arkansas v. Sa,nders, supra, 442 U. S .. at 768 (BuR()ER. C. J.,
concl'rring).

B
The Court overestimates the difficulties involved in determining whether a party has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular container. Many containers. such as
personal luggage. are "inevitably associated with the expec.yt4~Ji t~e
~ation of privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders, supra. at 762.
~ .1
I
· ~h rTY Jltbers, k arying from a plastic cup to the ub;quitous
~I(;( ~n rA
· hrown - a per grol'e v sack, consistently lack such an associar>!Decit u~ tion . In the llll( e are coutainers. such as ardboar boxes
...J/
and laundry bags. that may be used. althoug
repositories of personal effects but oftPn re not. __::..::.:;;...;..;:...~-

tL e

" fWle disagrPe that the mere possibility of S"Ch use
eads to the conclusion that such containers are "inevitably" associated with an expectation of privacy. The
many and varied uses of these containns that entail no
('xpectation of privacy militate against applying a pre-

'•
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sumption that a warrantless search of such a container
violates the Fourth Amendment." United States v.
Goshorn, supra, 628 F. 2d. at 700.
When confronted with the claim that police should have obtained a warrant before searching an ambiguous container,
a court should conduct a hearing to determine whether the
defendant had manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of the container. See id., at 701. Relevant
to such an inquiry should be the size. shape, material, and
condition of the exterior, the context within which it is discovered. and whether the possessor had taken some significant
precaution, such as securely sealing or binding the container,
that indicates a desire to prevent the contents from being
displayed upon simple mischance. A prudent officer will err
on the side of respecting ambiguous assertions of privacy, see
Ralws v. Illinois, supra, 439 U. S., at 152, n. 1 (PowEL~
concurring), and a realistic court seldom should second~ss ..___
the good faith judgment of the officer in the field when the
public consequently must suffer from the suppression of probative evidence. cf. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 611-:612
(1975) (PQWELoL, J., concurring).

II
These principles may be applied easily to the facts of this
case. We deal here with a sealed. rectangular package
wrapped in green opaque plastic. Examining a photograph,
the dissenter below saw "a package that had been tightly
wrapped for shipment by mail. or to protect its contents, or
for both purposes." 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 44; see ante, at
- , n. 1. The owner thus had manifested a desire that the
public at large JJOt casually observe the contents, even when
the package is subject to rough haudling. Our society's tra1 wua respect or t e pnvacy o seale
con nns
the reasonableuess of such expectations. This ourt long ago
recognized that the Fourth Amendment requires postal in ..
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spectors to obtain a warrant before examining the contents
of sealed packages to determine whether there has been a viof postal regulations. Ex parte Jackson, 97 U. S. 727,
78). The Court then stated:
"Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail
are as fully guarded from examination and inspection,
except as to their outward form and weight, as if they
were retained by the parties forwarding them in their
domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right of
the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus
closed against inspection, wherever they may be." Ibid.
See also United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
Petitioner's securely wrapped and sealed package cannot lose
constitutional protection because he transported it in his car
rather than sent it in the mail or left it at home. See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U. S., at 764-765.
Fourth Amendment adjudication requires courts to apply
the broadest of principles to eve varymg facts. While clarity of decision is desirable, particularly where an officer must
make speedy evaluations of circumstances. see United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); New York v. Belton,U. S . - (1981)/ the search for bright liue rules threatens to
4 I have joined the Court's opinion in New York v. Belton, U. S.
(1981), announced today, because I concluded that a "bright line"
rule was necessary in the quite different circumstances addressed there.
Belton, unlike this case, involves the exception to the warrant requirement
for a search incident to arrest . It presents the volatile and fluid situation
of an encounter between an arresting officer and a suspect apprehended
on the public highway. Whilr Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969),
determines in principle thr scope of a warrantless search incident to
arrest, practical rcessit ' rrquires that we allow an officer in these circumstances to ecure thoroughly the automobile without requiring him in
haste and un er prrssure to rna ·e close calculations about danger to himself or the vulnerability of evidence.
Any "bright line" rule involves costs. Belton trades marginal privacy·

F
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divorce practice from pr:inciple and reduce our reasoning to
pigeonholing. Although I recognize the difficulties an officer
in the field often may have distinguishing between those containers requiring a warrant and those not, see Arkansas v.
Sanders, supra, 442 U.S., at 772 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting),
I think this problem is an unavoidable cost of adherence to
the principles that give the Fourth Amendment its significance.
In sum, I would hold that the Fourth Amendment requires
an officer to obtain a warrant before searching a container
only when the container is one that customarily serves as a
repository for personal effect~ or when the circumstances indicate that the defendant has a reasonable expectation that
the contents will not be open to public scrutiny. The
wrapped and sealed package involved in this case plainly falls
within the second category. Accordingly, I agTee with the
Court's conclusion that the judgment below should be reversed.

strongly favors the Court's rule. The occupants of an automobile enjoy
only a limited expectation of privacy in the interior of the automobile
itself. See supra, at - : see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (PowELL, J ., concurring) . This limited interest is
diminished further when the occupants are placed under custodial arrest..
Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 237 (1973) (PowELL, J.,
concurring) . Immediately prPcedi11g the arrest, the passengers have complete control over the entire interior of the automobi!P, a11d can place
loose weapons or contraba11d into pochts or other containers as the officer
approaches. Thus, pmrticnlly spraking, it i~ difficult t;o juHtify varying
degrt>es of protection for various container,; and the general interior of the
car. The;;e considerations do not apply to the trunk of the rar, which is
not within the control of the pa~~engers eit!H'r immeuiately before or
during the pro.ce;;a Olf arreat.

,.

o: The Chief Ju'3 ice
Mr. Justic• .tlr ,.1nd.,,
Mr. Just t eo Stewart
Mr. J ust ce Wh i.te
Mr. J Ut~t ~ oe •.1.rshall
Mr. Just 4 "'e Blackmun
Mr. J ustl " Rohnquist
Mr. JU<=JtJ ce Stevens
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JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the Court's judgment because I believe that
petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
opaquely wrapped and sealed package in the rear compar•tment of his automobile. I cannot join the Court's opinion
because it could require officers to obtain warrants in ordPr
to examine the contents of insubstantial containers in which
no one had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court's
approach strains the rationales of our prior cases and imposes
f!ubstantial burdens on law enforcement without vindicating
any significant values of privacy.

I
Petitioner does not argue that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the officers from searching thoroughly the interior of
his station wagon. The officers had smelled and seen marihuana within the passenger compartment and thus had probable cause to search the remainder of the automobile, including the recessed luggage compartment in the rear of the station wagon. We have held in numerous cases that police
need not obtain a warrant to search an automobile when they
have probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will
be found therein, both because an automobile is inherently
mobile and because drivers enjoy only a limited privacy in terest in the interior of an automobile. See, e. g., South
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Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 367 1975); Cardwell v,
Le'Wis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1967); Cady v. Dombrowski, 41~
U.S. 433, 441-442 (1973); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925). See also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. \
1, 12-13 (1977) (not an "automobile case"; probable cause
ri11ened before the footlocker was placed in th~ automobile).

A
The Court today extends the Warrant Clauses of the Fourth
Arnenument to every "closed, opaque container," without regard to size, shape or whether common experience would suggest that the owner was asserting a privacy iuterest in thtl
contents. 1 The Court relies primarily on United States v.
Chadwick, s·upra, and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 75:1
(1979). Neither decision supports touay's holdiug. The
former case involved a footlocker secured by two vadlock::;, f
the latter a suitcase. Each decision emphasized that a search
of personal luggage implicated significant privacy iuterest::;
separate from and superior to those raised by the search of
the automobile. We stressed that luggage functious "as a
repository for personal efi'ects." United States v. Chadwick,
,-upra, at 13; see Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, at 764. PerJSonalluggage carries the privacy of the home onto the public
highway and is entitled to the full protection of the Fourth J
Amendment.
"By placing personal effects within a double-lockeJ
footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that
the contents would remain free from public examination.
No less than one who locks the doors of his home against
intruders, one who safeguards his personal posses~:>ions in
1 Th e term "container," used herein for <·onvpnirncc, irH:lutl!'~> , in lt C·
cordance with the Court's usag<', nny and all boxri:l, bags, tius, bottles and
th e likP, rcgardle,;s of ~ize, ~hape, or cul:ltomary function. The Court would
C>.Pmpt from the broad reach of its opinion only those "clo,;t·d, opaque
wntain ~: r~' where the ' ' cont ent ~ may be said to be in plaiu vi<'ll' ." Anle,
at ~' 7.
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this manner is due the protection of the Fourth Amend ..
ment Warrant Clause." United States v. Chadwick,
supra, at 11.
We concluded that "a person's privacy expectations of in per~
sonal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile." United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 13.
I read Chadwick and Sanders to require police to obtain a
warrant to search the contents of a container only when the
container is one that generally serves as a repository for personal effects or that has been sealed in a manner manifesting
a reasonable expectation that the contents will not be open
to public scrutiny. See, e. g., United States v. Manni:no, 635
F. 2d 110, 114 (CA2 1980); United States v. Goshorn, 628
F. 2d 697, 700-701 (CAl 1980); United States v. Mackey, 626
F. 2d 684, 687-688 (CA9 1980); United States v. Ross, U. S. App. D. C. - , - F . 2d - , (1981) (en bane)
(Tamm, J., dissenting). This resembles in principle the inquiry courts must undertake to determine whether a search
violates the Fourth Amendment rights of a complaining party.
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 (1978); id., at 150-152
(PowELL, J., concurring). In each instance, "[t]he ultimate
question ... is whether one's claim to privacy from govern~
ment intrusion is reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances." Ibid.; see Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347
(1967). 2
1 This case does not present the question whether police need probable
cause to search the contents of a container not entitled to the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. It could be argued that if the clefrndant
lacks a substantial expectation of privacy in some particular container, the
Fourth Amendment i~:~ simply inapplicable to police examination of its
contents. Cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979). Nonetheless,
it is apparent that the Court has inquired into the nature of a defendant'
privacy interest, not just its existence, to determine the extent of pr~
tection the Fourth Amendment provides. See, e. g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion) (reduced expectation of privacy
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The Court' approach today departs from this basic concen1
with interests in privacy, and adopts a rnechauical require~
ment for a warrant before police may search any closed con~
tainer. Nothing in Chadwick or Sanders justifies this ex ..
treme extension of the warrant requirement. Indeed, the
Court in Sanders explicitly foreclosed that reading: s
"There will be difficulties in determining· which parcels
taken from an automobile require a warrant for their
search and which do . not. Our decision · in this case
means only that a warrant generally is required before
personal luggage can be searched and that the extent to
which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and
other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are
seized from an automobile." 442 U. S., at 765, n. 13.
While the Court's blanket warrant requirement dues not
even purport to protect any privacy interest, it imposes substantantial new burdens on law enforcement. Confronted
with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course of a probable
cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the conscientiou:s
policeman will take the object to a magistrate, fill out thr
appropriate forms, await the decision. and fiually obtain the
warrant. Suspects or vehicles normally will be detained while
the warrant ·is sought. This process may take hours, removing the officer from his normal police duties. Exoenditure of such time and effort, cJrawn from the public's limiteJ
resources for detecting or preventing crimes. is justified when
I

l

in a car); United State~ v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311, 316 (ln72) (reductd
expectation of privacy in regulated business premises).
Hespond:nt also does nut argue that Jletitiuner_ cuusenteu to _the seank \
As a practical matter, consent to searclt ufteu wlll Le fn·ely g:tven .
3 I agree with the Court's reading of footnote 13 of Sanders. so far as
that reading goes. Ante, at - . No expectation of privacy attnehes to
n container that IJy its form or label proclaims its cont<·nb. Hut SunderJ
dt•alt only with luggage, and footuote 13 must be read in that eontext.
The footnote cannot fairly be read to extend the protection of i hO"
Warnwt Clause beyond the. functional cquivnlrnt of luggnge.
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H protects an individual's reasonable and geuuine privacy in- J
terests. In my view, the Court's requirement cannot be so
justified. The aggregate burden of procuring warrants wheuever an officer has probable cause to search the most trivial
container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the
advancement of important Fourth Amendment :values.
The Court undertakes to justify its sweeping warrant requirement by invoking a perceived necessity for easily applicable criteria. This rationale puts the cart before the horse,
and invites the criticism that a brighter line can be fashioned
by not requiring a warrant for the search of any containers.
See post, at (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Our quest
should not be for simple criteria in the first instance, but for
a general rule rooted in the policies and purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, .'~tich tam 6ii teiGimall 1 I!Oil. The in-!
finite variety of what may be transported in the trunk of an
automobile renders futile the search for a "bright line" rule
that would 11 safeguard both Fourth Amendment rights and
the public interest in a fair and effective criminal j 11stice
system ." Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U. S .. at 157-158
(PowELL, .J., concurring). See Arkansas v. Sauders, supra.
442 U. S., at 768 (BUROEH , C. .J., concurring).

c_ n
The Court overestimates the difficulties in volvcd w deter·m ining whether a party has a reasonable expectatiou of privacy in a particular container. Many contaiuers, such as
personal luggage, are "inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders, s·upra, at 762.
Others, at the opposite ell( I of the spectrum, varying from a
,___~
• .\stQntly lrieh s~lr 'ali associatien. -In the 1ttiddle art• eonsistently luck such as association. In the middle are eontainers, such as certain cardboard boxes and lauudry !Jags.
that may be used. although imperfectly, as repositories of
personal effects. But often they are uot. As to such eoiit.ainPrs, I would adopt thr view of Chid Judge Coffin:
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"[W]e disagree that the mere possibility of such use
leads to the conclusion that such containers are "inevitably" associated with an expectation of privacy. The
many and varied uses of these containers that entail no
expectation of privacy militate against applying a presumption that a warrantless search of such a container
violates the Fourth Amendment." United State& v.
Goshorn, supra, 628 F. 2d, at 700.
When confronted with the claim that police should have obtained a warrant before searching an ambiguous container,
a court should conduct a hearing to determine whether the
defendant had manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of the container. See id., at 701. Relevant
to such an inquiry should be the size, shape, material, and
condition of the exterior, the context within which it is discovered, and whether the possessor had taken some significant
precaution, such as securely sealing or binding the container,
that indicates a desire to prevent the contents from being
displayed upon simple mischance. A prudent officer will err
on the side of respecting ambiguous assertions of privacy, see
Rakas v. lll·inois, supra, 439 U. S., at 152, n. 1 (PowELL, J.,
concurring) , and a realistic court seldom should second-guess
the good faith judgment of the officer in the field when the
public consequently must suffer from the suppression of probative evidence, cf. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 611-611
(1975) (POWEJ..L, J., concurrin • .

These principles may be applied easily to the facts of this
tase. We deal here with a sealed, rectangular package
wrapped in green opaque plastic. Examining a photograpp,
the dissenter below saw "a package that had been tight1y
wrapped for shipment by mail, or to protect its contents, or
for both purposes." 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 44; see ante, at
- , n. 1. 'fhe owner thus h~q manifested a desire that thl'
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public at large not casually observe the contents, even when
the package is subject to rough handling. Our society's traditional re::;pect for the privacy of locked or sealed containers
confirms the rcasouableness of such expectations. This Court
long ago recognized that the Fourth Amendment requires
postal inspectors to obtain a warrant before :examining the
contents of sealed packages to determine whether there hae
been a violation of postal regulations. Ex parte Jacksun, 9Y
U. S. 727, 7a3 (1878). The Court then stated:
"Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail
nre as fully guarded from examination and inspection,
fxcept as to their outward form and weight, as if they
were retained by the parties forwardiug them in their
domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right o!
tl1e people to be secure in their papers agai11st unreason ...
~Lle searches and seizures extends to their papers, thu~
closed ayainst inspection, wherever they may be." lbid.
St~e also United States v. llan Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
Petitioner's securely wrapped and sealed package cannot lost~
constitutional protection because he transported it in his car
raLher than sent it in the mail or left it at home. See Arknnllas v. Sanders, S'Upra, 442 U. S.. at 764-765.
Fourth A1neudmcnt adjudication requires courts to apply
the broauest of principles to ever-varying facts. While clarity of decision is desirable. particularly where an officer must.
make speedy evaluations of circumstances, see Un·i ted State!"
v. Rul>iusou, 414 U. S. 218 (1973); New York v. Beltou, - U. S.- (1981),4 the search for bright line rules threatens tQ
-1 I lmvc joinc·d the Court's opinion in New Ym·k v. Belton, U. S.
(1981), annuunct-d today, l,N·ausc I ronclud(·d that. a. "bright lin€',..
rulo was necp&;ary iu the quit(• difl'rreut circum~tnnce:' arldrc~~ed then•.
Brllun, unlike thi~ c·a~:;e, involvrs thP Pxception to thr warrant requirPment.
for a. ~Parch incidPnt to arre::,t. lt prrscnt::, til(• volatilr and fluid situation
of an t•m·ounter between an :llTC·~t ing officer and a su~JJL•ct apprPiwndetr
em thP public hi~hll'ny. Wl\ill' Cliimel' v. Califomia. :ms U.S. 752 (J9(i!1), .

I
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divorce practice from principle and reduce our reasoning to
pigeonholing. Although I recognize the difficulties an officer
in the field often may have distinguishing between those containers requiring a warrant and those not, see Arkansas v.
Sanders, supra, 442 U.S., at 772 (BLACKMUN, J ., dissenting),
I think thls problem is an unavoidable cost of adherence to
the principles that give the Fourth Amendment its significance.
In sum, I would hold that the Fourth Amendment requires
an officer to obta.in a warrant before searching a container
only when the container is one that customarily serves as a
repository for personal effects, or when the circumstances indicate that the defendant has a reasonable expectation that
the contents will not be open to public scrutiny. The
wrapped and sealed package involved in this case plainly falls
within the second category. Accordingly, I a.gree with the
Court's conclusion that the judgment below should be reversed.
determines in principle the scope of a warrantless search incident to
arrest, practical necessity requires that we allow an officer in these circumstances to thoroughly secure the automobile without requiring him in
haste and under pressure to make close calculations about danger to himself or the vulnerability of evidence.
Any "bright line" rule involve_s costs. Belton trades marginal privacy
of containers within the passenger area of an automobile for protection of
the officer and of destructible evidence. The balance of these interel:lts
strongly favors the Court's rule. The occupants of an automobile enjoy
only a limited expectation of privacy in the interior of the automobile
itself. See supra, at - ; see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (PowELL, .T., concurring). This limited interest is
diminished further when the occupants are placed under custodial arrest.
Cf. United States v. Robin.son, 414 U. S. 218, 237 (1973) (PowELL, J .,
concurring). Immediately preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control over the entire interior of the automobile, and can place
loose weapons or contraband into pockets or other containers as the officer
approaches. Thus, practically speaking, it is difficult to justify varying
degrees of protection for various containers and the general interior of the
car. These considerations do not apply to the trunk of the car, which is
not within the control of the passengers either immediately before or
during the process of arrest.

Xo: The Chief Justice
r. Justice Brennan
r. Justice Stewart
Justice White
Mr. Juatioe Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Mr. Justice Stevens

rrom: Mr. Justice Powell
C1roulated:

-----
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
The Court's

judgment

is

justified,

though

not

compelled, by the Court's opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders,
442

u.s.

the

Court

756

(1979). Accordingly, I join the judgment. As

today

goes

well

beyond

Sanders or

any other

prior case to establish a new "bright line" rule, I cannot
join

its

opinion. 1

It

would

require

officers

to obtain

warrants in order to examine the contents of insubstantial
containers in which no one had a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
our

prior

The Court's approach strains
cases

and

imposes

the

substantial

rationales
burdens

of

on law

1
The Court's "bright-line" rule would extend the
warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment to every "closed,
opaque container," without regard to size, shape or
whether common experience would suggest that the owner was
asserting a privacy interest in the contents. The Court
would exempt from the broad reach of its rule only those
"closed, opaque contiainers" where, because of shape or
some other characteristic,
the "contents may be said to
be in plain view." In accordance with the Court's usage I
use the term "container" to include any and all packages,
bags, boxes, tins, bottles and the like.

2.

enforcement without vindicating any significant values of
privacy. I nevertheless concur in the judgment because the
manner in which the package at issue was carefully wrapped
and sealed evidenced petitioner's expectation of privacy
in its contents. As wehave stressed in prior decisions, a
central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is

to safeguard

reasonable expectations of privacy.
Having

reached

this

this case, I recognize

decision

on

the

facts

of

as the dissenting opinions find

it easy to proclaim -- that the law of search and seizure
with respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing. The
Court

apparently cannot

agree even on what

it has

held

previouly, let alone on how these cases should be decided.
Much

of

this

difficulty

comes

applying the general command of
ever-varying

facts;

more

may

from

necessity

of

the Fourth Amendment

to

stem

the

from

the

unpalatable consequences of the exclusionary rule,

often
which

spur the Court to reduce its analysis to simple mechanical
rules so that the constable has a fighting chance not to
blunder.

u.s.

This case and New York v. Belton,
(1981),

decided

today,

involve

three

different

Amendment questions regarding automobiles:

(A)

Fourth

the scope

3.

of the search incident to arrest on the public highway;
(B) whether officers must obtain a warrant when they have
probable cause to search a particular container in which
the suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy; and,
(C) the scope of the "automobile exception" to the warrant
requirement, which potentially includes all areas of the
car and containers found therein. These issues frequently
are

intertwined,

suggest:

both

as

the

involve

similar

the

stop

facts
of

an

of

these

cases

automobile

upon

probable cause, the arrest of the occupants, the search of
the

automobile,

and

the

search of

a

personal

container

found therein. Nonetheless, the cases have been litigated
and

presented

to

us

under

entirely

different

theories.

Intelligent analysis cannot proceed unless the issues are
addressed separately. Viewing similar facts from entirely
different perspectives need not lead to identical results.
A.
I
because

I

have

joined

concluded

the

that

Court's
a

opinion

"bright

line"

in

Belton

rule

was

necessary in the quite different circumstances addressed
there. 2

Belton,

unlike

this

case,

concerns

only

Footnote(s) 2 appear on following page(s).

the

4.

exception to the warrant requirement for a search incident
to

arrest;

contrary
the

officer

to

Justice

courts

had probable cause

Stevens's

below

never

implication,

found

that

the

to search the automobile.

It

presents the volatile and fluid situation of an encounter
between an arresting officer and a suspect apprehended on
the public highway. While Chimel v. California,
752

(1969),

determines

in

principle

the

u.s.

395

scope

of

a

warrantless search incident to arrest, practical necessity
requires that we allow an officer in these circumstances
to secure thoroughly the automobile without requiring him
in

haste

and

under

pressure

to make

close

calculations

about danger to himself or the vulnerabilty of evidence.
Any
Belton

"bright

line"

rule

trades marginal privacy of

passenger

area

of

an

automobile

does

involve

costs.

containers within
for

protection

of

the
the

officer and of destructable evidence. The balance of these
interests strongly favors the Court's rule. The occupants
of

an

automobile

enjoy

only

a

limited

expectation

of

2 The one significant factual difference is that
Belton involved only the passenger compartment
(the
"interior") of an automobile, whereas this case involves
the search of the functional equivelent of the trunk.

5.

privacy

in

the

interior

Almeida-Sanchez
(1973) (Powell,
diminished

v.

of

United

the

States,

concurring).

J.,

further

when

automobile

the

413

itself.

U.S.

See

266,

279

This limited interest is

occupants

are

placed

under

custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218,

237

(1973) (Powell,

concurring).

J.,

Immediately

preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control
over the entire interior of the automobile, and can place
loose

weapons

containers
speaking,

as

or

contrband

the

officer

into

pockets

approaches.

it is difficult to

or

Thus,

other

practically

justify varying degrees of

protection for various containers and the general interior
of the car. These considerations do not apply to the trunk
of

the

car,

which

is

not

within

the

control

of

the

passengers either immediately before or during the process
of arrest.
B.
Although petitioner Robbins was arrested, this
case

was

officers

litigated
needed

wrapped container

a

only

on

warrant
in

the

to

rear

the

question

open

a

whether

sealed,

compartment

wagon. The Court treats this situation as

of

the

opaquely
a

station

identical with

that in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), and

6.

Sanders, supra, which addressed warrantless searches of a
double-locked

footlocker

respectively.
concerns

Thus,

itself

requiring

a

the

and

warrant

opinion

Court's

primarily
for

with
their

personal

the

kinds

search

luggage

in

this

of

containers

when

police

case

have

probable cause to search them, and where there has been no
arrest.

For

reasons

explained more

fully

below,

I

will

share the Court's assumption that the police had probable
cause to search the container rather than the automobile
generally. Viewing this as a "container case," I concur in
the judgment.
Chadwick and Sanders require police to obtain a
warrant to search the contents of

a container only when

the container is one that generally serves as a repository
for personal effects or that has been sealed in a manner
manifesting

a

reasonable

expectation

that

the

contents

will not be open to public scrutiny. See Chadwick, supra,
at 13; Sanders, supra, at 764. See, e.g., United States v.
Mannino,

635 F.2d 110,

114

(CA2 1980);

United States v.

Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697, 700-01 (CAl 1980), United States v.
Mackey, 626 F.2d 684, 687-88 (CA9 1980); United States v.
Ross,

F.2d

dissenting).

This

(CADC
resembles

in

1981) (en

bane) (Tamm,

principle

the

J.

inquiry

7.

courts

must

violates

undertake

the

Fourth

to

determine

Amendment

whether

rights

of

a

a

search

complaining

party. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978; id., at
150-152
"[t]he

(Powell,
ultimate

concurring).

J.,

question

is

In

whether

each

instance,

one's

claim to

privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in light
of the surrounding circumstances." Id; see Katz v. United
States, 389

u.s.

The
basic

Court's

concern

mechanical
search
Sanders

347 (1967).

with

approach

interests

requirement

any

closed

justifies

requirement.

for

today
in

a

departs

privacy,

warrant

container.

and

before

Nothing

in

this extreme extension of

Indeed,

the

Court

in

from

Sanders

this

adopts

a

police may
Chadwick

or

the warrant
explicitly

foreclosed that reading:
"There will be difficulties in determining which
parcels taken from an automobile require a
warrant for their search and which do not. Our
decision in this case means only that a warrant
generally is required before personal luggage
can be searched and that the extent to which the
Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other
parcels depends not at all upon whether they are
siezed from an automobile." 442 U.S. at 765,
n.l3.
While

the

Court's

blanket

warrant

requirement

does not even purport to protect any privacy interest, it

8.

imposes

substantial

new

burdens

on

law

enforcement.

Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course
of a probable cause search of an automobile for narcotics,
the conscientious policeman would be required to take the
object

to a magistrate,

await

the

decision,

fill out the appropriate forms,

and

finally

obtain

the

warrant.

Suspects or vehicles normally will be detained while the
warrant is sought.

This process may take hours,

removing

the officer from his normal police duties. Expenditure of
such

time

and

effort,

drawn

from

the

public's

limited

resources for detecting or preventing crimes, is justified
when

it

interests.

protects

an

In my view,

so justified.

individual's

reasonable

privacy

the Court's requirement cannot be

The aggregate burden of procuring warrants

whenever an officer has probable cause to search the most
trivial container may be heavy and will not be compensated
by the advancement of

important Fourth Amendment values.

The sole virtue of the Court's rule is simplicity.3

3

The Court overestimates the difficulties involved
in
determining
whether
a
party
has
a
reasonable
expectation of privacy in a particular container. Many
containers, such as personal luggage, are "inevitably
associated with the expectation of privacy." Arkansas v.
Sanders, supra, at 762. Many others, varying from a

9.

c.
The dissenters argue, with some justice, that the

plastic cup to the ubiquitous brown paper grocery sack,
consistently lack such an association. In the middle are
containers, such as cardboard boxes and laundry bags, that
may be used, although imperfectly, as repositories of
personal
effects,
but
often
are
not.
As
to
such
containers, I would adopt the view of Chief Judge Coffin:
[W]e disagree that the mere possibility of such
use leads to the conclusion that such containers
are "inevitably" associated with an expectation
of privacy. The many and varied uses of these
containers that entail no expectation of privacy
militate against applying a presumption that a
warrantless search of such a container violates
the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Goshorn,
supra, 628 F.2d at 700.
When confronted with the claim that police should have
obtained
a
warrant
before
searching
an
ambiguous
container, a court should conduct a hearing to determine
whether
the
defendant
had
manifested
a
reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the container.
See id., at 701. Relevant to such an inquiry should be the
size, shape, material, and condition of the exterior, the
context within which it is discovered, and whether the
possessor had taken some significant precaution, such as
locking, securely sealing, or binding the container, that
indicates a desire to prevent the contents from being
displayed upon simple mischance. A prudent officer will
err on the side of respecting ambigous assertions of
privacy, see Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S., at 152,
n.l (Powell, J., concurring), and a realistic court seldom
should second guess the good faith judgment of the officer
in the field when the public consequently must suffer from
the suppression of probative evidence, cf. Brown v.
Illinois,
422
U.S.
590,
611-612
(1975) (Powell,
J.,
concurring).

~.··.

10.

controlling question should be the scope of the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement.
the police
rather

have

than

probable

only

to

cause to search an automobile,

search

a

particular

fortuitously is located in it,
the

police

to

search

In their view, when

the

container

that

the exigencies that allow

entire

automobile

without

a

warrant support the warrantless search of every container
found therin. See post, at

(Stevens J., dissenting).

This analysis is entirely consistent with the holdings in
Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which is an
case, 11

because

search

the

respectively

the

double

pol ice

there

locked

footlocker

before either

came

had

near

11

automobile

probable
and

the

at

766

dissenters'

(Burger,

C.J.,

view would

concurring).

require,

however,

to

suitcase

an automobile.

Chadwick, supra, at 11; Sanders, supra, at 761;
id.,

cause

See

see also

Adoption of

the

rejection of

a

good deal of the reasoning in the latter case.
Resolving

this case

by expanding

the

scope

of

the automobile exception is attractive not so much for its
logical

virtue,

but

because

it

may

provide

ground

for

agreement by a majority of the presently fractured Court
on an approach that would give more specific guidance to
police and courts in this recurring situation -- one that

11.

has

led

to

incessant

litigation.

I

note,

this benefit would not be realized fully,

however,

that

as courts may

find themselves deciding when probable cause ripened, or
whether suspicion focussed on the suitcase or on the car
in which it travelled.
The

par ties

have not pressed this argument

in

this case and it is late in the Term for us to undertake
sua sponte reconsideration of basic doctrines. Given these
constraints,

I

adhere

to statements in Sanders that the

fact that the container was seized from the trunk of an
automobile is irrelevant to the question whether a warrant
is

needed

to

search

its

contents.

Some

future

case

affording an opportunity for more thorough consideration
of the basic principles at risk may offer some better, if
more radical solution to the confusion that infects this
benighted area of the law.4

4
We have an institutional res pons ibi li ty not only
to respect stare decisis but also to harmonize our views
practical
on
constitutional
questions
of
broad
application.
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jusTICE PowELL, concurring.
The Court's judgment is justified, though not compelled,
by the Court's opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 756
(1979). Accordingly, I join the judgment. As the Court
today goes well beyond Sanders or any other prior case to
establish a new "bright line" rule, I cannot join its opinion. 1
It would require officers to obtain warrants in order to examine the contents of insubstantial containers in which no
one had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court's
approach strains the rationa.les of our prior cases and imposes
substantial burdens on law enforcement without vindicating
any significant values of privacy. I nevertheless concur in
the judgment because the manner in which the package at
issue was carefully wrapped and sealed evidenced petitioner's
expectation of privacy in its contents. As we have stressed
in prior decisions, a central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard reasonable expectations of privacy.
1 The Court's "bright-line" nile would extend the warrant clause of the
Fourth Amendment to every "closed, opaque container," without regard
to s:ze, shape or whether common experience would suggest tha t the owner
was asserting a privacy interest in the contents. The Court would exempt
from the broad reach of its rule only those "closed, opaque containers"
where, because of shape or some other characteristic, the "contents may
b e said to be in plain view.;, In accordance with the Court's usage I use
the term "container" to include any and all packages, bags, boxes, tins,
bottles and the like.

80-148-eONCUR (A}
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Having reached this decision on the facts of this case, I
recognize- as the dissenting opinions find it easy to proclaim-that the law of search and seizure with respect to
automobiles is intolerably confusing. The Court apparently
cannot agree even on what it has held previously, let alone
on how these cases should be decided. Much of this difficulty
comes from the necessity of applying the general command
of the Fourth Amendment to ever-varying facts; more may
stem from the often unpalatable consequences of the exclusionary rule, which spur the Court to reduce its analysis to
simple mechanical rules so that the constable has a fighting
chance not to blunder.
This case and New York v. Belton,- U. S. (1981) ,
decided today, involve three different Fourth Amendment
questions that arise in automobile cases: (A) the scope of the
search incident to arrest on the public highway; (B) whether
officers must obtain a warrant when they have probable cause
to search a particular container in which the suspect has a
reasonable expectation of privacy; and, (C) the scope of the
"automobile exception" to the warrant requirement, which
potentially includes all areas of the car and containers found
therein. These issues frequently are intertwined, as the similar facts of these cases suggest: both involve the stop of an
automobile upon probable cause, the arrest of the occupants,
the search of the automobile, and· the search of a personal
container found therein. Nonetheless, the cases have been
litigated and presented to us under entirely different theories ..
Intelligent analysis cannot proceed· unless the issues are addressed separately. Viewing similar facts from entirely different perspectives need not lead to identical results.
A
I have joined the Court's opinion in Belton because I concluded that a "bright line" rule was necessary in the quite
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different circumstances addressed there. 2 Belton, unlike this
case, concerns only the exception to the warrant requirement
for a search incident to arrest; contrary to JusTICE STEVENS's
implication, post, at - , the courts below never found that
the officer had probable cause to search the automobile. It
presents the volatile and fluid situation of an encounter between an arresting officer and a suspect apprehended on the
public highway. While Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752
(1969), determines in principle the scope of a warrantless
search incident to arrest, practical necessity requires that we
allow an officer in these circumstances to secure thoroughly
the automobile without requiring him in haste and under
pressure to make close calculations about danger to himself
or the vulnerability of evidence.
Any "bright line" rule does involve costs. Belton trades
marginal privacy of containers within the passenger area of
an automobile for protection of the officer and of destructable
evidence. The balance of these interests strongly favors the
Court's rule. The occupants of an automobile enjoy only a
limited expectation of privacy in the interior of the automobile itself. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S.
266, 279 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring). This limited interest is diminished further when the occupants are placed
under custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414
U. S. 218, 237 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring). Immediately preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control over the entire interior of the automobile, and can place
loose weapons or contraband into pockets or other containers
as the officer approaches. Thus, practically speaking, it is
difficult to justify varying degrees of protection for various
containers and the general interior of the car. These considerations do not apply to the trunk of the car, which is not
2 The one significant factual difference is that Belton involved only the
passenger compartment (the "interior") of an automobile, whereas this
case involves search of the trunk.
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within the control of the passengers either immediately before or during the process of arrest.

B
Although petitioner Robbins was arrested, this case was
litigated only on the question whether the officers needed a
warrant to open a sealed, opaquely wrapped container in the
rear compartment of a station wagon. The Court treats this
situation as identical with that in United States v. Chadwick,
433 U. S. 1 (1977), and Sanders, supra, which addressed warrantless searches of a double-locked footlocker and personal
luggage respectively. Thus, the Court's opinion in this case
concerns itself primarily with the kinds of containers requiring a warrant for their search when police have probable cause
to search them, and where there has been no arrest. For
reasons explained more fully below, I will share the Court's
assumption that the police had probable cause to search t~e
container rather than the automobile generally. Viewing this
as a "container case," I concur in the judgment.
Chadwick and Sanders require polic~ to obta~n a warra:n t
~o search the contents of a container only when the container
is one that generally. serves as a repository for personal effects
or that has been sealed in a manner manifesting a reasonable
expectation that the contents will not be open to public scrutiny. See Chadwick, supra, at 13; Sanders, supra, at 764.
See, e. g., United States v. Mannino, 635 F. 2d 110, 114 (CA2
1980); United States v. Goshorn, 628 F. 2d 697, 700-701
(CAl 1980); United States v. Maclcey, 626 F. 2d 684, 687-688
(CA9 1980); United States v. Ross,- U. S. App. D. C.-,
- F . 2d - , - (1981) (en bane) (Ta.mm, J., dissenting).
This resembles in principle the inq1.iiry courts must undertake
to determine whether 'a search violates the Fourth Amendment rights of a complaining party. See Rakas v. Illinois,
439 u. S. 128 (1978); id., at 150-152 (POWELL, J., concurring). In each instance, "[t]he ultimate question . . . is

80-148-G0NCUR (A)
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whether one's claim to privacy from government intrusion is
reasonable ir: light of the surrounding circumstances." Ibid.,'
see Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967).
The Court' approach today departs from this basic concern
. with intere'sts in privacy, and adopts a mechanical requirement for_ a ~arrant before police may search any closed con ..
tainer. Nothing in Chadwick or'' Smiders justifies this ex~
, treme -extension of the warral1t requirement. Indeed, the
Court in Sanders explicitly foreclosed that reading:
~'There will be difficulties in determining which parcels
taken ·from an automobile req'uire a warrant for their
search a~d which · do not. Our decision in this case
mean~ ?'nly that a warrant generally is required before
personal luggage can' be searched and that the extent to
'· which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and
other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are
seized . from an automobile." 442 U. S., at 765, n. 13.

While · the ·Court's blanket warrant requirement does not
· even purport to protect any privacy interest, it imposes sub. stantantial new · burdens on law enforcement. Confronted
with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course of a probable
· cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the conscientious
policeman wonld be required to take the object to a magistratP-, fill out the appropriate forms, await the decision, and
finally obtain the warrant. Suspects or vehiclPs normally
will be deta.ined while the warrant is sought. This proress
may take hours. removing the officer from his normal police
duties. Expenditure of such time and effort, drawn from the
public's limited resources for detecting or preventing crimes,
is justified when it protects an individual's reasonable privacy
interPsts. In my view, the Court's requirement cannot be so
justified. The aggregate burden of procuring warrants whenever an officer has probable cause to search the most. trivial
container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the
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advancement of important Fourth Amendment values. The
sole virtue of the Court's rule is simplicity. 8

c
The dissenters argue, with some justice, that the controlling
question should be the scope of the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement. In their view, when the police have
probable cause to search an automobile, rather than only to
search a particular container that fortuitously is located in it,
The Court overestimates the difficulties involved in determining
whether a party has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular
container. Many containers, such as personal luggage, are "inevitably
associated with the expectation of privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders, supra,
at 762. Many others, varying from a plastic cup to the ubiquitous brown
paper grocery sack, consistently lack such a.n association. In the middle
are containers, such as cardboard boxes and laundry bags, that may be
used, although imperfectly, as repositories of personal effects, but often
are not. As to such containers, I would adopt the view of Chief Judge
Coffin:
"[W]e disagree that the mere possibility of such use leads to the conclusion that such containers are 'inevitably' associated with an expectation of privacy. The many and varied uses of these containers that entail
no expectation of privacy militate against applying a presumption that
a warrantlc~s sea rch of such a container violates the Fourth Amendment."
United States v. Goshorn, supra, 628 F. 2d, at 700.
When confronted with the claim that police should have obtained a warrant before s.earching an ambiguous container, a court should conduct a
hearing to determine whether the defendant had manifested a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the container. See id., a.t 701.
Relevant to such an inquiry should be the size, ·shape, material, and condition of the exterior, the context witl1in which it is discovered, and
whether the possessor had taken some significant precaution, such as
locking, securely sealing or binding the container, that indicates a desire
to prevent the contents from being displayed upon simple mi.;chance. A
prudent officer will err on the side of re pecting ambigous assertions of
privacy, see Ralcas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U. S., at · 152, n. 1 (PowELL, J.,
concurring), and a realistic court seldom should second guess the good
faith judgment of the officer in .the field when the public consequently
must suffer from the suppression of probative evidence, cf. Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 611-612 (1975) (PowELL, J., concurring).
3
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the exigencies that allow the police to search the entire automobile without a warrant support the warrantless search of
(STEVENS,
every container found therein. See post, at J., dissenting). This analysis is entirely consistent with the
holdings in Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which is an
"automobile case," because the police there had probable
cause to search the double locked footlocker and the suitcase
respectively before either came near an automobile. See
Chadwick, supra, at 11; Sanders, supra, at 761; see also id.,
at 766 (BuRGER, C. J., concurring). Adoption of the dissenters' view would require, however, rejection of a good deal
of the reasoning in the latter case.
Resolving this case by expanding the scope of the automobile exception is attractive not so much for its logical virtue,
but because it may provide ground for agreement by a majority of the presently fractured Court on an approach that
would give more specific guidance to police and courts in this
recurring situation-one that has led to incessant litigation.
I note, however, that this benefit would not be realized fully,
as courts may find themselves deciding when probable cause
ripened, or whether suspicion focused on the suitcase or on
the car in which it traveled.
The parties have not pressed this argument in this case and
it is late in the Term for us to undertake sua sponte reconsideration of basic doctrines. Given these constraints, I adhere to statements in Sanders that the fact that the container
was seized from the trunk of an automobile is irrelevant to
the question whether a warrant is needed to search its contents. Some future case affording an opportunity for more
thorough consideration of the basic principles at risk may
offer some better, if more radical, solution to the confusion
that infects this benighted area of the law. 4
4 We have a.n institutional responsibility not only to respect stare decisis
but also to harmonize our views on constitutional questions of broa<J.
practical ltppljcation,
·
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JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
The Court's judgment is justified, though not compelled,
·by the Court's opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 756
(1979). Accordingly, I join the judgment. As the Court
today goes well beyond Sanders or any other prior case to
establish a new "bright line" rule, I cannot join its opinion. 1
It would require officers to obtain warrants in order to examine the contents of insubstantial containers in which no
one had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court's
approach strains the rationales of our prior cases and imposes
substantial burdens on law enforcement without vindicating
any significant values of privacy. I nevertheless concur in
the judgment because the manner in which the package at
issue was carefully wrapped and sealed evidenced petitioner's
expectation of privacy in its contents. As we have stressed
in prior decisions, a central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard reasonable expectations of privacy.
1 The Court's "bright-line" rule would extend the warrant clause of the
Fourth Amendment to every "closed, opaque container," without regard
to s:ze, shape or whether common experience would suggest that the owner
was asserting a privacy interest in the contents. The Court would exempt
from the broad reach of its rule only those "closed, opaque containers"
where, because of shape or some other characteristic, the "contents may
be said to be in plain view." In accordance with the Court's usage I use
the term "container" to include any and all packages, bags, boxes, tins,
bottles and the like.
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Having reached this decision on the facts of this case, I
recognize-as the dissenting opinions find it easy to proclaim-that the law of search and seizure with respect to
automobiles is intolerably confusing. The Court apparently
cannot agree even on what it has held previously, let alone
on how these cases should be decided. Much of this difficulty
comes from the necessity of applying the general command
of the Fourth Amendment to ever-varying facts; more may
stem from the often unpalatable consequences of the exclusionary rule, which spur the Court to reduce its analysis to
simple mechanical rules so that the constable has a fighting
chance not to blunder.
U. S. (1981),
This case and New York v. Belton, decided today, involve three different Fourth Amendment
questions that arise in automobile cases: (A) the scope of the
search incident to arrest on the public highway; (B) whether
officers must obtain a warrant when they have probable cause
to search a particular container in which the suspect has a
reasonable expectation of privacy; and, (C) the scope of the
"automobile exception" to the warrant requirement, which
potentially includes all areas of the car and containers found
therein. These issues frequently are intertwined, as the similar facts of these cases suggest: both involve the stop of an
automobile upon probable cause, the arrest of the occupants,
the search of the automobile, and · the search of a personal ·
container found therein. Nonetheless, the cases have been
litigated and presented ·to us under entirely different theories.
Intelligent analysis cannot proceed ·unless the issues are ad~
dressed separately. Viewing similar facts from entirely different perspectives need not lead to identical results.
A
I have joined the Court's opinion in Belton because I 'con• .
eluded that a "bright li'ne" ·rule was necessary in the quite ·
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different circumstances addressed there

3

Belton, unlike this

~ncerns only the exception to the w
t
~earch incident to arrest; contrary to JusTICE STEVENS's

implication, post, at - , the courts below never found that
the officer had probable cause to search the automobile. .It-,(
presents the volatile and fluid situation of an encounter between an arresting officer and a suspect apprehended on the
public highway. While Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752
{1969) , determines in principle the scope of a warrantless
search incident to arrest, practical necessity requires that we
allow an officer in these circumstances to secure thoroughly
the automobile without requiring him in haste and under
pressure to make close calculations about danger to himself
or the vulnerability of evidence.
Any "bright line" rule does involve costs. Belton trades
marginal privacy of containers within the passenger area of
an automobile for protection of the officer and of destructable
evidence. The balance of these interests strongly favors the
Court's rule. The occupants of an automobile enjoy only a
limited expectation of privacy in the interior of the automobile itself. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S.
266, 279 (1973) (PowELL, J. , concurring). This limited interest is diminished further when the occupants are placed
under custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414
U. S. 218, 237 (1973) (PowELL, J. , concurring). Immediately preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control over the entire interior of the automobile, and can place
loose weapons or contraband into pockets or other containers
as the officer approaches. Thus, practically speaking, it is
difficult to justify varying degrees of protection for various
containers ~Athe general interior of the car. These considerations do not apply to the trunk of the car, which is not
2 The one significant factual difference is that B elton involved only the
passenger compartment (the "interior") of an automobile, whereas this
case involves search of the trunk.
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within the control of the passengers either immediately before or during the process of arrest.

B
Although petitioner Robbins was arrested, this case was
litigated only on the question whether the officers needed a
warrant to open a sealed, opaquely wrapped container in the
rear compartment of a station wagon. The Court treats this
situation as identical with that in United States v. Chadwick,
433 U. S. 1 (1977), and Sanders, supra, which addressed warrantless searches of a double-locked footlocker and personal
luggage respectively. Thus, the Court's opinion in this case
concerns itself primarily with the kinds of containers requiring a warrant for their search when police have probable cause
to search them, and where there has been no arrest. For
reasons explained more fully below, r will share the Courfs
assumption that the police had probable cause to search the
container rather than the automobile generally. Viewing thl.s
as a "container case," I concur in the judgment.
Chadwick and Sanders require police to obtain a warrant
to search the contents of a container only when the container
is one that generally serves as a repository for personal effects
or that has been sealed in a manner manifesting a r~asonable
expectation that the contents will not be open to public scrutiny. See ,Chadwick, supra ~ at 13; Sanders, supra, at 764.
See, e. g.. United States v. Mannino , 635 F. 2d 110. 114 (CA2
1980); United States v. Goshorn. 62S F. 2d 697, 700- 701
(CAl 1980); United States v. Mackey, 626 F. 2d 684. 687- 688
(CA9 1980); United States v. Ross,- U.S. App. D. C.-,
- F . 2d - , - (1981) (en bane) (Tamm, J., dissentin~).
This resembles in principle the inquiry courts must undertake
to determine whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment rights of a complaining party. See Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U. S. 128 (1978); id., at 150-152 (PowELL, J., concurring). In each instance, " [ t] he ultimate question . . . is
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whether on 's claim to privacy from government intrusion is
reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances." Ibid.;
see Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967).
.
The Court~pproach today departs from this basic concern
with interests in privacy, and adopts a mechanical requirement for a warrant before police may search any closed container. Nothing in Chadwick or Sanders justifies this extreme extension of the warrant requirement. Indeed, the
Court in Sande;s exp~icitly foreclosed that reading:
"There will be difficultie~ in det.ermining which parcel11
taken from an automobile require a warrant for their
search anci which do not. Our decision in this case
means only that a warrant generally is required before
personal luggage can be searched and that the extent to·
which the Fourth Amend.m ent applies to containe~s and
other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are
seized from an automobile." 442 U. S., at 765, n. 13.
While the Court's blanket warrant requirement does not
even purport to protect any privacy interest, it imposes substantantial new burdens on law enforcement. Confronted
with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course of a probable
cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the conscientious
policemfln w011ld be rrquired to take the obiect to a magistratP, fill out the appropriate forms, await the decision, and
finally obtain the warrant. Suspects or vehiclPs normally
will be detained while the warrant is sought. This proress
ma.y take hours. removing the officer from his normal police
duties. Expenditure of such time and effort, drawn from the
p11blic's limited resources for deterting or preventing crimes,
is justified when it protects an individual's reasonable privacy
interPsts. In my view, the Court's requirement cannot be so
justified. The a.ggregate burden of procuring warrants whenever an officer has probable canse to search the most. trivial
container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the
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advancement of important Fourth Amendment values.
sole virtue of the Court's rule is simplicity. 3

The

c
The dissenters argue, with some justice, that the controlling
question should be the scope of the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement. In their view, when the police have
probable cause to search an automobile, rather than only to
search a particular container that fortuitously is located in it,
3 The Court overestimates the difficulties involved in determining
whether a party has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular
container. Many containers, such as personal luggage, are "inevitably
associated with the expectation of privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders, supra,
at 762. Many others, varying from a plastic cup to the ubiquitous brown
paper grocery sack, consistently lack such an association. In the middle
are containers, such as cardboard boxes and laundry bags, that may be
used, although imperfectly, as repositories of personal effects, but often
are not. As to such containers, I would adopt the view of Chief Judge
Coffin:
"[W]e disagree that the mere possibility of such use leads to the conclusion that such containers are 'jnevitably' associated with an expectation of privacy. The many and varied uses of these containers that entail
no expectation of privacy militate against applying a presumption that
a warrantlc~s search of such a container violates the Fourth Amendment."
United States v. Goshorn, supra, 628 F. 2d, at 700.
When confronted with the claim that police should have obtained a warrant before searching an ambiguous container, a court should conduct a
hearing to determine whether the defendant had manifested a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the container. See id., at 7(ll.
Relevant to such an inquiry should be the size, shape, material, and co:r;tdition of t.he exterior, the context within which it is discovered, and
whether the possessor had taken some significant precaution, such. as
locking, securely sealing or binding the container, that indiQates a desjre
to prevent the contents from being displayed upon simple mischance. A
prudent officer will err on the side of respecting ambigous assertions of
privacy, see Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U. S., at 152, n. 1 (PowELL, J.,
concurring}, and a realistic court seldom should second guess the good
faith judgment of the officer in the field when the public consequently
must suffer from the suppression of probative evidence, cf. Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 611-612 (1975) (PowELL, J., concurring).

J
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the exigencies that allow the police to search the entire automobile without a warrant support the warrantless search of
(STEVENS,
every container found therein. See post, at J., dissenting). This analysis is entirely consistent with the
holdings in Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which is an
"automobile case," because the police there had probable
cause to search the double locked footlocker and the suitcase
respectively before either came near an automobile. See
Chadwick, supra, at 11; Sanders, supra, at 761; see also id.,
at 766 (BURGER, C. J., concurring). Adoption of the dissenters' view would require, however, rejection of a good deal
of the reasoning in the latter case.
Resolving this case by expanding the scope of the automobile exception is attractive not so much for its logical virtue,
but because it may provide ground for agreement by a majority of the presently fractured Court on an approach that
would give more specific guidance to police and courts in this
recurring situation-one that has led to incessant litigation.
I note, however, that this benefit would not be realized fully,
as courts may find themselves deciding when probable cause
ripened, or whether suspicion focused on the sui.tgase~or on
the car in which it traveled.
The parties have not pressed this argument in this case and
it is late in the Term for us to undertake sua sponte reconsideration of basic doctrines. Given these constraints, I adhere to statements in Sanders that the fact that the container
was seized from ~»k of an automobile is irrelevant to
the question whether a warrant is needed to search its contents. Some future case affording an opportunity for more
thorough consideration of the basic principles at risk may
offer some better, if more radical, solution to the confusion
that infects this benighted area of the law.'

l

4 We have an institutional responsibility not only to respect stare decisis
but also to~lflr.tnonize our views on constitutional questions of broad
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JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment.
The Court's judgment is justified, though not compelled;
by the Court's opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 756
(1979). Accordingly, I join the judgment. As the plurality
today goes well beyond Sanders or any other prior case to
establish a new "bright line" rule, I cannot join its opinion. 1
It would require officers to obtain warrants in order to examine the contents of insubstantial containers in which no
(_ ~
one had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The pluralit~
approach strains the rationales of our prior cases and imposes
substantial burdens on law enforcement without vindicating
any significant values of privacy. I nevertheless concur in
.the judgment because the manner in which the package at
issue was carefully wrapped and sealed evidenced petitioner's
expectation of privacy in its contents. As we have stressed
in prior decisions, a central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard reasonable expectations of privacy.
l---------:::-12h~e~l~u~ra~li~tl) "bright-line" rule would extend the warrant clause of the

Fourth Amen ment to every "closed, opaque container," without regard
to s'ze, shape or whether common experience would suggest that the owner
was asserting a privacy interest in the contents. The plurality would exempt from the board reach of its rule only those "closed, opaque containers" where, because of shape or some other characteristic, the "contents
may be said to be in plain view." In accordance with the plurality's usage
I use the term "container" to include any and all packages, bags, boxes,
tins, bottles and the like.

·.•
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Having reached this decision on the facts of this case, I
recognize-as the dissenting opinions find it easy to proclaim-that the law of search and seizure with respect to
automobiles is intolerably confusing. The Court apparently
cannot agree even on what it has held previously, let alone
on how these cases should be decided. Much of this difficulty
comes from the necessity of applying the general command
of the Fourth Amendment to ever-varying facts; more may
stem from the often unpalatable consequences of the exclusionary rule, which spur the Court to reduce its analysis to ·
simple mechanical rules so that the constable has a fighting
chance not to blunder.
This case and New York v. B elton, U. S. (1981),
decided today, involve three different Fourth Amendment
questions that arise in automobile cases: (A) the scope of the
search incident to arrest on the public highway; (B) whether
officers must obtain a warrant when they have probable cause
to search a particular container in which the suspect has a
reasonable expectation of privacy; and, (C) the scope of the
"automobile exception" to the warrant requirement, which
potentially includes all areas of the car and containers found
therein. These issues frequently are intertwined, as the similar facts of these cases suggest: both involve the stop of an
automobile upon probable cause, the arrest of the occupants,
the search of the automobile, and the search of a personal
container found therein. Nonetheless, the cases have been
liti~ated and presented to us under entirely diff~rent theories.
Intelligent analysis cannot proceed unless the issues are addressed separately. Viewing similar facts from entirely different perspectives need not lead to identical results.
A

I have joined the Court's opinion in Belton because I con~
eluded that a "bright line" rule was necessary in the quite
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different circumstances addressed there. 2 Belton, unlike this
case, concerns only the exception to the warrant requirement
for a search incident to arrest; contrary to JusTICE STEVENS'
implication, post, at-, the courts below never found that the
officer had probable cause to search the automobile. Belton
presents the volatile and fluid · situation of an encounter between an arrestin~ officer and ·a susp~ct apprehended on the
public highway. While Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752
(1969), determines in principle the scope of a warrantless
search incident to arrest, practical necessity requires that we
allow an officer in these circumstances to secure thoroughly
the automobile without requiring him in haste and under
pressure to make close calculations about danger to himself
or the vulnerability of evidence.
Any "bright line" rule does involve costs. Belton trades
marginal privacy of containers within the passenger area of
an automobile for protection of the officer and of destructible
evidence. The balance of these interests strongly favors the
Court's rule. The occupants of an automobile enjoy only a
limited expectation of privacy in the interior of the automobile itself. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States. 413 U. S.
266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). This limited interest is diminished further when the occupants are placed
under custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414
U. S. 218, 237 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring). Immediately preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control over the entire interior of the automobile, and can place
weapons or contraband into pockets or other containers as the
officer approaches. Thus, practically speaking, it is difficult
to justify varying degrees of protection for the general interior
of the car and for the various containers found within. These
considerations do not apply to the trunk of the car, which is
2 The one significant factual difference is that Belton involved only the
passenger compartment (the "interior") of an automobile, whereas this
case involves search of the trunk.
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not within the control of the passengers either immediately
before or during the process of arrest.

B
Although petitioner Robbins was arrested, this case was
litigated only on the question whether the officers needed a
warrant to open a sealed, opaquely wrapped container in the
rear compartment of a station wagon. The plurality treats this
situation as identical with that in United S tates v. Chadwick,
433 U. S. 1 (1977) , and Sanders, supra, which addressed warrantless searches of a double-locked footlocker and personal
luggage respectively. Thus, the pluraliti"opinion in this case
concerns itself primarily with the kinds of containers requiring a warrant for their search when police have probable cause
to search them. and where there has been no arrest. For 7
reasons explained more fully below, I will share the pluralit;~
assumption that the police had probable cause to search the
container rather than the automobile ~enerally. Viewing this
as a "container case," I concur in the judgment.
Chadwick and Sanders require police to obtain a warrant
to search the contPnts of a container only when the container
is one that p:enerally serves as a repository for personal effects
or that has been sealed in a manner manifesting a reasonable
expectation that the contents will not be open to p11blic srrutiny. See Chadwirk, supra. at 13; Sanders. supra, at 764.
See. e. g.. Um"ted States v. Mannino, 605 F. 2d 110. 114 (CA2
19RO): Unit ed States v. Goshnrn. 62~ F. 2d 697, 700- 701
(CAl 1980); United States v. Mackey, 626 F. 2d 684. 6R7- 688
(CA9 1980); United States v. Ross, - U. S. App. D. C.-,
F. 2d - , (1981) (en bane) (Tamm, J. , dissenting).
This resembles in principle the inquiry courts must undertak,e
to determine whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment ri~rhts of a complaining party. See Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U. S. 128 (1978); id., at 150- 152 (PowELL. J ., concurring). In each instance, "[t]he ultimate question . . . is
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whether one's claim to privacy from government intrusion is
reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances." Ibid.;
see Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967).
The plurality's approach today departs from this basic concern with interests in privacy, and adopts a mechanical requirement for a warrant before police may search any closed container. Nothing in Chadwick or Sanders justifies this extreme extension of the warrant requirement. Indeed, the
Court in Sanders explicitly foreclosed that reading:
"There will be difficulties in determining which parcels
taken from an automobile require a warrant for their
search and which do not. Our decision in this case
means only that a warrant generally is required before
personal lup;gage can be searched and that the extent to
which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and
other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are
seized from an automobile." 442 U. S., at 765, n. 13.
While the plurality's blanket warrant requirement does not
even purport to protect any privacy interest, it would impose
substantial new burdens on law enforcement. Confronted
with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course of a probable
cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the conscientious
policem:m would be required to take the ob.iect to a magistratP, fill out the appropriate forms, await the decision, and
fina.llv obtain the warrant. Suspects or vehirlrs norma1ly
will be detained while the warrant is sought. This proress
may take hours. removing the officer from his normal police
duties. Expenditure of such time and effort, drawn from the
p11blic's limited resources for detecting or preventing crimes,
is justified when it protects an individual's reasonable privacy
interests. In my view, the plurality's requirement cannot be so
justified. The aggregate burden of procuring warrants whenever an officer has probable ca11se to search the most. trivial
container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the
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advancement of important Fourth Amendment values. The
sole virtue of the plurality's rule is simplicity.3
3 The plurality overestimates the difficulties involved in determining
whether a party has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular
container. Many containers, such as personal luggage, are "inevitably
associated with the expectation of privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders, supra,
at 762. Many others, varying ·from a plastic cup to the ubiquitous brown
paper grocery sack, consistently lack such an association. In the middle
are containers, such as cardboard boxes and laundry bags, that may be
used, although imperfectly, as repositories of personal effects, but often
are not. As to such containers, I would adopt the view of Chief Judge
Coffin:
"[W]e disagree that the mere possibility of such use leads to the conclusion that such containers are 'inevitably' associated with an expectation of privacy. The many and varied uses of these containers that entail
no expectation of privacy militate against applying a presumption that
a warrantless search of such a container violates the Fourth Amendment.''
United States v. Goshorn, supra, 628 F. 2d, at 700.
When confronted with the claim that police should have obtained a warrant before searching an ambiguous container, a court should conduct a
hearing to determine whether the defendant had manifested a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the container. See id., at 701.
Relevant to such an inquiry should be the size, shape, material, and condition of the exterior, the context within which it is discovered, and
whether the possessor had taken some significant precaution, such as
locking, securely sealing or binding the container, that .indicates a desire
to prevent the contents from being d.isplayed upon simple mischance. A
prudent officer will err on the side of respecting ambigous assertions of
privacy, see Rafcas v. Illinois, supra, 439 tJ. S., at 152, n. 1 (PowELL, J.;
concurrin11;), and a realistic court . seldom should second-guess the good
faith judgment of the officer iu the field when the public consequently
must suffer from the suppression of probative evidence, cf. Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 611-612 (1975) (PowELL, J., concurring).
In this case, petitioner, by securely wrapping and sealing his package,
had manifested a desire that the public not casually observe the contents.
See ante, at 1-2, n. 1. Our society's traditional respect for the privacy of
locked or sealed containers confirms the reasonableness of this expectation.
See Ex parte Jackson, 97 U. S. 727, 733 (1878) (warrant required for'
postal inspectors to open sealed packages sent thorugh mail). See also
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970) .
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c
The dissenters argue, with some justice, that the controlling
question should be the scope of the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement. In their view, when the police have
probable cause to search an automobile, rather than only to
search a particular container that fortuitously is located in it,
the exigencies that allow the police to search the entire automobile without a warrant support the warrantless search of
every container found therein. See post, at 8 & n. 13 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting). This analysis is entirely consistent with the
holdings in Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which is an
"automobile case," because the police there had probabl~
cause to search the double-locked footlocker and the suitcase
respectively before either ca,me near an automobile. See
Chadwick, supra, at 11; Sanders, supra, at 761; see also id.,
at 766 (BuRGER, C. J., concurring). Adoption of the dissenters' view would require, however, rejection of a good deal
of the reasoning in the latter: case.
Resolving this case by expanding the scope of the automo·bile exception is attractive not so much for its logical virtue,
but because it may provide ground for agreement by a majority of the presently fractured Court on an approach that
would give more specific guidance to police and courts in this
recurring situation-one that has led to incessant litigation.
I note, however, that this benefit would not be realized fully,
as courts may find themselves deciding when probable cause
ripened, or whether suspicion focused on the container or on
the car in which it traveled.
The parties have not pressed this argument in this case and
it is late in the Term for us to undertake sua sponte reconsideration of basic doctrines. Given these constraints, I adhere to statements in Sanders that the fact that the container
mas seized from an automobile is irrelevant to the question
whether a warrant is needed to search its contents. Some
future case affording an opportunity for more thorough con-
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sideration of the basic principles at risk may offer some better,
if more radical, solution to the confusion that infects this
benighted area of the law/

4 We have an institutional responsibility not only to respect stare decisis
but also to make every reasonable effort to harmonize our views on constitutional questions of broad practical application.

5AU{

~d DRAFT

I

SUPREME COURT

bF THE UNITED STATES

l . ..

No. 8.0-lf8

Jeffrey Richard Robbins,
Pet'tion~
'
' On Wpt of Certloran to the Count
1
'
of Appeal of California, First
v.. f
Appellate Di~triot.
·State of Cali ornia.
[June -, 1;981]

j

JusTICE PowELL, concurrin~
The Court's judgment is justified, though not compelled,
'by the Court's opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 75@
(1979). Accordingly, I join the judgment. As the
today goes well beyond Sanders or any other prior case to
establish a new "bright line" r~le, I cannot ' join its opinion. 1
It would require officers to obtain warrants in order to examine the contents of insubstantial containers in which no
one had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The e~
approach strains the rationales of our prior cases and imposes
substantial burdens on law enforcement without vindicating
any significant values of privacy. I nevertheless concur in
the judgment because the manner 'in which the package at
issue was carefully wrapped and sealed evidenced petitioner's
expectation of privacy in its contents. As we have stressed
in prior decisions, a central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard reasonable expectations of privacy.
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"bright-line" rule would extend the warrant clause of the
Fourth Amendment to every "closed, opaque container," without regard
}
/
to s:ze, shape or whether common experience would suggest t
he owner
U f'd /
was asserting a privacy interest in the contents. The
would exempt
-from the broad· reach of its rule only those "closed, OJ aque containers"
where, because of shape or some other characteristic, the "contents may
be said to be in plain view." In accordance with the
's usage I use
t( r~
LI )
the term "container" to include any and all packages, ba~g;B;s,:o<}x'es;tms;--tJ.~~~_:_~./2_~
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Having reached this decision on the facts of this case, I
recognize-as the dissenting opinions find it easy to proclaim-that the law of search and seizure with respect to
automobiles is intolerably confusing. The Court apparently
cannot agree even on what it has held previously, let alone
on how these cases should be decided. Much of this difficulty
comes from the necessity of applying the general command
of the Fourth Amendment to ever-varying facts; more may
stem from the often unpalatable consequences of the exclusionary rule, which spur the Court to reduce its analysis to
simple mechanical rules so that the constable has a fighting
chance not to blunder.
This case and New York v. Belton,- U. S. (1981),
decided today, involve three different Fourth Amendment
questions that arise in automobile cases: (A) the scope of the
search incident to arrest on the public highway; (B) whether
officers must obtain a warrant when they have probable cause
to search a particular container in which the suspect has a
reasonable expectation of privacy; and, (C) the scope of the
"automobile exception" to the warrant requirement, which
potentially includes all areas of the car and containers found
therein. These issues frequently are intertwined, as the similar facts of these cases suggest: both involve the stop of an
automobile upon probable cause, the arrest of the occupants,
the search of the automobile, and the search of a personal
container found therein. Nonetheless, the cases have been
litigated and presented to us under entirely different theories.
Intelligent analysis cannot proceed unless the issues are addressed separately. Viewing similar facts from entirely different perspectives need not lead to identical resufts.
A
I have joined the Court's opinion in Belton because I con-·
eluded· that a "bright li.ne" rule was necessary in the quite
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different circumstances addressed there. 2 Belton, unlike this
case, concerns only the exception to the warrant requirement
for a search incident to arrest; contrary to JusTICE STEVENS'~
implication, post, at - , the courts below never found that
j _;
the officer had probable cause to search the automobile. ~
l':fJ "1
presents the volatile and fluid situation of an encounter b~ C
tween an arresting officer and a suspect apprehended on the
public highway. While Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752
(1969), determines in principle the scope of a warrantless
search incident to arrest, practical necessity re uires that we
allow an officer in these circumstances to secure thoroughly
the automobile without requiring him in haste and under
pressure to make close calculations about danger to himself
or the vulnerability of evidence.
Any "bright line" rule does involve costs. Belton trades
marginal privacy of containers within the passenger area of
'
an automobile for protection of the officer and of destruct~~
evidence. The balance of these interests strongly favors the
Court's rule. The occupants of an automobile enjoy only a
limited expectation of privacy in the interior of the automobile itself. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S.
266, 279 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring). This limited interest is diminished further when the occupants are placed
under custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414
U. S. 218, 237 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring). Immediately preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete con~ver the entire interior of the automobile, and can place
u ~ weapons or contraband into pockets or other containers
')
as the officer approaches. Thus, practically speakin , it is
difficult to justify varyin degrees of protection for Wf!l!Rt~ J
to~~'
~ntairrers and t e general interior of t e ca
ese cons1 erations do not apply to the trunk of the ar, which is not VJ-Y'M/IJ Ct?fd~

/Je

I-t)
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The one significant factual difference is that B elton involved only the
passenger compartment (the "interior") of an automobile, whereas this
case involves search of the trunk.
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the control of the passengers either immediately before or during the process of arrest.

t

B
Although petitioner Robbins was arrested, this case was
litigated only on the question whether the officers needed a
warrant to open a sealed, opaquely wrapped container in the ~/vtr J/it..
rear compartment of a station wagon. The ~ f.i::_
d
../
situation as identical with that in United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1 (1977), and Sanders, supra, which addressed warrantless searches of a double-locked footlocker and personal
luggage respectively. Thus, the
opinion in t IS case
concerns itse'lf primarily with the kinds of containers requiring a warrant for their search when police have probable cause
to search them, and where there has been no arrest. For
reasons explained more fully below, I will share the
'
assumption that the police had probable cause to search the
container rather than the automobile generally. Viewing thls
as a "container case," I concur in the judgment.
Chadwick and Sanders require police to obtain a warrant
to search the contents of a container only when the conta!ner .
is one that generally serves as a repository for personal effects
or that has been sealed in a manner manifesting a reasonable
expectation that the contents will not be open to public scrutiny. See Chadwick, supra, at 13; Sanders, supra, at 764.
See, e. g. , United States v. Mannino , 635 F. 2d 110, 114 (CA2
1980); United States v. Goshorn , 62S F. 2d 697, 700-701
(CAl 1980); United States v. Mackey, 626 F. 2d 684. 687-688
(CA9 1980); United States v. Ross, - U. S. App. D. C. - ,
- F . 2d - , - (1981) (en bane) (Tamm, J. , dissenting).
This resembles in principle the inquiry courts must undertake
to determine whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment ril!hts of a complaining party. See Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U. S. 128 (1978); id., at 150- 152 (PowELL, J., concurring). In each instance, "[t]he ultimate question . . . is
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·whether one's claim to privacy from government intrusion is
reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances." Ibid. ;
see Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967).
The
approac o ay eparts from this basic concern
'th interests in privacy, and adopts a mechanical require. ment for a warrant before police may search any closed con ..
tainer. Nothing in Chadwick or Sanders justifies this ex..
· treme extension of the warrant requirement. Indeed, the
Court in Sanders explicitly foreclosed that reading:
"There will be difficulties in determining which parcels
taken from an automobile require a warrant for their
search and which do not. Our decision in this case
means only that a warrant generally is required before
personal luggage can be searched and that the extent to
which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and
other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are
)
/ it..J
seized from an automobile." 442 U. S., at 765, n. 13.
,..-:-:--:JUi'J 1 yS
While the ~~ blanket warrant requireme t aoes not '-'~------.
even purport to protect any privacy interest, i impose sub- j
/.' J
s ntantial new burdens on law enforcement.
on ronte
(}:v ~ /,1 Cf
with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course of a probable
cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the conscientious
policeman would be required to take the object to a magistrate. fill out the appropriate forms , await the decision, and
finally obtain the warrant. Suspects or vehiclPs normally
will be deta.ined while the warrant is so11ght. This proress
may take hours. removing the officer from his normal police
duties. Expenditure of such time and effort. drawn from the
pnblic's limited resources for det.ed,ing or preventing; crimes,
, it? _/;" ~d.~ ~is justified when it protects an individual's reasonable privacy
interPsts. In my view, the C~ requirement cannot be so
/~ ~..
justified. The aggregate burden of procuring warrants whenever an officer has probable cal1se to search the most. trivial
container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the
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advancement of important F
mendment values.
sole virtue of the
rule is simplicity. 3

c
The dissenters argue, with some justice, that the controlling
question should be the scope of the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement. In their view, when the police have
probable cause to search an automobile, rather than only to
search a particular container that fortuitously is located in it,
overestimates the difficulties involved in determining
whether a party has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular
container. Many containers, such as personal luggage, are "inevitably
associated with the expectation of privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders, supra,
at 762. Many others, varying from a plastic cup to the ubiquitous brown
paper grocery sack, consistently lack such an association. In the middle
are containers, such as cardboard boxes and laundry bags, that may be
used, although imperfectly, as repositories of personal effects, but often
are not. As to such containers, I would adopt the view of Chief Judge
Coffin:
"[Wle disagree that the mere possibility of such use leads to the conclusion that such containers are 'inevitably' associated with an expectation of privacy. The many and varied usc$ of these containers that entail
no expectation of privacy militate against applying a presumption that
a warrnntiC'~s srarch of such a container violates the Fourth Amendment."
United States v. Goshorn, supra, 628 F. 2d, at 700.
When confronted with the cla im that police should have obtained a warrant before searching an ambiguous container, a court should conduct a
hearing to determine whC'lher the defendant had manifested a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contcnts of the container. See id., at 701.
Relevant to such an inquiry should be the sizC', shape, material, and condition of the exterior, the context within which it is discovered, and
whether the possessor had taken some significant precaution, such as
locking, securely scaling or binding the container, that indicatcs a desire
to prevent the contents from being displayed upon simple mischance. A
prudent officer will err on the side of respecting ambigous assertions of
privacy, see Rokas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U. S., at 152, n. ~ _
~
concurring), and a realistic court seldom should second [isuess the go~d ......____faith judgment of the officer in the field when the pubhc consequently
must suffer from the suppression of probative evidence, cf. Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 611-612 (1975) (PowELL, J., concurring).
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the exigencies that allow the police to search the entire automobile without a warrant support the warrantle se ch
every container found therein. See post, at
(STEVENS,
J., dissenting). This analysis is entirely consistent with the
holdings in Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which is an
"automobile case," because the olice there had probable
cause to search the doubl · loc ed footlocker and the suitcase
respectively before either came near an automobile. See
Chadwick, supra, at 11; Sanders, supra, at 761; see also id.,
at 766 (BURGER, C. J. , concurring). Adoption of the dissenters' view would require, however, rejection of a good deal
of the reasoning in the latter case.
Resolving this case by expanding the scope of the automobile exception is attractive not so much for its logical virtue,
but because it may provide ground for agreement by a majority of the presently fractured Court on an approach that
would give more specific guidance to police and courts in this
recurring situation-one that has led to incessant Jitigation.
I note, however, that this benefit would not be realized fully,
as courts may find themselves deciding when probable cause
ripened, or whether suspicion focused on the ~ or on \.
the car in which it traveled.
~~· ~ \C OJ-, J I h t' r
The parties have not pressed this argument in this case and
it is late in the Term for us to undertake sua sponte reconsideration of basic doctrines. Given these constraints, I adhere to statements in Sanders that the fact that the container
was seized from the ~rttnk of-all automobile is irrelevant to
the question whether a warrant is needed to search its contents. Some future case affording an opportunity for more
thorough consideration of the basic principles at risk may
offer some better, if more radical, solution to the confusion
~ infects this benighted area of the law. 4
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practical application,
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JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment.
The Court's judgment is justified, though not compelled;
by the Court's opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 756
(1979). Accordingly, I join the judgment. As the plurality
today goes well beyond Sanders or any other prior case to
establish a new "bright line" rule, I cannot join its opinion. 1
It would require officers to obtain warrants in order to examine the contents of insubstantial containers in which no
( 0one had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The pluralitu---approach strains the rationales of our prior cases and imposes
substantial burdens on law enforcement without vindicating
any significant values of privacy. I nevertheless concur in
the judgment because the manner in which the package at
issue was carefully wrapped and scaled evidenced petitioner's
expectation of privacy in its contents. As we have stressed
in prior decisions, a central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard reasonable expectations of privacy.
r--------~1 ....J1u'h~e~l~u:_::ra~li~tvo"bright-line" rule would extend the warrant clause of the

Fourth Amen ment to every "closed, opaque container," without regard
to s'ze, shape or whrther common experience would sugge~t that the owner
was asserting a privacy interc'st in the contents. The plurality would exempt from the board rrach of its rule only tho~e "clo8ccl, opaque containers" where, because of shape or some other characlpri~tir, the "contents
may be said to be in plain view." In accordance with the plura lit y's us:1ge
I use the term "container" to iucluclc any and all packages, bags, boxes,
tins, bottles and the like .
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Having reached this decision on the facts of this case, I
recognize-as the dissenting opinions find it easy to proclaim-that the law of search and seizure with respect to
automobiles is intolerably confusing. The Court apparently
cannot agree even on what it has held previously, let alone
on how these cases should be decided. Much of this difficulty
comes from the necessity of applying the general command
of the Fourth Amendment to ever-varying facts; more may
stem from the often unpalatable consequences of the exclusionary rule, which spur the Court to reduce its analysis to ·
simple mechanical rules so that the constable has a fighting
chance not to blunder.
This case and New Yorlc v. B elton, U. S. (1981),
decided today, involve three different Fourth Amendment
questions that arise in automobile cases: (A) the scope of the
search incident to arrest on the public highway; (B) ·whether
officers must obtain a warrant when they have probable cause
to search a particular container in which the suspect has a
reasonable expectation of privacy; and, (C) the scope of the
"automobile exception" to the warrant requirement, which
potentially includes all areas of the car and containers found
therein. These issues frequently are intert,vinecl , as the similar facts of these cases su~gcst: both involve the stop of an
automobile upon probable cause, the arrest of the occupants,
the search of the automobile. and the search of _a personal
container found therein. Nonetheless. the cases have been
liti~ated and presented to us under entirely different theories.
Intel1igent analysis cannot proceed unless the issues are addressed separately. Viewing similar facts from entirely different perspectives need not lead to identical results.
A

I have joined the Court's opinion in Belton because I concluded that a "bright line" rule was necessary in the quite
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different circumstances addressed there. 2 Belton, unlike this
case, concerns only the exception to the warrant requirement
for a search incident to arrest; contrary to JusTICE STEVENs'
implication , post, at-, the courts below never found that the
officer had probable cause to search the automobile. Belton
presents the volatile and fluid situation of an encounter between an arresting officer and ·a suspect apprehended on the
public highway. While Chimel v. C~lifornia, 395 U. S. 752
(1969), determines in principle the scope of a warrantless
search incident to arrest, practical necessity requires that we
allow an officer in these circumstances to secure thoroughly
the automobile without requiring him in haste and under
pressure to make close calculations about danger to himself
or the vulnerability of evidence.
Any "bright line" rule does involve costs. Belton trades
marginal privacy of containers within the passenger area of
an automobile for protection of the officer and of destructible
evidence. The balance of these interests strongly favors the
Court's rule. The occupants of an automobile enjoy only a
limited expectation of privacy in the interior of the automobile itself. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States. 413 U. S.
266, 279 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring). This limited interest is diminished further when the occupants are placed
under custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414
U. S. 218, 237 (HJ73) (PowELL, J., concurring). Immediately preceding the arrest, the passengers have complete control over the entire interior of the automobile. and can place
weapons or contraband into pockets or other containers as the
officer approaches. Thus, practically speaking. it is difficult
to justify varving degrees of protection for the general intPrior
of the car and for the various containers found within. These
considerations do not apply to the trunk of the car, which is
2 The one significant factual diiTerence is that Belton involved only the
passenger compartment (the "interior") of nn automobile, whereas this
case involves search of the trunk.
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not within the control of the passengers either immediately
before or during the process of arrest.

B
Although petitioner Robbins was arrested. this case was
litigated only on the question whether the officers needed a
warrant to open a sealed, opaquely wrapped container in the
rear compartment of a station wagon. The plurality treats this
situation as identical with that in United States v. Chadwick,
433 U. S. 1 (1977), and Sanders, supra, which addres~ed war- J lr
rantless searches of a double-locked footlocker~ personal ~
luggage respectively. Thus, the pluralit~n in thrs case
concerns itself primarily with the kinds of containers requiring a warrant for their search when police have probable cause
to search them. and where th0re has been no arrest. For 7
reasons explained more fully below, I will share the pluralit;~
assumption that the police had probable cause to search the
container rather than the automobile generally. Viewing this
as a "container ca~c." I concur in the judgment.
Chadwick and Sanders require police to obtain a warrant
to search the cont<:•nts of a container only when the container
is one that generally serves as a repository for personal cffcr.ts
or that has b0en scaled in a manner manifesting a rf'~sonable
expectation that the contents will not be open to ]wblic srrutiny. See Chad·wirlc, supra. at 13: Sanders. supra. at 7Ci4.
See. e. (J .. United States v. Mannhw. 5~5 F. 2d 110. 114 (CA2
HlRO): United States v. Goshnrn. G2~ F. 2d 607. 700-701
(CAl 1980); Un.;ted States v. Mack ey, G25 F. 2d 584. GR7-5S8
(CArl Hl80); United States v. Ross.- U.S. Anp. D. C.-,
- F . 2d - , - (10Rl) (en bane) (Tamm, J., dissenting).
This resembles in principle the inquiry courts must undertake
to determine whether a senrch violates the Fourth Amendment rights of a complaining 11arty. See Rakas v. lllino·is,
439 U. S. 128 (1978); id., at 150-152 (Powr•:LL. J., concurring). In each instance, "[t]he ultimate question . . . is
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whether one's claim to privacy from government intrusion is
reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances." Ibid.;
see Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1!)67).
The plurality's approach today departs from this basic concern with interests in privacy, and adopts a mechanical requirement for a warrant before police may search any closed container. Nothing in Chadwick or Sanders justifies this extreme extension of the warrant requirement. Indeed, the
Court in Sanders explicitly foreclosed that reading:
"There will be difficulties in determining which parcels
taken from an automobile require a warrant for their
search and which do not. .Our decision in this case
means only that a warrant generally is required before
personal luggage can be searched and that the extent to
which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and
other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are
seized from an automobile." 442 U. S., at 765, n. 13.
While the plurality's blanket warrant requirement does not
evPn purport to protect any privacy interest, it would impose
substantial new burdens on law enforcement. Confronted
with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in the course of a probable
cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the conscientious
policem:m would be rr quired to take the ob.iect to a magistratP, fill out the appropriate forms. await the decision. and
fin allv obtain the warrant. Suspects or vehieks normally
will be detained while the warrnnt is so11ght. This proress
may take ho11rs. removing the officer from his normal polire
duties. Exnenditnre of such time and effort. drawn from the
p11b1ir.'s limited resource's for deterting or preventing rr;mes,
is iustified when it protects nn individnal's reasonable privacy
interests. In my view. the plurality's requirement cannot be so
justified. The aggregate bmdcn of procuring wnrrants whenever an officer hac; probable cn11se to search the most. trivial
container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the

- ...

'I(

..

I"

..

loU

'

.•,

•:;

.~

80-148-CONCUR (A)
ROBBINS v. CALIFORNIA

6
·l
1

!

advancement of important Fourth Amendment values.
sole virtue of the plurality's rule is simplicity. 8
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The plurality overest imates the difficulti es involved in determining
whether a party has a rea sonable expectation of privacy in a particular
contain er. Many containers, such as personal luggage, are "inevitably
associated with the expectation of privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders, supra,
at 762. Many others, varying from a plastic cup to the ubiquitous brown
paper grocery sack, consistently lack such an association. In the middle
are containers, such as cardboard boxes and laundry bags, that may be
used, although imperfectly, as repositories of personal effects, but often
are not. As to such containers, I would adopt the view of Chief Judge
Coffin:
"[W]e disagree that the mere possibility of such use leads to the conclusion that such containers arc 'inevitably' associated with nn expectation of privncy. Thr many and varied uses of these containers that entail
no expectntion of privacy militate against applying a presumption that
a warrantless search of such a containrr violates the Fourth Amendment."
United States v. Goshorn, supra, G28 F. 2d, at 700.
When confronted with the claim that police should have obtnined a warrant before sea rching; an amh ignon~ container, a court should conduct a
hearing to determine '"hether the defendant had manifested a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the contniner. See id., at 701.
Relevant to such an inquiry should be the size, shape, mntcrial, nnci conclition of the exterior, the context within which it is discovered, and
whether the possrs~or had taken Rome signiflc:mt prrra ution, such as
locking, securely sra ling or binding the conlniner, that indicntrs a desire
to prevent the contents from b eing clisplayed upon ~im]>le mi ~chnnce. A
prudent offircr will err on the ~i~lr of rr~pcc t ing ambigons assertions of
privacy, see Rakas v. l/linois, supra, 43!) U. S., at 152, n. 1 (PowELL, ,T .,
concurrin:;r), and a reali ~ t ic comt ~rlclom Rhonlrl second-guess the good
faith judgment of the officer in the flrlcl when the ]mblic ron~cquently
must su!Tr r from lhe snpprr~'ion of probative evidence, cf. Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U. S. 5!)0, 611-612 (Hl75) (Pmn:u,, J., concurring).
In thiR cnse, pet ition er, by ~ccnrcly wrapping nnd Re:-tling his pnrkngc,
ktd m:~nifPsted :1 drsirc that thr public not c:~~Hnlly ob~Nvr tlw rontents.
Src antr, at 1-2 , n. 1. Onr soPirty's tr:~dition n l rrRprrt for the priYnry of
lor·kcd or ~rnl rd <'Oilt~tinrr~ ronfirms thr rra~onablrness of this rxprrtntion.
Sec Ex 7W1'te Jad.-son, !)7 U. S. 7'27, 733 (1L7c) (warrant rcf)uired for'
po~tal in ~ pPctors to open ~en led pnekngcs ~enl thorugh mail). See nlso
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) .
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The dissenters argue, with some justice, that the controlling
question should be the scope of tl1e automobile exception to
the warrant requirement. In their view, when the police have
probable cause to search an automobile, rather than only to
search a particular container that fortuitously is located in it,
the exigencies that allow the police to search the entire automobile without a warrant support the warrantless search of
every container found therein. See post, at 8 & n. 13 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting). This analysis is entirely consistent with the
holdings in Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which is a~
"automobile case," because the police there had probable,
cause to search the double-locked footlocker and the suitcase
respectively before either came near an automobile. See
Chadwick, supra, at 11; Sanders, supra, at 761; see also id.,
at 766 (BuRGEH, C. J., concurring). Adoption of the dissenters' view would require, however, rejection of a good deal
of the reasoning in the latter case.
Resolving this case by expanding the scope of the automobile exception is attractive not so much for its logical virtue,
but because it may provide ground for agreement by a majority of the presently fractured Court on an approach that
would give more specific guidance to police and courts in this
recurring situation-one that has led to incessant litigation.
I note, however. that this benefit would not be realized fully,
as court.s may find themselves deciding when probable cause
ripened, or whether suspicion focused on the container or on
the car in which it traveled.
The parties have not pressed this argument in this case and
it is late in the Term for us to undertake sua sponte reconsideration of basic doctrines. Given these constraints, I adhere to statements in Sanders that the fact that the contniner
mas seized from an automobile is irrelevant to the question
whether a warrant is needed to search its contents. Some
future case affording an opportunity for more thorough con-
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sideration of the basic principles at risk may offer some better,
if more radical, solution to the confusion that infects this
benighted area of the law, 4

We have an institutional re~ pon s ibilily not only to respect ~tare decisis
but abo to make every rea~o nable dl'orL lo harmonize our YiCWti on constitutional questions of broad practic:1l application .
4
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